

INTRODUCTION
TO
The Purva Mimamsa.
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PREFACE.

Modern students of Indian Darsanas do not, as a rule, study the Purva Mimamsa as a separate system. Grammar has its life long devotees, the Nyaya and the Vedanta have their specialists but the Purva-Mimamsa is without any such ardent and enthusiastic adherents. The neglect into which it has fallen may be traced to three principal causes. The sacrificial system of the Vedas, the main theme of the Purva-Mimamsa, being no longer in force, it is thought unnecessary to study the Shastra that chiefly deals with it. Secondly, the Mimamsa is regarded as less attractive and magnificent than some of the other systems of Indian Philosophy. Lastly, the doctrines of the Mimamsa have been largely discussed in other systems, and so, the student thinks that, by studying any such system, he will have an adequate knowledge of the Mimamsa. As a matter of fact, it is only the principles of interpretation of the Purva-Mimamsa that still continue to attract attention, and this is so because they are in evidence in almost all the branches of Sanskrit Literature and are indispensable to the interpretation and proper understanding of many an abstruse and ambiguous text. This general and continued neglect has resulted in the growth and prevalence of various, erroneous notions about the doctrines and character of the Purva-Mimamsa, so much

so that even its title to be considered as a Darshana has often been called in question.

But the Purva-Mimamsa has the right to demand greater attention from the students of Indian Philosophy. The Mimamsa and the Nyaya are systems that had their origin far back in the dim past. There is evidence that the Naiyayikas, the Mimamsakas and the Buddhists were long engaged in controversy with one another. We have not had the opportunity of ascertaining how the Mimamsa doctrines were represented in the works of the Buddhistic Schools, but in the works of the Mimamsakas as well as in those of the Naiyayikas, the tenets of the rival systems have been freely attacked and discussed. The School of Navya (modern) Nyaya, the works of which throw much light on the doctrines of the Mimamsa, owes its development mainly to its criticism and discussion of these Mimamsa doctrines. But, however elaborate these discussions, we cannot always rely on them for a correct representation of the views which are criticised and refuted therein. Apart from the fact that in the heat of controversy, things are scarcely seen in their proper perspective, it is impossible to gain an accurate and systematic knowledge from garbled and imperfect representations. To kill two birds with a single stone is a feat which can very rarely be performed, and the student, who would pick up an adequate knowledge of

the Mimamsa while studying one of the rival systems, must not expect to have more than a nodding and imperfect, if not erroneous, acquaintance with the doctrines and principles of the Mimamsa. If he is at all desirous of obtaining a thorough mastery of the subject, he must devote himself wholly to its study.

Quite recently, the difficulties that confronted a Mimamsa student have been, to some extent, removed. Of the two chief Schools of the Mimamsa, we had the works of the Bhatta school, while it was thought that the works of the Prabhakara School had succumbed to the ravages of time. Thanks to the unwearied efforts of Dr. Ganganath Jha, three important works of the Prabhakara School viz, (1) *Brhati*, the great exposition of Shabara Swamin's *Bhasya* by Prabhakara himself, a work which, unfortunately, is extant only in an incomplete form (2) the *Rjurimala*, a commentary on the *Brhati* by Shalikanatha Mishra and (3) the *Prakaranapanchika*, dealing mostly with the epistemological and metaphysical views of the School, have been unearthed. Besides these three books, some other works of this School have also been found. Of these, one, Bhavanath Mishra's *Nayaviveka*, has been referred to in the present work. These publications have removed the complaint about the scantiness and insufficiency of the Mimamsa literature.

European scholars of the Mimamsa had another

difficulty in their way. Formerly, Colebrooke's essay on the Mimamsa was the only source on which scholars as well as students of Indian Philosophy had to draw for information. This essay does not contain a proper delineation of the subject and is not, therefore, fully trustworthy. Herein, too, by his book on the Prabhakara Mimamsa and his translations of some of the most important works of the Mimamsa literature, Dr. Jha, for the first time, gave much valuable information regarding the tenets not only of the Prabhakara but also of the Kumarila School. In fact Dr. Jha is really the pioneer in the field, and every student of the Mimamsa must be under a deep debt of obligation to him.

Since the said publication of Dr. Jha, a few handbooks, etc, have appeared which purport to deal with the doctrines of the Mimamsa. Unfortunately, however, these mark very little advance on the work of Dr. Jha. As a matter of fact, in most cases they are but echoes and repetitions of his statements and views. Dr. Jha's interpretations and views, cannot, however, be taken to be the last word on the Mimamsa. The subject is difficult and intricate; the doctrines have been represented for a long time in several antagonistic schools in a number of ways, and traditional interpretations are mostly lost. In these circumstances, it must be evident to everyone that there is much room

for difference of opinion and much scope for research-work.

The vastness of the subject has compelled me to confine myself to a limited area. I have introduced here only four principal topics, viz, validity of knowledge, Atman, God and Liberation. In dealing with these topics, I have always tried to be as independent in my judgments as I could be. Many new features will, I hope, be found in this book, of which the following may be mentioned :

(1) I have tried to ascertain precisely the claims of the Purva-Mimamsa to be called a *Darshana* in a manner not to be found elsewhere.

(2) I have tried to show that many conclusions of Kumarila and Prabhakara which are regarded as the characteristic doctrines of the Mimamsakas are only apparent conclusions, but in reality are nothing but protests against the views of the rival systems.

(3) I have tried to refute the belief that the Purva Mimamsa is an atheistical system, and to establish that the Mimamsakas admit that God is the Creator, is the custodian of the Vedas and is an object of worship.

(4) It has been concluded by my predecessors in the field that according to the Mimamsakas, Atman is not self-illuminated, but I have tried to establish that the *Bhottas* regard Atman as self-illuminated and cognition as an object of inference, and that one section at least.

if not all, of the Prabhakaras, holds the same view.

(5) I have tried to show, in opposition to my predecessors, that the Prabhakara view of Liberation is not the same as the Bhattacharya view, but that the means of attaining Liberation viz, the combination of Jnana and Karma, is the same in both the Schools.

(6) The Purva-Mimamsa and the Uttara-Mimamsa are believed by some to be parts of the same system, while others think that they are antagonistic to each other; I have tried to show that they respectively represent two distinct kinds of culture (purification of the mind and absence of worldly desires) of which one is preliminary to the other, that both Kumarila and Prabhakara indicate that finer ideas about Atman, etc, are to be gathered from the Vedanta while the Advaitins admit the necessity of the Purva-Mimamsa principles for present practical purposes.

(7) I have tried to show on internal evidence that the Uttara-Mimamsa Sutras first came into existence and that Jaimini adopted many theories of the Uttara-Mimamsa, such as the theory of the existence of non-corporeal Atman, without propounding them separately.

(8) I have not touched any question regarding the treatment of sacrificial matters, but at the end of the work I have added a dissertation on the application of the Mimamsa maxims to Hindu Law. I have selected

one case—the prohibition of the gift of an only son in adoption—and have tried to discuss it fully from the Mimamsa point of view, as has not been done in any other previous work.

With regard to many difficult points, the advice of my revered colleague, Pandit Ananta Krishna Shastriar, has been of incalculable help to me. Pandit Ananta Krishna Shastriar possesses a thorough mastery of both the Purva-Mimamsa and the Uttara-Mimamsa, and is entitled to be appealed to on any question connected with either of the systems. My best and sincerest thanks are, therefore, due to him. My thanks are also due to Mr. Patanjali Bhattacharya B. A. for his correcting the proofs of almost the whole book excepting the first few pages.

As I could not find a well-furnished printing-press, the printing of the book has not been, inspite of all my care, satisfactory. Sanskrit words could not be got transliterated. I have affixed a list of errors, but I do not hope that it covers all the printing mistakes. In the transliteration of certain sanskrit words, I have used *a* for *अ* and *r* for *र*.

Calcutta University,

1st June, 1923.

} PASHUPATI NATH SHASTRI.

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159	20	जगत्	जगत्
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173	21	सत्त्वाद्	सत्त्वाद्
175	10	नैमित्तिकर्म	नैमित्तिककर्मा
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4	29	Bom. Ed.	Ben. Ed.
5	28	Nayaya	Nyaya
8	26	अतिरप्रमाणम्	अतिरप्रमाणम्
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14	23	उभाभ्य	उभाभ्यां
15	17	स्वातन्त्र	स्वातन्त्र्य
16	28	प्रोचति	प्रोचति
26	29	Narayancaharya	Narayanacharya
31	12	कार्य	कार्यम्
32	21	पृथक्त्व	पृथक्त्व
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INTRODUCTION TO THE PURVA MIMAMSA.

CHAPTER I. SECTION. (A)

Is the Purva Mimamsa a Darshana?

The word, Darshana, is derived from the root, drsh (to see). It ordinarily means 'seeing.' In its technical sense it means an act of seeing which is not tainted with any falsehood, or a correct ascertainment of something perceptible or imperceptible. To make it more explicit we may define Darshana as an argumentative deliberation upon a thing of which some knowledge has been already obtained by perception, or some other means, ending in the discovery of its actual form. So there must be some previous conceptions derived either by perception or some other means to make a Darshana possible. Without such conceptions mere argumentation will stand without a basis, and will fail to effect the desired discovery. The inference arrived at after argumentation must again correspond to reality, for "there can be no formal correctness as opposed to real representation of truth.....For in the Nyaya

view the knowledge that some S is P is not true knowledge which would require a knowledge of exactly what S were P.*

The following verse states this view concisely.—
 “नानधीना नैवनिर्दिनानिर्दिता ज्ञयताः” “the correct knowledge of an object depends upon a Mana (means of proof), and the possibility of a Mana is due to a description.” Here the second ‘Mana’ undoubtedly means inference, because in the case of perception, etc., we can proceed without a description of the object. From descriptions or definitions we obtain conceptions of things and thereby we are enabled to start propositions. These preliminary conceptions are to be derived either by perception or by some means other than the inference, for, if they also are to be derived by inference there will be no limit to arguments and we shall arrive at no conclusion at all. The Sruti also says, “Atma va are Srotavyo Mantavyo, etc.”.....where Manana, i.e., deliberation is mentioned after Sravana, i.e., hearing. One should hear about Atman from the Sruti and then by deliberation, etc., obtain a full and correct knowledge of it.

We shall now see how far this definition of ‘Darshana’ applies to the Indian systems of philosophy. Brahman and Atman are, as Prof. Max Müller has said, the two pillars on which rests nearly the whole edifice of Indian philosophy. So if we examine how these two things have been dealt with in these

systems and in what way preliminary conceptions about them have been obtained, we shall be able to form an opinion as to whether these systems should be called Darshanas.

The Darshanas are said to be twelve in number of which six are known as Astika Darshanas and six as Nastika Darshanas. The six Nastika Darshanas are,—the Charvaka Darshana, the Jaina Darshana and the four Bouddha Darshanas (the Soutrantika, the Vaibhasika, the Yogachara and the Madhyamika systems.) The six Astika Darshanas are,—the Nyaya Darshana, the Vaishesika Darshana, the Sankhya-Patanjala Darshana, the Purva Mimamsa Darshana, the Seshvara Mimamsa Darshana, and the Advaita-Darshana. We do not mention here the Sankhya Darshana of Kapila as a separate Darshana, because it has been treated along with the Patanjala Darshana as forming one system with it. It is for this reason that the Yoga-Sutra-Bhasya has been described as the Samkhya, Pravachana—Bhasya. On the other hand we count the Seshvara-Mimamsa as a separate system, because it differs fundamentally from the Advaita system. It establishes the worship of Saguna (qualified) Brahman, whereas the Advaita system establishes one Nirguna (absolute) Brahman. The Purva-Mimamsa takes up the sacrificial portion of the Veda for discussion, and the Advaita system takes up the Upanisads, but the Seshvara-Mimamsa system, treats both of them together as forming one complete whole. So these three systems may otherwise be termed as

the Karma-Mimamsa, the Karma-Jnana-Mimamsa, and the Jnana-Mimamsa ; or the Purva Mimamsa the Purvottara Mimamsa, and the Uttara Mimamsa ; or the Karmakanda Darshana, the Veda Darshana and the Vedanta Darshana. As the Advaita system devotes itself exclusively to the Upanisads which are the Vedantas properly so called, we can distinguish the Advaita system as the Vedanta Darshana. The oldest available system that deserves the name, 'Sesvara-Mimamsa, is the Pashupata Darshana. The Vishistadvaita, the Shuddhadvaita, the Dvaitadvaita and the Dvaita systems are all of the same type.

Now of these twelve the six Nastika systems do not admit the existence of God. So if you take up the conception of Brahman merely, then these six systems are not Darshanas at all, judged by our standard. Let us next see how 'Atman' has been dealt with in them. The Charvaka School conceives the notion of Atman (body) from perception. It does not recognise inference as a means of proof, but according to it continued perception may be regarded as a sort of deliberation, and therefore, as far as Atman is concerned it may be called a Darshana. The Jaina and the Bouddha systems conceive the first notion of Atman from inner perception, and then they ascertain various forms and characters of Atman by deliberation. Some hold it to be as big as the body, others think that it is Shunya, while others think that it is nothing but a momentary

cognition, and so on. Hence so far as Atman is concerned they are Darshanas.

The Vaisheshikas and the Naiya'yikas have tried to establish the existence of God simply by means of inference without previously conceiving any notion of God from the Sruti or any other source. But to settle conclusively that there is one God by means of mere arguments without any preconceived notion is impossible. Hence as far as the knowledge of God is concerned these two systems cannot be properly called Darshanas. The Patanjala system does not derive any conception of God from the Sruti, but it prescribes processes of Yoga which will make a supernatural perception of God possible. Though deliberation is not considered as the means of seeing God still it is included in the processes. So strictly speaking this system is not a Darshana, so far as God is concerned, There is this difference between the Naiyayika, the Vaisheshika and the Patanjala systems that while the first two hold that a true knowledge of God will be the result of deliberation the last one holds that God can be made visible by carrying out the prescribed processes of Yoga.

The Purva Mimamsa derives the first conception of God from the Sruti. It does not believe that the true form of God is visible through deliberations, but it holds that a correct knowledge of God is possible by that means. The Seshwara Mimamsa derives the first conception of God from the Sruti. It holds that God is knowable through deliberations, and

visible through meditation, etc. In the Advaita system the first conception of the identity of God and Atman is taken from the Sruti. It propounds that the one real thing is visible through proper deliberations. Hence so far as God is concerned these three systems are Darshanas.

According to the Nyaya, the Vaishesika and the Patanjala systems the first conception of Atman and its attributes is to be derived from inner perception, but the true form of Atman is revealed through deliberations. The Purva Mimamsa and the Seshwara Mimamsa also conceive the first notion of Atman from inner perception, but derive the first conceptions of some attributes of Atman, such as eternal existence, transmigration, etc., from the Sruti. According to them also the true knowledge of Atman is to be derived through deliberations. The view of the Advaita system regarding Atman has been given above. Hence so far as the knowledge of Atman is concerned these six systems deserve the name, 'Darshana.'

Here we should ascertain the cause of the distinction between an Astika Darshana and a Nastika Darshana. It may be suggested that those systems which derive their first conceptions from the Sruti are Astika Darshanas, and those which do not do so are Nastika Darshanas. If this be the cause of the distinction, the Purva-Mimamsa, the Seshwara Mimamsa and the Advaita systems can be without any difficulty designated as Astika Darshanas. Of these three the Purva Mimamsa shows an unusual ardour for establishing the eternal

existence and an all-importance of the Veda, and the other two systems are indebted to it for that. But a difficulty arises with regard to the Nyaya, the Vaisheshika and the Patanjali systems. They do not receive any of their first conceptions from the Sruti, but still they have enjoyed all along the reputation of being Astika Darshanās. Probably they are called, Astika Darshanās, because they admit the existence of the next world, of God and of an eternal Atman. But there is no doubt that they profess to build their theories on inference only and independently of the Sruti, which, however, seems to be not possible, as has been wisely pointed out by Kumarila. In the *Sambandhiksepa-parihara* chapter of the *Sloka-varitika* Kumarila has shown by strong arguments that the ascertainment of God by mere arguments, as made by the Naiyayikas, is absurd. It also seems probable that the Naiyayikas and the Vaisesika have incorporated the theory of God as established by the Mimamsika into their own systems so that these systems may pass for Astika Darshanās. But they do not declare that they base these theories on Vedic conceptions. The Naiyayikas have also borrowed the theory of the preception of God by Yoga from the Patanjali system, but that, too, has nothing to do with the Sruti.

But their reputation as Astika Darshanās is traditional. So for the sake of the tradition we propose to give another definition of Darshanā below

Any system which deals with Sadhya (end or fruit), Sadhana (means to that end), Bhoktr (the enjoyer of the fruit,) and God as Phala-prapaka (the ordainer of the fruit.) is to be called a Darshana proper.

Now all the six systems (the Naiyayika, etc.) which are designated as Astika Darshanas deal with these four essential elements and so according to this definition they can be called Darshanas proper. But the Charvaka the Jaina and the Bouddha systems reject the fourth element, God, and hence they do not properly deserve the name, Darshana. This is the cause of the distinction that is drawn between these two sets, the first six being called, Astika Darsanas and the last six, Nastika Darshanas.

There arises a difficulty with regard to the Advaita system. It aims mainly at establishing that there is only one Real Entity and so it seems to reject every thing else as false. It may be said, therefore, that the above definition does not apply to this system, and that it should not be called a Darshana. But although the Advaita system points to only one Real Entity it does not exclude the consideration of all other things as unnecessary. It holds, on the contrary, that until the True Knowledge arises the phenomenal existence of the world is true and that a discussion of all the four items is necessary as a preliminary to the awakening of the True Knowledge. Shankaracharya has plainly stated in his commentary that until the True Knowledge of self arises this Shastra will continue to regard all manifestations of Nescience as true. So the Advai-

ta system must be treated as a Darshana. The Advaita Darshana will, of course, cease to be a Darshana with the cessation of Nescience, but until that time comes it is no less a Darshana than any other Darshana.

A doubt might arise as to whether the treatment of the sacrificial injunctions of the Veda which has been made in the Purva Mimamsa at great length, really forms the subject matter of a Darshana. But this doubt will disappear if we consider the traditional definition of Darshana given above. The sacrifices are regarded as the means (Sadhana), of our attaining bliss (Sadhya), and so discussions about the sacrificial injunctions form clearly the subject matter of this Darshana. These discussions are often very lengthy and full of numerous details, but the sacrificial system of the Veda is itself a very vast matter, and any systematic treatment of it could not but be lengthy. The Sadhana element of the Purva Mimamsa may be a peculiar one, but it is a Sadhana all the same, and so there should not be any doubt regarding the consistency of the discussions bearing upon it.

A charge of atheism is also brought against the Purva Mimamsa. If this charge be true this system should not be called an Astika Darshana in accordance with the definition given above. So we must carefully examine the conclusions of the Purva Mimamsa regarding God.

It is true that Jaimini has not made discussions about God in his Sutras, but he has nowhere denied the existence of God. We shall show later on that

though Jaimini has taken great pains for establishing that the fruits of actions are produced through Apurva still he has recognised God as the creator or the maker of these fruits.

There are two leading schools belonging to this system, viz, the school of Kumarila Bhatta and the school of Prabhakara. Of these two the school of Kumarila is by far the more prominent. This school does not admit that we derive the fruits of our actions through the favour of God, but it regards him as the ordainer of the fruits in as much as he helps us in obtaining them by creating the things of this world.

M. M. Dr. Ganganath Jha has observed in his famous article on the Prabhakara Mimamsa.* that Kumarila has denied the creation or the dissolution of the world as a whole. He has referred to four verses of the Sloka vartika ‡ as his authority, It is true that Kumarila has said that God, corporeal or spiritual, does neither superintend nor is the cause of this creation, and that the

* Indian Thought. Vol. IV. p. 262.

‡ सर्वज्ञवन्निषेध्या च स्रष्टुः सद्भावकल्पना ।

न च धर्मादृते तस्य भवेल्लोकाद् विशिष्टता ॥

न चाननुष्ठितो धर्मो नानुष्ठान मृते मतेः ॥

न च वेदादृते सा स्यादवेदो न च पदादिभिः ॥

तस्मात् प्रागपि सर्वेऽमी स्रष्टुरासन् पदादयः ॥

स्यात् तत्पूर्वकता चास्य चैतन्यादस्मदादिवत् ॥

एवं ये युक्तिभिः प्राहु स्तेषां दुर्लभमुत्तरम्

सम्बन्धाक्षेपपरिहारे Verses 114-17

creation or the dissolution of the world at any one time is impossible. But if we scrutinise the verses referred to above we shall see that Kumarila does not at all intend to deny creation by God, but he intends to bring out the logical absurdity involved in the idea of the creation of the world by a God who himself is a product of human imagination. Kumarila has written this chapter, entitled, *Sambandha-ksepa-parihara* not with a view to treating the problem of creation as such but with a view to rebutting the presumption that the Vedas have been composed by somebody, and particularly to refute the theory of the Naiyayikas and the Vaisheshikas who first establish the existence of God by reasoning and then hold that the Vedas are a composition of God. He would rather have no God than a God as the author of the Sruti nor would he admit any authority of that Sruti which is a composition of God. So if we properly judge the purport and connection of the above mentioned Slokas we shall arrive at a conclusion which is very different from that of Dr. Jha. We find no reason as to why creation and dissolution of the world should be treated in a chapter where the personal authorship of the Vedas is the matter for discussion. The correctness of our conclusion is warranted by the very same verses of the Vartika.

The simple meaning of the 114th sloka* which causes this confusion is,—“the assumption of the existence

* सर्वशक्तिपेध्या स्यात् सद्गुः सद्भावकल्पना

of a creator should be rejected as in the case of Sarvajna." If in a book written by Buddha himself we find that he himself has been described as an omniscient person (Sarvajna) we cannot believe that statement. Similarly if the Sruti be a composition of God, and if that Sruti says that God is the creator of the world we should not believe that statement. * Bhatta is not prepared to attach any value to that Sruti which is a creation of God, who again is a creation of the human imagination. He holds that the knowledge of God or his creation can be derived only from the Sruti (and from no other source) which is eternal and independent. Thus we see that the intention of Kumarila is clear and that he does not deny that God is the creator of the world.

It is also a mistake to suppose that the system of Kumarila is not a purely theistic one because it has denied the existence of the physical forms of gods. But Kumarila has not actually denied the existence of such things. The truth is that he has not been very keen about this matter. All that he has wanted to make out is that we do not derive the fruits of our actions through the favour of gods, and that gods need have no bodies for that purpose. He has put forward the view that a cause and its consequence cling to the same basis. When a man has performed a sacrifice the result will as a matter of course come over to him. Now the results

* Sloka Vartik Chodana Sutram 142nd Sloka.

नर्तेतद् आगच्छत् सिध्येत् न च तेनागमोचना ।
दृष्टान्तोऽपि न तस्यान्यो नृषुकश्चित् प्रवर्तते ।

do not always come out at once, they may come out long afterwards, and in order to show a connection between an act and its result two theories are generally propounded. According to one theory the result comes through the favour of the gods who were propitiated in the sacrifice, while according to the other an unseen merit (*Apurva*) arises immediately on the performance of the sacrifice, which serves as a connecting link between the performance and its fruit. Kumarila adopts the latter theory. He says that if we admit this *Apurva*, the cause, the medium, and the ultimate consequence—all three will take place in one's self, whereas the favour of a god is not in the sacrificer himself, but is an extraneous thing.

Besides, in the texts of the *Sruti* there is no mention of the favour of any god. If any sacrificial injunction be properly construed we shall see that it tells a man to produce a desirable result by means of performing a sacrifice. Thus it is the performance that is the only means of producing the fruit, and as the performance does not continue up to the time of the production of the fruit an *Apurva* is imagined as a link, and so the interference of any external god is not necessary. Moreover, the necessity of the favour of the gods is not only not indicated in the *Sruti* but is opposed to its spirit. The *Sruti* tells us that the performance of a sacrifice is the cause or means of producing a particular fruit. If we now introduce the favour of the gods as the cause of the production of the fruit the importance of the performance as the cause, will be

ignored, and this can by no means be the intention of the Sruti. So there is neither any necessity for nor any advantage in introducing the favour of the gods, and Kumarila has not, therefore, introduced it. Kumarila would have no objection to a god having a body provided that he does not interfere in the dispensation of the fruit.

Thus we find all the necessary elements of an Astika Darshana in the system of Kumarila, and hence it should be treated as such.

We come next to the Prabhakara school of the Purva-Mimamsa system. With reference to this school also Dr. Jha has observed that it denies the existence of God,—“there is no room for an ultra-cosmic God.”* If this system have really denied the existence of God we shall be compelled to regard it as a Nastika Darshana in accordance with the definition given above. But before doing so we ought to ascertain the actual state of things. It is true that Prabhakara has not dealt with God as the founders of the other Astika schools have done; but this fact alone is not sufficient to establish the atheistical character of his system. Let us first ascertain the view of Prabhakara with regard to the Upanisads from which we derive mainly our conception of God. It is said that according to Prabhakara all the Upanisad texts are mere Arthavadas, i.e. praises, and therefore, they do not convey any truth, about God, etc. If we accept this view as true the Vedanta Darshana which is entirely based on the texts of the Upanisads will

* Indian Theoght. Vol. IV. p. 262.

be lost to the Prabhakaras. One might say that the loss of the Vedānta Darśhana will not affect the position of the Prabhakaras; but the loss of such a system as the Vedānta is no trifling matter, and we shall show later on that Prabhakara has shown a great reverence for some doctrines of the Vedānta. As a matter of fact the Prabhakaras have not regarded the Upaniṣad texts as mere praises, and consequently have not denied the importance of the Vedānta Darśhana. With regard to one Upaniṣad text at least Dr. Jha agrees with us. We are quoting here his very words—"The Vedic texts speaking of the 'non-return' to this world cannot be regarded as mere Arthavadas * Now if it be once admitted that one text is not a mere Arthavada, it can no longer be said that other texts of the same class are mere Arthavadas. It would be absurd to contend that of the same class some individuals are of one type and the others are of a different type. So we see that there is no reason for supposing that Prabhakara has absolutely denied the the authority of Upaniṣad texts, and consequently there is no justification for the conclusion that he has denied the existence of God. In fact, there is no difference of opinion between Kumārila and Prabhakara in this respect. The Prabhakaras have denied the creation and the dissolution of world, and the existence of the physical forms of the gods, etc., just in the same way as Kumārila has done. Hence there is little

* Indian Thought Vol IV. p. 258.

doubt that their motive must have been the same as that of Kumarila. they have tried only to establish that the Veda is not a creation of God and that the fruits of actions are obtained through Apurva and through no other agency. The following extract from the Nyayaratnavali contains a passage which has been quoted from some work of the Prabhakara school:— which throws a good deal of light on the real attitude of Prabhakara,—

निष्प्रपञ्चं ब्रह्मैव आत्मा, तथापि कर्मप्रसङ्गे न तथा वाच्यम्, उक्तं हि ऋषिण्य
भगवता, न बुद्धिमेदं जनयेदज्ञानां कर्मसङ्गिनानिति प्राभाकरग्रन्थगतोक्तेः ॥

“Brahman who is the noumenal reality is Atman; but we must not say so while we are dealing with sacrifices, for Lord Kṛṣṇa has said that one should not create a confusion in the minds of the ignorant people who are attached to Karman,— this statement is found in a Prabhakara work.”* The author of the Nyayaratnavali has not given the name of the work from which he has quoted this statement, but his own name carries sufficient weight and we can without any hesitation rely upon him. This shows clearly that the system of Prabhakara is not essentially an atheistical one. Prabhakara admits that there is God, but he does not enter into deliberations for determining the actual form of God, as it is likely to be prejudicial to the ordinary run of people who are fond of Karman.

In the Nyayaratnavali we also find that both the Bhatta and Prabhakara systems have been recognised as Astika Darshanas.* It is not at all probable that a leading theist like the author of the Nyayaratnavali should have recognised a godless system as an Astika Darshana, nor can it be said that he has called it so only on account of its acceptance of the authority of the Veda, for then the Vaishesika system which does not accept that authority would never have been included in his list of Astika Darshanas. We can conclude, therefore, that the system of Prabhakara is a theistic one.

As regards the particular conception of God in the Purva Mimamsa and his connection with the dispensation of fruits we shall speak fully in the chapter on God. We have seen above that one of the systems of Astika Darshanas, is called, the Seshwara-Mimamsa.† This name may at the first sight lead one to think that it represents a particular school of the Purva Mimamsa, and that the other schools of the Purva Mimamsa are atheistical. We find a typical work of this system, entitled, the 'Seshwara-Mimamsa-Darshana.' It was composed by Shri Venkatanatha † about two hundred years ago. He was a follower of the Vishistadwaita school and wrote this work with the object of explaining the Sutras of Jaimini, according to the view of the Seshwara Mimamsakās who hold that the Purva Mimamsa and the Uttara Mimamsa are not separate systems but form one

* Nyayaratnavali, p p. 59, 60

† A leader of the Vishistadwaitins

complete system. In this work the Sūtras of Jaimini have been treated as supplementary to the Sūtras of Bādarāyana, and so the Purva Mimamsa has been practically subordinated to the Uttara Mimamsa. The Seshwara-Mimamsakas do not admit an independent existence of the Purva Mimamsa. Besides, the Purva Mimamsa is known as the Karma Mimamsa, because it establishes that it is Karman only that produces the fruit, and that no favour of any God or gods is necessary for that purpose. But the Seshwara Mimamsa does not preach this characteristic doctrine of the Purva Mimamsa. So the two are completely different systems, and the Seswara Mimamsa does not belong to any particular school of the Purva Mimamsa. We have shewn above that the Purva Mimamsa is a theistic system, and that neither of the two schools of the Purva Mimamsa is atheistical. So the epithet, 'Seshwara', can by no means be meant for distinguishing this system from any branch of the Purva Mimamsa.

It will be interesting to notice the relationstip between the Purva Mimamsa and the Vedānta. If we adopt the view that according to the Purva Mimamsa the texts of the Upanisads are not meant to convey any truth the whole foundation of the Vedānta would be gone. But this view is not correct and we have shewn above that even the Prabhākaras do not altogether deny the importance of Upanisad texts. Neither the Bhatta system nor the Prabhākara is antagonistic

to the Vedānta, but the affinity of the former is closer. The author of the *Nyayaratnavali* bears out the truth of this statement:

“भाट्टे र्जडयोधात्मन आत्मेति स्वग्रन्थवाक्येन अविद्यापहिन
चिद्रूप आत्मेति सूचनात्, प्रामाकरेण स्वप्रकाराजन्यवोधाश्रयः
चिद्रूप आत्मेति स्वग्रन्थे कथनात्.....प्रामाकरो
भाट्टापेक्षया न्यूनः ”

“The Bhattas state in their works that Atman is imperceptible and is of the nature of consciousness, and thereby they indicate that Atman is consciousness covered by Nescience (this is the view of the Advaitins), and the Prabhākaras state in their works that Atman is the basis of cognition which is self-illuminated.So the Prabhākaras are more remote than the Bhattas.”

It is on account of this close relationship that the Advaitins declare-‘*व्यवहारे मदनयः*’ i.e., the principles of Bhatta are to be adopted for all practical purposes. Most probably its closer affinity with the Vedānta has made the system of Bhatta more popular than that of Prabhākara.

We have thus given two traditional definitions of the name, Darshana, and have seen how that name applies itself to various systems. We have also noticed that the Purva Mimamsa and the Uttara Mimamsa are two distinct systems, and that the former does not ignore the importance of the latter. We shall now ascertain if there is any distinction between a

Darshana, and a philosophy and if these Darshanas, and particularly the Purva Mimamsa, can be called, systems of philosophy.

Is the Purva Mimamsa a System of Philosophy ?

The word, philosophy, has been taken to mean 'an examination of our means of knowledge', or 'an enquiry into the limits of human knowledge.' The structure of all systems of philosophy is based upon independent human reasoning, but all the Darshanas do not stand upon that basis. In some of the Darshanas at least the Shruti has been accepted as the infallible authority on many fundamental points.

The Bouddha and the Jaina Darshanas are entirely free from the influence of the Shruti and do not rely upon anything which lies beyond human reasoning. So they are without any doubt philosophical systems according to the true conception of the word, philosophy. There will be possibly no objection to calling the Vaisheshika, the Naiyayika, and the Patanjala Darshanas systems of philosophy, for though they have admitted the authority of the Shruti they have admitted it in so far as it does not clash with reasoning.

The Charvaka Darshana has a curious position. It is out and out an atheistical system and disregards the authority of the Shruti altogether. But still it cannot be called a system of philosophy; because it professes to accept perception as the sole means of knowledge and shows little regard for inference or reasoning.

But the Purva Mimamsa and the Vedanta can by no means be brought to bear the name, philosophy. Prof. Max Müller has observed that leaving aside the sacrificial treatment which is directly based on the Shruti, and such other things the Purva Mimamsa has touched on many a problem which comes within the sphere of philosophy and that if the claim of infallibility in favour of the utterances of the sages of Upanisads be waived a real philosophy will be found in system of Badarayana.

Now we must not forget that so far as the Purva Mimamsa is concerned the discussions of the sacrificial injunctions form the cream of the system. Here Jaimini wants to lay down what Dharma is, and he treats the Shruti as the only original source of Dharma. Discussions as to the existence and nature of Atman and various other things are found here, but they play only a very subordinate part. The performance of sacrifices (Dharma) is the principal thing, and all other things are introduced, simply because they are necessary for such a performance. The deities are necessary, for without them a sacrifice cannot be completed, The existence of Atman is necessary, for, if there be no Atman, the enjoyment of the fruit of the sacrifice will be impossible. Had there been no sacrifice and no fruit to enjoy Jaimini would never have discussed the nature of Atman. So, if the treatment of the sacrificial system be removed many topics will be simply out of place. Moreover, the discussion of all the topics which seem to be based on independent reasoning, are really based on the Shruti, be-

cause all the leading ideas, viz., the existence of the soul, its immortality and transmigration, the eternity of sound, etc., are borrowed direct from the Shruti, and arguments are advanced not for the purpose of building up new theories, but for supporting and developing the ideas of the Shruti. Strictly speaking, this sort of reasoning cannot be regarded as independent human reasoning. So if the Shruti be discarded the arguments will lose their central plank and consequently will lose much of their charm.

The same remarks will apply to the Vedanta system also. This system has arrived at conclusions regarding the nature of Atman, Nirguna Brahman, etc., which can never be ascertained by inference. The ideas of the Shruti are bred in the bones of the Vedanta system and it is not easy to imagine how it can strip itself of those ideas.

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SECTION (B)

The Purva Mimamsa and the Uttara Mimamsa,

The two names have all along been used in many authoritative works to designate the two systems, the Karma-Mimamsa and the Vedanta. A question naturally arises as to why they should be so called.

- The Seshwara Mimamsa Darshana regards the two systems as one, and so according to it the epithets, Purva and Uttara, mean simply the former and the latter parts of the same system. But if the two systems really form one work we do not understand on what principle this division has been made. We can not take the word 'Jijnasa' in the Sutra, 'Athato Brahmajijnasa,' as indicating the commencement of the latter part, for the word, Jijnasa is also found in the first Sutra of the fourth chapter of the Purva Mimamsa, "Athatah Kratwartha-Purusarthayor Jijnasa," and the latter part does not commence therewith. If we take such a Sutra as the title of a new work or part, as Prof Max Müller has said,* we should have here three parts instead of two. Nor can it be said that the division is due to the treatment of different matters, for according to the Seshwara Mimamsa Dharma and Brahman are not exclusive of each other. Dharma and Brahman are the two principal topics which have been dealt with in these two systems. If Dharma includes Brahman † there will be only one main subject and not two. It is not also possible to take the subordinate matters into account, for then we shall have more than two themes. In the Purva Mimamsa itself the first six chapters deal with Mpadasha and the next six chapters deal with Atidesha but no division of the Purva Mimamsa has been made on that basis.

* Six systems of Ind Phil. p.261

† अत्र धर्मशब्देन कर्तृस्त्वो वेदार्थो लभ्यते, अतएव सिद्धपर-
भागस्यापि संप्रदः । Seshwara Mimamsa Darshana, P.4.

It may next be suggested that the division is due to different authorship. That portion which was composed by Jaimini goes by the name of Purva Mimamsa, and that composed by Badarayana, is known as the Uttara Mimamsa. In the case of the prose work, Kadambari, we find just the same thing. *Bana* wrote the first part, and after his death his son completed the work by writing the second part. But there is a difference between these two cases. *Bana's* son completed his father's work because his father had died; but here there is nothing to show why Jaimini stopped with the Purva Mimamsa and did not compose the Uttara Mimamsa. It is believed that he was a sage, and as a sage he was certainly competent enough to finish the rest of his work and so there was no necessity for his making over the charge to Badarayana. Besides, this sort of division presupposes that the Purva Mimamsa was composed before the Uttara Mimamsa. So unless the priority of the Purva Mimamsa is first established this division into Purva and Uttara will be untenable.

Prof. Max Müller is of opinion that 'Purva' does not mean 'prior in time.' He says, "The names, however, were not meant to imply, as Colebrooke seems to have supposed, that the Purva Mimamsa was prior in time, though it is true that it is sometimes called *Praki* previous... I should not like to commit myself so far as to claim priority in time for the Vedanta..... We saw why

the fact that Badarayana quotes Jaimini can not be used for chronological purposes, for Jaimini returns the compliment and quotes Badarayana.

Let us now see if we can obtain any evidence on the point from the Sūtras themselves. In ten Sūtras of the *Uttara Mimamsa* * Jaimini's name is found, whereas Badarayana's name is found in five Sūtras of the *Purva Mimamsa*. † It is remarkable that the matters discussed in nine out of the ten Sūtras of the *Uttara Mimamsa* are not found at all in the Sūtras of Jaimini but the matter of the tenth Sūtra only corresponds with that of a Sūtra of the *Purva Mimamsa*. This fact points to several inferences. It may be supposed that the Jaimini mentioned in the nine Sūtras of the *Uttara Mimamsa* is different from the Jaimini mentioned in the tenth Sūtra, or that Badarayana refers to some other work or works of Jaimini which have not come down to us, or the Badarayana refers to such views of Jaimini which were not reduced to the form of Sūtras at all.

The purport of the first inference is that Badarayana has referred at least to two Jaiminis of whom one was the author of the *Purva Mimamsa Sūtras*. But it is

I. 2. 28	III. 4. 2	† I. 1. 5
I. 2. 31	III. 4. 18	II. 2. 19
I. 4. 18	III. 4. 40	VI. 1. 8
I. 3. 31	IV. 3. 12	X. 8. 44
III. 2. 49	IV. 4. 5	XI. 1. 64

not probable that Badarayana has referred to more than one Jaimini. Had that been the fact he would have certainly given some hint to that effect; but the name is mentioned in all the Sutras in the same strain without the shadow of a distinction. Hence the above conclusion does not seem to be a satisfactory one. The second and the third inferences are virtually the same, and are to the effect that the same Jaimini is referred to in the Uttara Mimamsa Sutras.

Prof. Keith, however, raises a doubt as to the identity of Jaimini. He says: "Who Jaimini was, I can not say.As an authority on philosophy Jaimini appears in the Vedanta Sutra, and often in the later works, but it is significant that while it is possible that the Mahabharata recognises the existence of the Mimamsa it does not refer to Jaimini as a philosopher but merely as an ancient sage."† But the Mahabharata does not propose to give a list of the philosophers of its time, nor has it any particular occasion for mentioning Jaimini as a philosopher. So the mere fact that Jaimini is not referred to in the Mahabharata as a philosopher is not enough to prove that Jaimini was not an author of the Purva Mimamsa Sutras.

There is a long-established tradition that Jaimini, who was a disciple of Badarayana, composed the Purva Mimamsa Sutras. We must not ignore this tradition unless we obtain some strong evidence against it. It is

† The Karma-Mimamsa, p-5.

not absurd to assume that Jaimini was a worthy disciple of Badarayana, that Badarayana had discussed various matters with him, and that at the time of writing his Sūtras he referred to the views of Jaimini. Only one of such discussions is found embodied in a Sūtra of Jaimini while the others are not found. This omission may be explained by assuming that Jaimini did not like to embody those discussions in his Sūtras, or that he put them in some other works of his which are not extant. We are practically assuming here only one thing, viz, the possibility of the existence of some other works of the same Jaimini, and this is certainly preferable to assuming that there were many Jaiminis and that there were many works of them which have perished in course of time.

It may appear strange that Badarayana, who was the preceptor, referred to the views of Jaimini, his pupil. But even in those days such a thing was not impossible. After finishing the study of the Vedas the student was to make *Mīmāṃsā*. At this period the rigour of discipline would be relaxed, and he could mix more freely with his preceptor. Śhābārī Swamin has indicated this while explaining the word 'Athā' in the first Sūtra of the *Purva Mīmāṃsā*. The student used to be treated at this stage somewhat like a research scholar of modern times. The worth of a scholar like Jaimini was sure to be appreciated by Badarayana, and there is no harm in thinking that Badarayana took his views into consideration. So we see that the mention of Jaimini's name in the Sūtras of Badarayana can be consistent with

tradition, and hence we conclude that the name of Jaimini, the author of the Purva Mamamsa Sutras, is referred to in the Sutras of the Uttara Mimamsa.

Of the Sutras of Jaimini in which the name of Badarayana is found, the fifth deserves the greatest attention. So let us first take this Sutra for consideration. If we carefully analyse this Sutra we shall perceive that the name of Badarayana is mentioned here not for the purpose of merely supporting the author's view, but also for expressing a feeling of gratitude to Badarayana. This Sutra does not contain the argument on which the theory of the existence of a non-corporeal Atman is based, while we find it in the corresponding Sutra of the Vedanta.* This Sutra of Jaimini cannot be fully explained without referring to the afore-mentioned Sutra of the Uttara Mimamsa. We shall see later on that Upavarsa Shabara, Shankara and Kumarila are all of the same opinion. The doctrine of the existence of a non-corporeal Atman is one of the principal doctrines of the Purva Mimamsa and unless it is assumed that Jaimini known the Uttara Mimamsa Sutra first it will be difficult to explain why he should have only so slightly hinted at it in his own Sutra.

Mr. Nilkantha Shastri has made an attempt to prove that Badarayana whose name is mentioned in the fifth Sutra of Jaimini, is not the same person as the

author of the Vedānta Sūtras but is a Mīmāṃsist anterior to Jaimini. His arguments will be found in the following extract which is quoted from an article published in the Indian Antiquary.

It is clear that there is nothing corresponding to these discussions or even remotely bearing upon them in the Vedānta Sūtras. 1-1-5 is a case that requires a little more consideration, for here Jaimini claims that Badarayana and himself are at one on the question of the Eternity and Infallibility of Word. It might, therefore, appear at first sight that at least the Badarayana referred to here must be the same as the author of the Vedānta Sūtras, who also maintains the Eternity and the Infallibility of the Veda. But closer scrutiny shows that here again we are dealing with one of the most vital points of difference between Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta. In the view of the former the Veda's authority is innate and absolute, and not dependent on any god or deity, personal or otherwise, the Vedāntist view is that the Eternity of the veda is only a relative quality and dependent on Ishwara. Hence we find that the reason assigned by the Mīmāṃsist for his position is *अविच्छेदतः*, while the reasons assigned by Badarayana in Vedānta Sūtra 1-3-28, are *एतन्मन्त्राणां दृष्टान्तानुमानात्*, and it is to be particularly noticed that Śaṅkara repeats part of the Sūtra of Jaimini 1-1-5 above, *चैतरेयब्रह्म*, etc., in the Pūrvapakṣa. In his comment on the Vedānta Sūtra just referred to Śaṅkara must surely have noticed that a Badarayana

is referred to as taking Jaimini's view in the औत्पत्तिक Sutra, and if he believed for a moment that it was his own Sutrakara who was so mentioned, it is not in the least likely that he would have treated the very Sutra of Jaimini as the Purvapaksa view to be refuted by him. On the contrary, we should find Shankara attempting somehow a reconciliation between the contrary view of Badarayana, the one mentioned by Jaimini and the other stated in the Vedanta Sutra. To my mind this fact taken along with the other that in the remaining four instances where Badarayana is referred to by Jaimini there is nothing to suggest an identity with the author of the Vedanta Sutra, is conclusive proof that the Badarayana referred to by Jaimini, is anterior to him, and is a Mimamsist different "from the author of the Vedanta Sutra." *

The first argument adduced by Mr. Shastri is that as the Mimamsist view of the Eternity of the Veda is different from the Vedantist view, the Sutrakaras of the two systems cannot be at one on that point. Mr. Shastri has not cited any authority in support of this statement. So far as we know this does not seem to be a correct representation. We shall show in the chapter on God that in the view of the Mimamsakas the Vedas are regarded as uncreated just in the same manner as by the Vedantists. The Vedantists never admit that God or any other deity has any independent control over the Vedas. This view has been

expressly stated in the Bhamati in the Shastra-yonitwa Adhikarana. We quote here the very words of the Bhamati — “पुनरावातात्तमसरोद्देशस्य राजयने जैमिनीया अपि तद्वद्वक्तव्यमपि समानम्” “the followers of Jaimini also mean by *राजयने* nothing more than the want of independent control on the part of God; we, too, hold the same view.” So it cannot be said that in the Vedantist view the Eternity of the Veda is dependent on Ishwara.

It is for this reason that the Sutra, *अतएव निश्चितम्* of the Uttara Mimamsa becomes very appropriate for the establishment of the Eternity of the Vedas. In the introduction to his comment on this Sutra Shankara says — “Though the eternity of the Vedas has been established on the ground that no independent author is remembered, etc.,” and thus considering that this matter has already been settled in the Purva Mimamsa, he indicates that this Sutra is necessary for removing other doubts. This remark of Shankara clearly tells us that there is an intimate connexion between the Purva and Uttara Mimamsa and that the Badarayana who is mentioned in the *चैतन्यिक* Sutra is none other than the author of the Vedānta Sūtras. There is no dispute that it is only in the *चैतन्यिक* Sutra that the lack of evidence of accredited authorship has been put forth as the reason while establishing a permanent connexion between words and their meanings, and that the same reason has served to establish the eternity of the

Vedas also. Had Shankara not understood that the reason assigned in the औत्पत्तिक Sutra for proving the eternity of the Vedas (viz., the non-recollection of any author) was approved of by his Sutrakara (whose name is mentioned in that Sutra), it would not have been possible for him to make the above remark ("though the eternity of the vedas has been established on the ground that no independent author of them is remembered,") while explaining a Sutra of the Uttara Mimamsa. If any other Badarayana had established the eternity of the Vedas by adopting the above reason Shankara would certainly have not recognised that conclusion as a decisive one. There is no reason why a Vedantist Badarayana should not prove afresh what has already been proved by a Mimamsist Badarayana.

Again, it cannot be suggested that the above remark of Shankara has no reference to the औत्पत्तिक Sutra. for the Bhamati has removed all possible doubts by saying,—“In the Purva Mimamsa the eternity of the Vedas has been established, what is the good of establishing it again?—Therefore, he (Shankara) says, ‘Swatantrasya, etc.’ The position has been made clearer in the Kalpataru:—“He (Shankara) says, ‘Swatantrasya, etc, to avoid a conflict with the Shastrayonitwa Sutra.’ This means that the use of the word ‘swatantra’ denotes that though the name of an author may be recollected, still he has no independent control.

Thus on a closer scrutiny we find that there is no difference between the two systems on this most

vital point and that the Badarayana, whose name is mentioned in the श्रुतसूत्र Sutra, is the same person is the author of the Vedānta Sūtras.

The second argument is that as Shankara has treated the same Sūtra of Jaimini as the Purvapakṣa view to be refuted by him it cannot contain the view of his own Sūtrakāra. Let us see if this argument, too, holds good. We should ascertain in the first place whether the conclusion of Jaimini has at all been treated as the Purvapakṣa view by Shankara. It is true that Shankara has used the expression, *सन्निवृत्त्यर्थं*, for strengthening his Purvapakṣa in his comment on the Sūtra, *ननु तत्रैव ननु ननु ननु ननु ननु ननु* *. The view stated in the Purvapakṣa is that the ideas of words are of the form of individuals. But this is not the view of the Mimamsakas, for the Mimamsakas hold that concepts are general ideas. So it cannot be said that in the said Purvapakṣa the Mimamsaka view has been stated. So in order to show that there is no conflict with the श्रुतसूत्र Sūtra Shankara states that words convey general conceptions, and not conceptions of individuals. It is not a fact that in the श्रुतसूत्र Sūtra the view, that words express individual representations, is supported by using the expression *सन्निवृत्त्यर्थं*. Shankara simply concludes that the said Purvapakṣa cannot arise because both Jaimini and Badarayana are of the opinion that concepts of words are general representations. So this furnishes an additional

* Vedānta Sūtra 1. 3. 28

ground for supposing that in the opinion of Shankara the Badarayana of the औत्पत्तिक Sutra is the same as the author of the Vedanta Sutra. Mr. Shastri has failed to notice that the Purvapaksa is not constructed in accordance with any conclusion of the Mimamsakas but in accordance with a view opposed to the conclusion of the औत्पत्तिक Sutra. Probably the word अतपेक्षत्वात् in the Purvapaksa of Shankara has led Mr. Shastri to suppose that the Fifth Sutra forms the basis of the Purvapaksa.

Following Upavarsa, Shabara and Shankara we have all along supposed that the word बादरायणस्य in the Fifth Sutra is connected with the word अव्यतिरिक्त; but the position will not be altered even if we connect it with अतपेक्षत्वात् and औत्पत्तिक.

Thus we see that the arguments advanced by Mr. Shastri are not strong enough to convince us that the Badarayana of the Fifth Sutra is not the same person as the author of the Vedanta Sutra.

In the Devatadhikarana * of the Purva Mimamsa, Shabara and others have propounded the theory of the non-existence of physical forms of the gods not on the basis of any Sutra of Jaimini but on that of the Uttara Mimamsa. The Sutra† चौदना पुनरात्मः of Jaimini is interpreted as meaning that there is an Apurva which is quite independent of the favour of the gods. The

* Jaimini Sutra IX. 1.

† Jaimini Sutra II. 1. 5.

mere word, *Arambha*, does not mean that the favour of the gods is excluded; and we cannot obtain a full interpretation of the Sutra unless we refer to the corresponding Sutra* of the *Uttara Mimamsa*. Similarly other instances may be cited to show that some Sutras of the *Purva Mimamsa* clearly indicate a previous existence of the Sutras of the *Uttara Mimamsa*. The doctrines of the want of origin of the Veda, etc., are no doubt more fully dealt with in the *Purva Mimamsa*, but the discussions of these matters are also found in the *Uttara Mimamsa*, which can stand by themselves without any reference to the *Purva Mimamsa*. That the *Uttara Mimamsa* is a self-contained system has been graphically shewn by *Apyaya Diksita* in his famous commentary, *Parimala*: "Here (in the *Uttara Mimamsa*) also the authoritativeness of the Vedic texts forms the subject-matter of the Sutras as in the *Purva Mimamsa*. The Sutra अथ एव च निदहन् १, establishes the authoritativeness of the Vedic texts. The Sutra भाषा स्यादभिधानं २, deals with difference of words, etc. The Sutras स्यादेव प्रमितः ३, वाक्यमप्यभिधानं ४, तथा येन वाक्यताप्यभिधानं ५, प्रवरणां ६, नृणां दिव्योदहस्य न भिदः ७, etc, ascertain the principles of *Shruti* (direct text), *Linga* (sense), etc., and their respective value. The Sutras, विपर्ययश्च ८, नः ९, etc, show how to determine

* *Vedanta Sutra* III, 2, 40.

1. <i>Vedanta Sutra</i> I. 3. 23.	5. <i>Vedanta Sutra</i> III. 4. 24.
2. " " III. 3. 54.	6. " " I. 3.
3. " " I. 3. 24.	7. " " III. 3. 49.
4. " " I. 1. 22. 7.	8. " " II. 3. 14.

the order of various things The Sutra अतिदेशः* establishes the rule of transference. So all the things (dealt with in the Purva Mimamsa are found in the (Uttara Mimamsa) Sutas. Our revered preceptor (Vachaspati Mishra) has said no doubt that the principles of Shruti, Linga, etc., have been determined in the Purva Mimamsa. But he has nowhere said that it (the Uttara Mimamsa, depends upon that (the Purva Mimamsa)" † It cannot be said that in the cases mentioned above the Purva Mimamsa Sutas are stated in brief and that the corresponding Uttara Mimamsa Sutas serve as their explanations, for the Sutas of Jaimini are not only brief but they are so incomplete that without a reference to the Uttara Mimamsa Sutas it is not possible to draw the necessary meanings from them.

Again, the Purva Mimamsa imitates the style of the Uttara Mimamsa. Prof. Max Muller also is of the same opinion: "While Badarayana begins his Sutas with 'Athato Brahmajijnasa.....Jaimini apparently in imitation of it begins with 'Athato 'Dharmajijnasa.....'‡ Hence it can be concluded that the Uttara Mimamsa Sutas were the first to come into existence.

Now it may be asked whether two persons, named Badarayana and Jaimini, actually composed these Sutas We first quote below what Prof. Max Muller has said on this point: "Badarayana is likewise acquainted with the

*Vedanta Sutra III. 346.

† Parimala. Nirnayasagar Ed. p. 64.

‡Six systems of Ind- Philosophy p. 261.

the atheistical doctrines of Kapila and the atomistic theories of Kanada, and tries to refute them. But in India this is far from proving the later date of Badarayana. We must learn to look on Badarayana, Jaimini, Kapila and similar names as simply eponymous heroes of different philosophies; so at whatever time these systems were reduced to the form of Sutras, certain opinions could be called by their names. Colebrooke states on the authority of a scholiast of Manu and Yajnavalkya that the instructions of a teacher were often reduced to writing by his pupils, and that these would account for the fact that the author of a system is often quoted in the third person in his book. ”*

But the mere fact that the author is quoted in the third person in his book is not sufficient to prove that the book was not written by the author himself. These Sutras are not written in the style in which books are written now-a-days. If an author wanted to attach his name to his work, he could not put it at the beginning or at the end of the Sutras, for nothing could be attached to the Sutras which was not connected with the subject-matter. He could not, on the other hand, omit to mention his name, for then there would be a misapprehension that the Sutras were of a superhuman origin. He could not also use the first person as it would not denote any particular person. Where the name of the author is given either at the beginning or at the end of a book there the use of the

† Six systems of Ind. Philosophy p. 158

first person, such as "my view," "I hold this," etc, can show who is referred to by the first person; but where the name of the author is not found at all the use of the first person would be useless. So the only way left open to the author was to insert his name in the Sūtras in connexion with some particular theory or view of his own.

Though Prof. Keith says, "we have no valid reason for assuming that the Sūtras were actually redacted by Jaimini and Bādarāyana themselves, and unless this is established the argument for contemporaneity is invalid,"* still we do not think that there is any harm in assuming that they themselves redacted the Sūtras. Somebody must have redacted the Sūtras, for they could not come into existence without an author; and our task will indeed be much lighter if the reputed author can be proved to be the real author. There is a strong tradition which says that Jaimini and Bādarāyana actually wrote the Sūtras. We have never doubted that the Raghuvansha is a work of Kālidāsa although it is nowhere found that he is the author of the work. Here we have depended only upon tradition. Where no other relationship is traceable traditional appellations are usually regarded as denoting authorship. In the Purva Mimamsa discussions have been made regarding the appellations, Kathaka, Kalāpaka, etc., and Jaimini would certainly have held that Katha and Kalāpa were the authors of certain portions

of the Vedas had not the Vedas been regarded to be of divine origin. We ought not to ignore the value of such traditional appellations, as 'Jaimini Sutram,' 'Badarayana Sutram,' etc. unless we find strong reasons against it. We have shewn above that it is reasonable to believe that Badarayana and Jaimini were contemporaries, and that the latter wrote his Sutras after the former. It is true that the views of the other systems are found in these Sutras, but that fact alone does not upset our conclusion. We do not propose to hold that the theories of other systems were not in existence before Badarayana or Jaimini wrote his Sutras. It will be rather a mistake to imagine that the Mimamsa as a science did not develop before Jaimini. The very name "Sutra" or "thread" implies that it was meant to compress a large amount of matter within a short compass so that it might not be a burden on the memory. "The main object of the Sutras", says Prof. Macdonell, "is "therefore, to supply a short survey of these scattered details."* Unless a thing had been very large there would have been no necessity for embodying it into Sutras. But such a growth must have required a great length of time. So it is very likely that during that time the views of one system should have been discussed in another. It will be out of place here to try to ascertain the order of priority amongst the Sutrakaras of all the Darshanās. All that we want to assert here is that Badarayana and Jaimini were not mythical heroes of

† History of Sanskrit Literature, chap II.

their systems but that they actually wrote the Sūtras which tradition ascribes to them.

Now if the composition of the Uttara Mimamsa Sūtras be prior to that of the Purva Mimamsa Sūtras in time the division of the Mimamsa into a first part and a second part as has been made in the Seshwara Mimamsa will not be tenable. It will be preposterous to maintain that what was written first should be called, the second part, and what was written subsequently should form the first part. So the words 'Purva' and 'Uttara' were not used with reference to chronology.

Vedānta, because it deals with the sacred rites, the knowledge of which in the view of one school of the Vedānta is an indispensable preliminary to the knowledge of the absolute.¹ This statement of Prof. Keith, however, seems to be a representation of the view of the Viśhitādvaita system² and not that of Śaṅkara for he himself writes next,—“Though Śaṅkara declines to accept this view and insists instead on the diverse character of the two disciplines which renders it impossible to treat the former as the normal or necessary prelude to the latter”³ Śaṅkara has held, no doubt, that it is possible for a man who has read the Vedānta to have a desire for knowing Brahman even without desiring to know what Dharma is.⁴ What Śaṅkara means is that in this life some persons may have Brahman-jyāsa without Dharma-jyāsa, but that it is possible for those persons only who performed in their previous lives all the necessary duties prescribed in the Pūrva Mimamsā and possess in this life, as a consequence of such performances, a sufficient amount of restraint of senses etc., either in their childhood or during their student life. It is for such persons only that the following injunctions of the Shruti, ‘Brahmachāryadeva

1 Keith *Āstika Mimamsā* p. 6

2 धर्मावधानलक्ष्यमयजुर्ह्यर्थ — Śrī Lāra Bhāṣya

3 Keith *Āstika Mimamsā* p. 6

4 वसतिष्ठासताः प्रागधीतवद् लभ्य ब्रह्मजिज्ञासापन्न — Śrī Lāra Bhāṣya

Pravrajet," "Yadahareva Virajet Tadahareva Pravrajat," etc.; are intended. But at any rate this does not preclude the necessity of Dharma-jijnasa as a prelude to Brahma-jijnasa in the case of all ordinary persons. The Bhamati clearly states that this is the implication of Shankara.* We do not know on what authority Prof. Keith makes the remark quoted above. It is clear that Shankara instead of taking an exception to the view supports it fully.

As we see that according to these eminent authorities the aim of the Purva Mimamsa is a necessary prelude to the object of the Uttara Mimamsa, we can safely conclude that the epithets. "Purva" and "Uttara," have been used only with reference to different aims and to nothing else.

SECTION (C)

KUMARILA AND PRABHAKARA.

Of the two principal schools of the Purva Mimamsa the Bhatta school has all along attracted greater attention than the Prabhakara school. The study of the works of the Prabhakara school has been neglected for a long time past. All the knowledge that our

*एवं च अनुष्ठितकर्मापि प्राग्भवोयकर्मवशाद् यो विशुद्धसत्त्वः, संसारासारतादर्शनेन निष्पन्नवैराग्यः, कृतं तस्य कर्मानुष्ठानेन वैराग्योत्पादोपयोगिना, प्राग्भवोयकर्मानुष्ठानेनैव तत्सिद्धेः । Nirnayasagar Bd, p. 63.

old Sanskrit scholars had of the tenets of this school was derived solely from the stray references found in the works of the other systems. The first work of this school that has been recently published is Shalikanatha's *Prakaranapanchika*. This work epitomises many characteristic tenets of the Prabhakara school. Dr. Ganganath Jha has written a very learned thesis in which he has presented in a lucid form the main principles of the Prabhakara school as they have been dealt with in the *Prakaranapanchika*. He has also given for the first time, much valuable information regarding the *Bṛhātī* of Prabhakara which is a commentary on Śhībarī's *Bhāṣya*.

Dr. Jha has tried to show that though there are traditional stories which tell us that Prabhakara was a pupil of Kumārila there is no internal evidence proving this relationship. He has suggested that Prabhakara's works belong to a period earlier than that of Kumārila. Dr. Keith has, in his book, entitled, the *Karmamīmamsā* has repeated the opinion of Dr. Jha, and has gone even a step further in asserting that Shalikanatha also belonged to the antekumārila period.

In the Second Oriental Conference† Prof. Kuppuswami Shastri read a paper in which he thoroughly discussed the above points. He has attempted to support the tradition on historically acceptable grounds. To understand the matter properly it will be necessary for us to see from what data Dr. Jha has

† Held at Calcutta in 1922

drawn his conclusion, and whether the grounds given by Prof. Shastri are sufficient to make a refutation of that conclusion. The following is an extract from the book of Dr. Jha mentioned above:

“As regards the time and place where Prabhakara rose we have not been able to obtain any information except certain traditional stories current among Pundits. According to these¹ Prabhakara along with Mandana Mishra was a pupil of Kumarila. From the very beginning of his studies, he evinced great independence of thought and opinion, and many a story is told in exemplification of his independent spirit..... The teacher was pleased¹ at the ingenuity of his pupil that he, thereupon, conferred upon him the title of “Guru” or “Teacher.” That the tradition bearing upon the relation of Prabhakara to Kumarila is not a mere lip-story is proved by the following extract from an old Ms. of the Sarvasiddhanta Rahasya by Shesa commented upon by his son, Govinda, a pupil of the great Madhusudana:—

“अस्यां सूत्रं जैमिनीयं शाबर्यं भाष्यमस्य तु ।

मीमांसावार्त्तिकम् भाट्टम् भट्टाचार्य्यकृतं हि तत् ॥

तच्छिष्योऽप्यल्पभेदेन शाबरस्य मतान्तरम् ।

प्रभाकरगुरुश्चक्रे तद्धि प्राभाकरमतम् ॥

तस्य भाष्यवार्त्तिककक्तं भट्टाचार्य्यस्य शिष्यः प्रभाकरगुरुर्म-
दमताद् उपादानग्राहकग्रहणादिरूपप्रमाणान्तरनियोग-शब्दबल-
वार्द्धवादादिरूपपदभेदस्वीकारेण शाबरस्य शबरस्वामिकृतस्य
भाष्यस्य मतान्तरं प्राभाकरं नाम ग्रन्थभेदं कृतवानित्यर्थः :—

In regard to the relation between Kumarila and Prabhakara as indicated by the above tradition, it may be noted that it is not borne out by the internal evidence available in the writings of these authors.

(A) Prabhakara's *Brhati* is a 'comment' in the strict sense of the word, upon Shabara's *Bhasya*; it does not in any place differ from the original, which it always tries to support, nor does it attack any opinions of the original; in fact, as a rule it attacks no opinions except those of the avowed Purvapaka Kumarila, on the other hand, in many places in the *Tantra-vartika*, rejects the interpretation of Shabara, and offers an entirely different interpretation of his own. If Prabhakara had been an innovator or reformer or improver of the Bhatta system, he would naturally have taken up every one of these deviations from the *Bhasya* and tried to demolish it with his wonted veve and vigour. As a matter of fact, however, we find that the *Brhati* takes no notice of any of the new interpretations proposed by Kumarila. This would perhaps indicate that it was Kumarila and not Prabhakara, who was an innovator or reformer. This view is confirmed by the fact that while Prabhakara does not criticise any of the strikingly original interpretations of Kumarila the latter in many places, takes great pains to demolish certain views, a few of which we find put forward by Prabhakara in the *Brhati*. We append a few of these.—

(a) 1—ii su 31 (*Tantra-vartika*, Translation p. 54.)

Kumarila objects to the question of the Adhikarana being put in the form 'are mantras meaningless or not?'—the form in which it has been stated in the Brhāti (Ms. p-31 a).

(b) I—III-2 (Tantravartika, Translation p 31 a). According to Prabhakara (Ms. p. 31b) the Vedic texts in corroboration of injunctions found in the Smṛti are to be inferred. This is objected to by Kumarila.

(c) I—IV—1 As regards the connection of pada IV with the subject matter of the whole Adhyaya Prabhakara in agreement with the Bhasya, puts forward the question in the form—"Are the words (udvid and the like) expressive of materials or of names of sacrifices ?"—this question bearing upon the authority of Dharma (Brhāti p 38 a). This is objected to by Kumarila (Tantravartika, Trans. 373)

(d) I—IV—1 On the same Adhikarana, the Bhasya and the Brhāti with it, takes Sutra (1) as the 'Purvapakṣa' and su (2) as the Siddhanta : while Kumarila takes the two sutras as embodying two distinct Adhikaranas and objects to the other interpretation.

(Tantravartika Trans. p 373). The only point where we have found Prabhakara combating a view propounded by Kumarila is under IV—1—2 (Brhāti Ms. p 64 b, line 9 et seq). But in this connection also it is noteworthy that the words in which the view combated is expressed—which are apparently a quotation—are very different from those employed by Kumarila (IV-1-2) The words of the latter are—

“कृतये द्व्यार्जने ऋतुविपातः स्यात् ;” while those used by Prabhakara are—“कृतदंते चप्रमेव न भवतीति याव एव न संभवेत्” and this is combated by Prabhakara in the words—

प्रलपितमिदं केनापि भर्जनं सत्त्वं नापादयतीति प्रतिपिद्धम्.

The difference in the words shows that ‘Kenapi’ of Prabhakara must refer to some one entirely different from Kumarila.....

(B) In point of style also, the Brhati shows distinct signs of being older than the Tantravartika...”†

Thus we see that Dr Jha has adduced external evidence showing that Prabhakara was a pupil of Kumarila and evidence from their own works indicating that Prabhakara was anterior to Kumarila. It is clear enough that the internal evidence far outweighs the external. His principal argument is that Kumarila’s Vartika is nowhere referred to in the Brhati whereas the Brhati is referred to in many places in the Tantravartika.

Against this Prof. Kuppswami Shastri urges that Shalikanatha who was a direct pupil of Prabhakara, has referred to the Shlokavartika in several places of his Prakaranapanchika, Rjuvimala and Parishista. Hence he supposes that Prabhakara was not anterior to Kumarila. We quote his own words below :

“Prabhakara, Shalikanatha and Bhavanatha are the three greatest exponents of the Prabhakara school, so far definitely known to us. Shalikanatha in the first verse of Nitipatha, (section II of the Prakaranapanchika)”

† Indian Thought pp—129—34.

refers to himself as Prabhakara's pupil. In the Prakaranapanchika, several quotations from the Shlokavartika are found. For instance, on pages 5, 114, and 122 of the Benares Sanskrit Series Edition of the Prakaranapanchika the following verses from the Shlokavartika are found :—

“अथातो धर्मजिज्ञासासूत्रमाद्यमिदं कृतम् ।” page 5.

“गेहाभावेस्तु यः शुद्धः.....” page 114.

“स्वरूपमात्रं दृष्ट्वापि.....” page 122.

Similar quotations from Kumarila Bhatta's Shloka-vartika are found in Shalikanatha's Rjuvimala and Pari-shista.....

Again, in the Tarkapada of the Rjuvimala, on the first leaf..... which is found in a crumbling condition, I find the following portion of the Avatarika to the first sentence in the Brhati :—

“लोक इत्यादि भाष्यं यत्तगौरवं प्र.....(broken) तिरिक-
कारेण व्याख्यातम् । तच्च मन्दप्रयोजनमिति मत्वा टोकाकारः
प्रयोजनं दर्शयति—लोक इत्यादिभाष्यस्य इत्यादिना ।”

The following further extract also from the same broken leaf is worthy of note :—

“.....त्वादविप्रतिपन्नत्वाच्च अथातः शब्दयो रेवालौकि-
कार्याशङ्कानिवृत्ति.....योजनं लौकिक.....”

However imperfect the above extracts may be, to my mind it is clear that two inferences could be

unmistakably drawn from them. Firstly, Shalikanatha assumes that Prabhakara is refuting the views of the Vartikakara with reference to the purpose of the opening sentence of the Bhasya. Secondly, Prabhakara interprets the Bhasyakara as re-affirming the view of an earlier commentator, that 'Adhatah' should be interpreted as a single significative unit. Though I agree with Dr. Gangadhar Jha in thinking that there might have been more than one Vartikakara, and that one of them was Kumarila and the 'Vartakakara' quoted frequently by Shalikanatha and Bhavanatha in support of the Prabhakara doctrines must have been different from Kumarila and probably earlier than both Kumarila and Prabhakara, yet I am strongly inclined to think that the Vartikakara referred to in the above extract from the Rjuvimala must be Kumarila himself, one important reason being that the above Vartikakara is generally found invoked only in support of Prabhakara's view and not for offering 'refutatory comments.'

Let us now examine the grounds on which the assertion that Shalikanatha was a direct pupil of Prabhakara, rests. In the first verse of the second section of the Prakaranapanchika we find the passage

"गुरुः प्रभाकरः"

Prof. Kuppaswami Shastri interprets this as meaning that the author was a pupil of Prabhakara. But it is evident that the word "Guru" does not mean here a preceptor. Had it meant a preceptor it should have been placed as the first part of the compound as 'प्रभाकरगुरुः' and not as the second part.

It is well-known that गुरु was a title of Prabhakara, and there is little doubt that it has been used here as such. Again, the word गुरु has been used in the singular number and the word शिष्य in the plural. This is simply preposterous. It is too well-known that the plural number denotes dignity, and the names of all revered persons, are, therefore, always used in the plural number. We cannot believe that Shalikanatha was so impertinent that he arrogated all the dignity to himself to the exclusion of his preceptor who was no less a personage than Prabhakara himself. Hence it is not proper to infer from this passage that Shalikanatha was a direct pupil of Prabhakara. That Shalikanatha flourished at a later time is borne out by evidence gathered from the Prakaranapanchika itself. All of us know that in the Prakaranapanchika two Purvapaksas regarding the injunction for Vedic study have been framed one after another. The first of them runs thus : अन्ये पुनरे पूर्वपक्षयानि, अध्यापन-विधिप्रयुक्तमध्ययन मध्यापनाङ्गम्. It purports to follow the line indicated by Prabhakara, but still it is rejected and another Purvapaksa तस्मादनङ्गतदेव पूर्वपक्षणीयम् is proposed. There is no doubt that the passage—प्रयोज्यत्व दनङ्गत्वाच्च संशयः of the Bṛhati is the root of both of these Purvapaksas. From this we can infer that the above passage of the Bṛhati was differently understood by different persons, and that Shalikanatha wants to point out its true purport by correcting the errors committed by the other followers of Prabhakara. It is not probable that such

different interpretations took place during the lifetime of the author himself or that of his direct pupils. It is more probable that there came a time when the proper study of the works of Prabhakara fell off. At that time people felt a difficulty in ascertaining the true interpretation of Prabhakara's works. The very manner in which the two divergent Purvapaksa views have been put forward in the *Prakarana-panchika*, clearly indicates that it was composed at such a time, and unless we assume the existence of such a state of things it will not be possible to explain why such an important passage of the *Brhati* should be so differently understood and why *Shalikhatha* should assert something as the true view of Prabhakara.

The study of the works of Kumarila has all along been continuously carried on, and that is certainly one of the reasons of the wide dissemination of his doctrines; on the other hand, the deterioration of the study of the Prabhakara system has been the main cause of the want of its circulation. We have seen that there are traditional stories which tell us that Prabhakara was a pupil of Kumarila; but at the same time there are other similar stories from which we learn that that it was Kumarila who destroyed the system of Prabhakara. It clearly appears from the tenth verse of the *Pratijna-sutra* that Kumarila had a very bitter feeling against an older system (of *Bhartṛmitra* and others) which, as Prof. Shastri says, was identical with the Prabhakara system. That verse runs thus:—

“प्रायेणैव दि मीमांसा लोके लोकायतीकृता ।

तामास्तिकपथे कर्तुमयं यत्नः कृतो मया ॥”

"The Mimamsa has been reduced almost to a heretical system in this world. I make this attempt to revert it to the orthodox line." In the Nyayaratnakara this verse has been explained as follows :—

**“नित्यकर्मणां फलं नास्तीति बह्वपसिद्धान्तपरिग्रहेण
मोमांसा भर्तृमित्रादिभिर्लोकायतीकृता”**

“Bhartṛmitra and others have reduced the Mimamsa to a heterodox system by adopting many wrong conclusions such as,—‘the compulsory duties bring in no rewards’, etc.’ But Bhartṛmitra and others obeyed the authorities of the Vedas as much as Kumarila did. So it is not at all probable that they actually preached heterodox doctrines like the followers of the Charvaka School. This vilification must have been, therefore, made by Kumarila out of spite against Bhartṛmitra and his followers. This verse plainly indicates that Kumarila tried his best to put down the rival system, and it corroborates the tradition that Kumarila destroyed the Prabhākara system. So we see that this tradition is not without foundation, and hence we cannot easily ignore it though it contradicts the other tradition mentioned before.

It cannot be fairly contended that ‘Kumarila condemned the doctrines of Bhartṛmitra who had been anterior to him and that Prabhākara, a pupil of Kumarila, simply re-established those doctrines, for it should not be believed for a moment that a pupil made it his sole aim to resuscitate those doctrines which had been openly condemned by his preceptor as heretical.

Thus it appears that owing to the attacks of Kumarila or any other cause the system of Prabhakara was reduced to a dwindling condition, and men like Shalikanatha attempted to revive it at a later period. Owing to the reasons assigned above we are unable to conclude that Shalikanatha was a direct pupil of Prabhakara.

The next thing urged by Prof. Kuppaswami Shastri, is that Shalikanatha has quoted certain passages from the Shlokavartika. On a closer scrutiny it will be found that this also is not maintainable. The learned professor has pointed out three passages as specimens. The first of them is—

“अथातो धर्मजिज्ञासा-सूत्रमाद्यमिदं कृतम्”*

This verse has been quoted in the Prakāraṇa-panchika in the course of stating a certain view of the Bhatta School. But it has been quoted after invoking a certain ‘Vartikakara-mishra’—‘the revered Vartikakara’—twice; and the name of Kumarila has not been mentioned in this connexion. Hence there arises a doubt as to whether this Vartikakara-mishra and Kumarila are one and the same person.

In an earlier portion of the Prakāraṇa-panchika the appellation, ‘Vartikakara-mishra’, occurs, and there, too, he is referred to in connexion with a Purvapākṣa which has been framed in accordance with the Bhatta view. This view is found stated in the Nayaviveka of Bhavanatha in the following words :—

* Prakāraṇa Panchika. P. 5.

“परैरेवं चिन्तितम्, अतोऽतिदेशागतार्थवादावगत-

पितृवृत्तिद्वारकं सार्वार्थ्यं भाव्यं कल्प्यम्”*

“Others (opponents) think that we should imagine a fruit in the shape of omnipotence which is to be achieved by producing the satisfaction of the manes, and which is connected (with the present injunction) by transferring it from the Arthavada of an analogous injunction.” Here this view is described as the view of the opponents. Now, if we compare this passage with the said portion of the Purvapaksa of Prakarana-panchika we shall find that it is identically the same thing. That portion runs thus :—

तदाहुर्वार्तिककारमिश्राः—

‘अनुपपन्नानुमानाद्यैर्लभ्यन्तेऽन्येऽतिदेशतः’ इति ते अर्थ-
वादा अर्थभावनायां फलं कल्पयन्ति* ।

“On this point the revered Vartikakara says—‘other Arthavadas are obtained by transference through association or inference,’ and those Arthavadas supply fruits for the Arthi Bhavana.”

So there is not a shadow of doubt that this ‘revered Vartikakara’ is an opponent of the Prābhakaras. Though this ‘revered Vartikakara’ has been invoked in the Prakarana-panchika for supporting the Prābhakara view relating to Arthapatti as a means of proof *still it can not be said that he is a friend of the Prābhakaras, in as much as Kumarila himself holds the same opinion on that point. So it cannot be maintained that the above

* Nayaviveka. Ms.

* Prakarana Panchika, P. 3.

Vartikakara is generally found invoked only in support of Prabhakara's view, and it seems that the above Vartikakara and Kumarila are one and the same person

But the verse ("चतुष्टयमुक्तमात्रं" . . . which has been quoted above from the Prakaranapanchika does not occur in the Kumarila-Vartika at all. This fact, along with the other, viz, that Kumarila's name is not specifically mentioned in any of the above cases, can lead to the only conclusion that there was another Vartikakara, an earlier originator of the Bhatta School, from whose works both Kumarila and Shrilakshana have quoted passages. The verse, "चदाता धर्मजिज्ञासु-स्वभावमिदं ह्यहम्" is most likely a verse of this kind

The second verse "नेष्टुमात्रं य इदं," which is pointed out by Prof. Kuppaswami Shastri has also been quoted in the Prakaranapanchika after invoking the Vartikakara mishra and not Kumarila. Hence this verse, too, may be regarded as a composition of that Vartikakara and not of Kumarila

The third verse pointed out by Prof. Shastri is--
"सर्वमात्रं दृष्ट्वा" * To this verse the appellation, Vartikakara mishra, is not attached. But the reading differs palpably from the reading of the Shlokavartika. In the Prakaranapanchika it runs thus --

"स्वरूपमात्रं दृष्ट्वा हि वैशमाययं स्मरन् पुनः । तत्रान्येनास्ति-
ता दृष्टस्तदेव प्रतिपद्यते ॥ "

while in the Shlokavartika the reading is

* Prakaraṇa pañchika P 114

“स्वरूपमात्रं दृष्ट्वापि, पश्चात् किञ्चित् स्मरन्नपि-। तत्रान्यैर्ना-
स्तितं पृष्टस्तदेव प्रतिपद्यते ॥ ”

The interpretation given in the Prakaranapanchika is also different from that given in the Nyayaratnakara. In the Prakaranapanchika it is introduced to prove that Anupalabdhi is not an independent means of proof, whereas in the Shlokavartika it is put forward for establishing the reverse of it. So it is evident that both the readings have all along been recognised as correct readings, and neither of them can be rejected as an erroneous one. How can we say then, that Shalikanatha has quoted it from Kumarila? This fact not only negatives the conclusion that Shalikanatha has borrowed verses from Kumarila, but it also goes to support the other conclusion that both of them have borrowed from some other original source. They have quoted some verses, word for word, while in others they themselves have made changes as they thought fit. The readings of the first two verses, therefore, agree exactly with one another, whereas the readings of the third one do not so agree.

The next point urged by Prof. Shastri is that the Vartikakara referred to in the Avatarika to the first sentence of the Brhati in the Rjuvimala of Shalikanatha, is Kumarila himself. Here Prabhakara is represented as refuting the view of the Vartikakara. But we are to determine whether the particular view that is refuted is actually the view of Kumarila. The interpretation of the expression 'Athatah' is here the subject for discussion. In the explanation of the Sutras made by Bhava-

dasa and other Vrttikaras, this expression was treated as a single technical expression. But all commentators and even Kumarila himself have rejected that interpretation. The following verse of the Shlokavartika shows that Kumarila has treated this case as one of Parisankhya :—

“मध्यमे चातिदीर्घन्यात् परिसंख्येयमुच्यते ।”

So there cannot be any doubt, whatsoever, that Kumarila has not ascribed any technical meaning to the expression. Why should, then, the interpretation of Kumarila be condemned as *सन्दर्भोक्तम्*? If we scrutinise the following passage of the Nayavivēka in which the very same matter has been discussed, we shall be convinced that Kumarila is not the person referred to there. It runs thus :—

परमते लोक इत्यादिभाष्यस्य पदार्थानुक्त्या दशावक्षी च अपरा उक्ता, तथापि अथशब्दद्वयणार्थम् औचित्यानुभाषणपरत्वमेव स्योक्तम् ॥ ”

“The opponents have first stated the six interpretations of the passage, *लोके* etc., of the Bhasya, and then ten other alternatives.....” But in the Vartika we do not find the ten other alternatives.

No attempt has been made in the Brhati to support the view of the Vrttikara by holding that the expression ‘Athatah’ is a single word. The Bhasya has plainly treated it as consisting of two words, and the Brhati and

other commentaries have followed the Bhasya in this respect. It is for this reason that the ordinary meaning of the expression has been adopted in the *Nayaviveka* :—

“लौकिकार्थं पदद्वयमिति शास्त्रारम्भः प्रतिज्ञासूत्रम्”*

“as the two words have an ordinary sense the *Pratijña-sūtra* forms the beginning of the *Śāstra*.” It is well-known that *Bhavadāsa* did not attribute any ordinary meaning because he treated the two words as forming one single unit. He is referred to in the *Shloka-vartika* in this connection :—

‘वृत्त्यन्तरेषु केषांचिद् लौकिकार्थव्यतिक्रमः’*

“in the *Vṛttis* of some others the ordinary meaning has been given up.” Thus we see that the *Shloka-vartika*, the *Bṛhāti* and the *Nayaviveka* agree in their conclusion that the expression “*Athatah*” does not possess any extraordinary meaning. Thus it is not possible to assume that the word, *Vartikakarena*’ used in the beginning of the *Rjūvimala* designates *Kumarila*.

Prof. Kuppuswami Shastri has spoken of other quotations from the *Shloka-vartika* which he has found in the *Rjūvimala* and the *Parishista*. But as he has not exhibited them, we are unable to examine them and consequently cannot come to any definite conclusion regarding them. But until those quotations are shown and judged it cannot be said only on the grounds adduced

* *Nayaviveka*, Ms. *Jijnāśasūtra*.

* *Pratijñāsūtra*, verse 33.

above that the Vartikakara-mishra of the Prakaranapanchika is Kumarila. Hence we are unable to conform to the opinion of Prof. Shastri,—“I am strongly inclined to think that the Vartikakara referred to in the above extract from the Rjuvimala must be Kumarila himself, etc.”

Prof. Shastri next urges that Prabhakara was a contemporary of Kumarila. He says, “Shalikanatha, who describes himself as Prabhakara's pupil, refers to a Mandana Mishra in his Prakaranapanchika on page 178 in which a well-known verse from Mandana's Vidhiviveka is quoted viz:—“*युगं शिष्याचार्यतया*” Mandana is generally believed to be one of the pupils of Kumarila Bhatta. Mandana refers to Prabhakara and the Brhati in the Vidhiviveka (already printed) and in the Brahmasiddhi (of which my edition is under preparation) in several places with the animus generally characteristic of a contemporaneous opponent.” By analysing this statement we obtain the following facts:—Mandana is a pupil of Kumarila, Shalikanatha is a pupil of Prabhakara, Mandana treats Prabhakara in a manner that besits a contemporary, and Shalikanatha quotes passages from Mandana's Vidhiviveka. From these facts Prof. Shastri intends to draw the conclusion that Prabhakara was a contemporary of Kumarila.

But we have shown above that Shalikanatha was not a pupil of Prabhakara. As regards the assertion that Mandana was a pupil of Kumarila there is no evidence excepting a general belief. Even if this belief

“उम्बेकः कारिकां वेत्ति चम्पू वेत्ति प्रभाकरः । मण्डनस्तूमयं वेत्ति नीमयं वेत्ति रेवणः ॥”

Prof. Shastriar asserts that both Umveka and Mandana are pupils of Kumarila. We have already discussed the question of relationship between Mandana and Kumarila. Let us now see how Prof. Shastri makes out that Umveka was a pupil of Kumarila. He finds his strongest evidence in the Shastradipika. :—“The subjoined extract from Shastradipika* would appear to leave no alternative except to assume that Umveka Bhatta was one of the pupils of Kumarila Bhatta

“अत्रोम्बेकमष्टैरिदं तु चार्तिककारीयं दूषणं समर्थनं च सर्वमेवालूनविशोर्णमित्यादिना..... गुरोरप्यवलितस्य कार्य्या-कार्य्यमज्ञानतः । उत्पथप्रतिपन्नस्य परित्यागो विधीयते ॥ इत्यनेन ग्रन्थेन भाष्यं चार्तिकं च दूषितम् ।”

But we do not think that from this extract from the Shastradipika we are justified in concluding that Umveka was a direct pupil of Kumarila. In the very beginning of the Shastradipika we find this passage —

“ऊक्तं च उम्बेकेन,ग्रन्थारम्भे अभिमतदेवतानमस्कारं करोति चार्तिककारः”

which contains a quotation from some work of Umveka. Here the word, Vartikakara, is in the singular

above, Prof. Shastri has observed: "It is noteworthy here that the *Apasiddhanta* referred to in this extract is widely known to the world of Indian philosophers as one of the distinctive tenets of the *Prabhakara* school. If *Bhartrmutra*, and not *Prabhakara*, is associated with this tenet as its exponent as presupposed by *Kumarila*, one is tempted to fancy that perhaps *Prabhakara*'s relation to *Bhartrmutra* was similar to *Shankara*'s relation to *Gaudapada*." We do not understand exactly what Prof. Shastri means to establish here. If the relation of *Prabhakara* to *Bhartrmutra* be the same as that of *Shankara* to *Gaudapada*, then *Prabhakara* must be regarded as a direct pupil of *Bhartrmutra*. How can he then say again that *Prabhakara* was a direct pupil of *Kumarila*? So his argument affects the very tradition which he wants to maintain. But if he regards *Bhartrmutra* as the rival founder of the *Prabhakara* school of which *Prabhakara* was a later exponent, still he cannot establish that *Prabhakara* was a pupil of *Kumarila*, for we do not know exactly whether he flourished before, or at the time of *Kumarila*.

Thus on a consideration of all the above points we find that the grounds stated by Prof. Shastri do not enable us to draw any conclusion regarding the relationship of *Kumarila* and *Prabhakara*, and that, on the other hand, there is strong evidence, both internal and external, supporting the suggestion made by Dr. Jha (viz. that *Prabhakara* was anterior to *Kumarila*)

CHAPTER II.

PRAMA AND PRAMANA.

Cognitions are divided into two classes,--(1) Prama or valid cognition, and (2) Aprama or invalid cognition. The Bhattas define valid cognition as that 'which being free⁶ from discrepancies apprehends things not already apprehended.' There is practically not much difference between this definition of the Bhattas and the corresponding definition of the Prabhakaras. But Dr. Jha is of opinion that the Bhattas do not accept the definition given by the Prabhakaras, and that the definition given by the former is subversive of the Swatah-pramanya or self-validity of cognition 'which forms the very keynote of Mimamsa.'

Dr. Jha derives the Prabhakara definition of Prama from the following verse of the Prakarana-panchika :--

“प्रमाणमनुभूतिः, सा स्मृतेरन्या न सा स्मृतिः

न प्रमाणं स्मृतिः पूर्वप्रतिपत्तिव्यपेक्षणात् ॥”

He explains this verse thus:—“That is to say, valid cognition is apprehension, it is totally different from Remembrance which is not valid, inasmuch as it stands in need of a previous cognition, being as it is, a cognition, produced only by the impressions left by a previous cognition.....Thus Remembrance cannot be regarded as valid, because it bears upon its (object) not directly, but only indirectly, through the agency of previous cognitions of that object.”

Here we notice that remembrance is not regarded as valid cognition, and why?—Because it stands in need of a previous cognition. Thus, according to the author of *Prakaranapanchika*, the need of a previous apprehension is the cause of the invalidity of remembrance. By this statement of the *Prakaranapanchika*, it is clearly implied that previous non-apprehension of the object is a criterion of validity.

So, we see that the remark, that valid cognition is but apprehension, pure and simple, does not tally with the view of the *Prakaranapanchika*. Had it been the intention of the author of the *Prakaranapanchika* to define valid cognition as mere apprehension without attaching to it any extraneous condition, such as previous non-apprehension, he would certainly have denied the validity of remembrance on the simple ground that it is not an apprehension, and he would never have felt the necessity of assigning any other reason.

* There is no doubt, therefore, that the condition of not being apprehended before is accepted by both the schools. The only difference between the views of the two schools is that while the *Bhettas* impose two conditions, viz., the absence of discrepancies and the previous nonapprehension of the object, the *Prabhakaras* impose only the latter. That remembrance is no valid cognition is admitted by both the schools. But there is a difference of opinion regarding such a wrong cognition as that of silver in a conch-shell. The *Bhettas* hold that the cognition—

"this is silver"—is only one cognition, but, according to the Prabhakaras, there are two cognitions involved in it, of which, one is an apprehension and the other is a remembrance. Dr. Jha has explained this very lucidly, and it is worth while to quote his explanation here: "The judgment or idea resulting from the cognition, "this is silver" when referring to the shell, contains not one, but two cognitions,—one pertaining to 'silver' and the other to 'this'; and of these two, the idea of 'silver' is mere remembrance; and as such, not being 'apprehension', it cannot be regarded as valid; the other factor in the idea—the idea of 'this'—is of the nature of apprehension, and, as such, must be regarded as valid. Thus we find that the wrongness of the judgment 'this is silver' lies in the idea of silver which is remembrance; and this also is regarded as wrong, simply because it is not found to agree with the real state of things, when the agent proceeds to act up to the judgment, and picks up the piece. Even those* who regard the judgment, 'this is silver,' as containing a single idea, and as wrong, base the wrongness upon the fact of the judgment being one that is found to be subsequently sublated, and not upon anything in the nature of the cognition itself. But these people also cannot regard as wrong that factor of the judgment which pertains to 'this' as the notion of 'this' is not found to be sublated, being retained in the sublating judgment also, which latter is in the form—"this is not silver but shell"†

The next question is whether the introduction of the two qualifications would disturb the *Swatah-pramanya* of cognitions or not. On this point Dr. Jha says: "If the validity of cognitions depends not upon its own nature, but upon such extraneous circumstances as the absence of discrepancies and the previous non-apprehension of the object, then where would be its *Swatah-pramanya* or self-validity?"*

It is true that errors, remembrances, apprehensions and other instances of cognition are all valid as cognitions. Even if a cognition is found not to agree with the real state of things, the cognition as cognition cannot but be regarded as valid. But still, for practical purposes, cognitions are divided into valid and invalid cognitions. If a cognition satisfies such conditions as the absence of discrepancies, or a previous non-apprehension of the object, it is regarded as a valid cognition, otherwise it is regarded as invalid, in spite of the fact that it is valid as a cognition. We have seen above that the invalidity of remembrance is due to the fact that it depends upon a previous apprehension and not to the fact that the very nature of cognition is wanting there.

Thus we see that the expression, 'validity of cognition,' is used in two senses. A cognition is valid *per se*, and a cognition is valid which stands the tests mentioned above; or in other words, there is a validity which is due to an internal cause, and there

* Ind. Thought Vol. II, p. 142.

is another validity which depends upon external causes also.

In the Nyayaratnavali the external causes have been specifically described.* It is stated there that the external causes which make a cognition valid are of two kinds,—the absence of discrepancies, and want of previous apprehension of the object—of which the first is common to remembrance and apprehension, and the second is found only in the case of apprehension. In the Vedantaparibhasa, too, it is stated that the validity which depends upon the two factors—absence of discrepancies and previous non-apprehension, does not exist in remembrance, but that that validity which depends upon the absence of discrepancies only, is common to remembrance also. On a consideration of these statements we find that three kinds of validity are recognised. The first depends upon the absence of discrepancies and previous non-apprehension, and exists in direct apprehension; the second depends upon the absence of discrepancies only and exists both in remembrance and in apprehension; and the third is inherent in the nature of cognition, and so, is present in all sorts of cognition—error, remembrance and apprehension. The first two are known as Paratograhya Pramatta, i.e., validity due to extraneous causes, and the third one is called, Swatograhya Pramatta, i.e., validity due to cognition itself. That Kumarila has recognised this distinction appears from the following passage of his—

* Nyayaratnavali, p. 123.

‘तस्माद् बोधादप्रकल्पेन स्वतः प्राप्ता प्रमाणता ।

अप्यन्यथात्वहेतुद्वयोपपत्त्याद् अपोपत्ते ॥’ •

“The validity of cognition, therefore, lies in its very nature ; it is set aside when it is found to be vitiated on account of disagreement with the real state of things.” Here Kumarila has very briefly spoken of the two kinds of validity. His followers, Parthasarathi Mishra† and other later writers, have, however, put forward the definition of valid cognition as that which being free from discrepancies, apprehends things not already apprehended. But they have simply defined the Paratograhya Pramatta. They have not, as Dr. Jha supposes, ‘missed the very point of the dictum of the Swatah-pramanya of cognitions,’ but they have not clearly drawn a distinction between Swatograhya Pramatta and Paratograhya Pramatta. There is no evidence to show that they have denied the self-validity of cognitions, save that they have mentioned the other kind of validity. The mere mention of the Paratograhya Pramatta, however, does not imply the denial of the Swatograhya Pramatta, because the former presupposes the latter and does not exclude it. As Kumarila himself has definitely accepted the Swatah-pramanya of cognitions, the later text-writers have only taken it for granted. Besides, the Swatograhya Pramatta exists in all cognitions, whereas the Paratograhya Pramatta exists only in some of them. So,

* Shlokavartika, 2nd Su, Verse 53.

† Shastradipika, p. 23.

whenever the validity of a cognition is questioned, it is the Parato-grahya Pramātva that is invariably taken into account. This is also another reason why the later writers of the Bhatta School have defined this kind of validity only. It is clear from their definition, that it is only the Paratograhya Pramātva that is meant, though, in fact, they have not used that specific name to designate it. In the Laghu-chandrika this Parato-grahya Pramātva has been clearly described as that Pramātva which is good for practical purposes:

“व्यवहारप्रयोजकं प्रमात्वं, स्वतो ग्राह्यं प्रमात्वं च, द्विविधं प्रमात्वं वर्तते ।” *

Thus we see that the expression “Validity” has all along been used in two different senses, between which there is no confusion. There is no reason, therefore, to fear that the Swatah-pramanya of cognitions will disappear if the validity is made to depend upon extraneous circumstances.

Prabhakara recognises five forms of valid cognition: (1) Pratyaksa (perception); (2) Anumana (inference); (3) Upamana. (analogy); (5) Shaztra (Shabda) and (5) Arthapatti (presumption). Kumarila accepts all these and adds one more, viz, Abhava (non-apprehension). Pratyaksa proceeds from the direct contact of the sense-organs with the object. Inference is the cognition of an object not in direct

* Gauda-Brahmanandi,

Nirnaya Sagar Press Ed., P. 319.

contact with our senses, which (cognition) is due to the perception of some other thing, between which and the first object, an invariable connection is known to exist. *Upamāna* is the cognition of similarity of an object not in contact with our senses to an object which is actually perceived.

Shabda (*Shāstra*) or verbal cognition is the cognition by virtue of the knowledge of words, of something which is not open to the ordinary means of cognition. *Arthapatti* or presumption is the presumption of a thing which is necessary for reconciling the apparent inconsistency of two certain perceptions. *Abhāva* (non-existence) or *Anupalabdhi* (non-apprehension) is recognised by *Kumarila* as a separate means of proof. In the case of the judgment, 'there is no jar on the table,' the absence of the jar is cognised; but this cognition is neither perception, nor inference, nor any of the above-mentioned means of proof. *Kumarila* holds, therefore, that non-apprehension is the only means whereby this absence is cognised. As against this the *Prabhakaras* argue that there is nothing which could be cognised by means of non-apprehension, and, therefore, they do not accept *Anupalabdhi* as a distinct means of proof.

It is needless for us to enter here into all the details and differences of views regarding these six *Pramanas*. We shall, therefore, say only a word or two about the necessity of introducing so many *Pramanas* into the *Mīmāṃsā*.

The sole business of the Mimamsakas consists in ascertaining Dharma or Duty. This Duty is not a materially existing thing, and there is no possibility, therefore, of its ever coming into contact with our sense-organs. Hence, Pratyaksa is of no use here. Similarly, Anumana, Upamana, Arthapatti and Anupalabdhi, all of which are dependent more or less upon Pratyaksa, are of no avail in ascertaining Duty or Dharma. Consequently, the Mimamsakas have accepted the Vedas as the only infallible means of acquiring the knowledge of Duty. Now, if the Vedas be the only means in this respect, why should the other four or five means be at all discussed in the Mimamsa? To this Shabara Swamin gives the simple answer that Pratyaksa and the other means of proof have been introduced into the Mimamsa not for the purpose of ascertaining Dharma through them, but only with a view to satisfying ourselves that Dharma cannot be ascertained through them.

But though Pratyaksa etc. are not directly useful for ascertaining Dharma, they are necessary for refuting some of the antagonistic views questioning the authoritativeness of the Vedas and for settling various questions in connection with Dharma.

The Sougatas have denied the existence of external things. They hold that there is no actual existence of external things as apart from cognitions, and that the outside world is nothing but Shunya. This view is clearly in opposition to that of the Shruti. If there be no real existence of Paradise, etc., why should the

Shruti enjoin sacrifices? Hence it is necessary to conclude that the external world does actually exist and that a correct knowledge of it can be derived by Pratyakṣa. It is evident, therefore, that the recognition of Pratyakṣa as a means of proof is not out of place in the Mimamsa. This fact is put very concisely in the following verse of the Shlokaṣṭika:

“इति बहिर्विषयप्रतिपादनात्
तदभावकृता मत्तिसंकृतिः ।
अस्य तदविवर्ति परमार्थतः
असमिद्धं धुरि धर्म-विचारणे ॥” †

“The false notion that was created by (preaching the theory of) the non-existence of external things is thus (removed) by propounding that they are existent. This (Mimamsa Shashtra) is able to help those who believe in the truth of both (cognitions and external things) in discussing Dharma.”

The usefulness of Anumana lies in making various necessary assumptions. We may cite a well-known case by way of illustration. The authority of Smṛti texts is established by assuming that they have had a Vedic origin. The Smṛti texts are all human compositions, and so, their authority regarding matters of Dharma is challenged. But as their authors were pre-eminent Vedic scholars, it is assumed that they have been derived from the Vedas.*

* Shunyatva, Verse 201.

† Purva-mimamsa, I. 3

In the latter half of the Purva-Mimamsa, the question of Atidesha or transference is discussed in numerous cases. In all those cases, the usefulness of Upamāna or analogy is clearly perceived. We cannot decide that the Sourya Sacrifice is to be performed after the manner of the Agneya Sacrifice unless we accept analogy as a valid means of proof. Again, the question of substitution is decided only on the ground of analogy.† We quote below the verses of the Shlokavartika showing the usefulness of Upamāna:—

भिन्नानुमानादुपमेयमुक्ता

सौर्यादि वाक्ये रसहापि दृष्टम् ।

सादृश्यतोऽग्न्यादि युतं कथं नो

प्रत्याययेदित्युपयुज्यते नः ॥

प्रतिनिधिरपि चेवं ब्रूहि सः दृश्ययोगात्

भवति तदपचारे यत्र नीवार—जातौ ।

तदपि फलमभीष्टं लक्षणस्योपमायाः

प्रतिकृतिरपि गौणे बौध्यते यत्र चान्यैः ॥

यदि सुसदृशमेतत् लभ्यते तत्र मिथ्या

भवति विसदृशत्वान् मन्दसादृश्ययुक्तम् ।

मतिरपि च तथैव द्रागिवोत्पद्यतेऽस्मिन्

इतरविषयबोधे सत्यपीत्थंञ्च बाधः॥**

“This Upamāna is different from Anumana, The sentence containing the words ‘Agni, etc,’ is not con-

† Chap. VI. Adhi, 3, 11, 14, 15 etc.

* Upamāna Parichheda, Verses 52-54.

ned with the sentences beginning with Sourya, etc., but still by analogy it transfers its own details. Here lies the usefulness (of Upamana). Where Brih is lost or is not available Nivara is accepted as a substitute on account of its similarity to Brih. Here also Upamana serves a distinct purpose. In some cases the similarity is understood through points of similitude which are not strong, and in other cases it is clear—the points of similitude being strong. The former which is not clearly similar, is useless, because of its less similarity, whereas the latter is accepted readily; and when it is once accepted, the other one is excluded in spite of its being taken into account."

The usefulness of Arthapatti as a means of proof is thus set forth in the Shlokavastika* :—

“स्मृत्या धृतिर्या परिकल्प्यतेस्मिन्

लिङ्गादिभिर्या विनिर्वाहिका च ।

फलादिभि र्यत् परिपूर्णं च

संबन्धद्वक् तत्र न काचिदस्ति ॥” *

“In it (the Purva-Mimamsa) an original Vedic text is imagined from the existence of a Smṛti text; a -text of the Shruti showing the application of a particular thing is imagined on the Linga principle, etc., and results etc., are imagined to make (injunctions) complete. But in all these cases there is no means of showing these connections (except Arthapatti)” We have cited the first of these cases under Anumana. Where there is

* Arthapatti, verse 87

no direct pronouncement of the Shruti showing an application, an injunction is made out by the suggestive power of ideas, etc. In the injunctions for Vishvajit and some other sacrifices no fruits are mentioned but are imagined. All these things are made out by Arthapatti. It may be said that really speaking there is no distinction between Anumāna and Arthapatti. Kumarila, in fact, actually draws a distinction between them, yet at the same time it must be admitted that he is never eager to regard Arthapatti as a separate means of proof. The following Shloka clearly sets forth his view :—

“एवं स्वभावाप्यनुमानशब्दं
लभेत चेदस्ति यथेप्सितं नः । †

‘ Such is (Arthapatti),—but if it still comes to be called, Anumana, we give our consent.”

The necessity of adopting Anupalabdhi as a separate means of proof is explained by Kumarila in the following verse of the Shlokavartika :—

“कर्माणि सर्वाणि फलैः समस्तेः
सर्व्वैर्यथावच्च यदंगकाण्डः ।
न संगतानीह परस्परं च
नांगं तदेतत् प्रभवं क्रतूनां ॥” ‡

“All the sacrifices do not produce all the results, nor do they possess all the details, nor are they connected

† Arthapatti, verse 88.

‡ Abhava, verse 56.

with one another..." Chapters are devoted in the Purva Mimamsa to discussions regarding differentiation, sublation, etc. According to Kumarila, Anupalabdhī is the only means of proof by which the fact, that one sacrifice is not identical with, or is not a part of, another sacrifice, is known. And it is also implied by him that it is not possible for the followers of the other schools to make such discriminations.

Thus we conclude that though Dharma is not known directly by these means of proof, still they are absolutely necessary for carrying on various discussions raised in this connection.

We have said above that Shabda or word has been accepted by the Mimamsakas as the means for ascertaining Dharma. Now, Shabda may be of two kinds—vedic and human. In the Lokavedadhikarāṇa it has been shown that there is no actual difference between vedic and human words. The meanings of words are known from Vyavahara.* But Vyavahara is possible only in the case of human words, and not in the case of vedic words. So, if we deny the validity of human words altogether, we shall not be able to know the meanings of vedic words. This importance of human words has been recognised in the beginning of the Shlokavartika on the Chodanasūtra. There is only this difference between a vedic word and a human word—a human word may or may not be valid, whereas a vedic word is always valid. This has been propounded by Shabara Swamin in his commentary on the Chodana-sūtra.

† By watching the usage of older persons.

In the Sutra of Jaimini, mentioned above, the word, 'Chodana,' occurs, and hence, it appears that only those sentences in which an action forms the leading element are to be regarded as authoritative. Jaimini keeps this in view when he says that Arthavada texts are authoritative in so far as they contain eulogies which create a tendency in the mind of a man to act*. The Vedantins, on the other hand, recognise the authority even of such vedic texts which do not make the action-element prominent but simply describe saguna (immanent) Brahman, nirguna (transcendental) Brahman, etc. This is opposed to the purport of the Sutra "Amnayasya etc."† of Jaimini. But it has been pointed out in the *Brhati* and other works that there is really no such conflict between the Sutras of Jaimini and the Vedanta doctrines. We shall speak more fully of this in the next chapter.

There is a difference of opinion between the *Bhattas* and the *Prabhakaras* regarding the way in which the validity of words is made out. It is well known that the *Prabhakaras* have accepted the theory of *Anvita-bhishanavada*, and the *Bhattas* have accepted *Abhihitavayavada*. According to the first theory, two powers of words are recognised— one enables us to remember the meanings and the other establishes the connexion between the meanings remembered: the former itself, being known first, causes the recollection of meanings, whereas the latter gives rise to a knowledge of the

† Jaimini Sutra 1. 2. 7.

* Jaimini Sutra 1. 2. 1.

connexion without itself being known. This second power is known technically as the Kubja-shakti.

According to the Abhihitānvayavāda the knowledge of meanings is due to words, but that knowledge arises neither through recollection nor through apprehension, but through what is technically called Abhidhāna (denotation), and the knowledge of the connexion of the meanings is due to the meanings known: the power of making meanings known is inherent in words, but the power of giving rise to the knowledge of the connexion lies in the meanings. According to both the theories, the knowledge of the first power is necessary, but that of the second one is not so.

According to Anvitābhidhānavāda, there will be no apprehension of the sense of words unless the words be used. If any one utter the word, 'door', only, we must understand some other word, such as 'shut,' to make the sense complete, but according to the other theory, any two ideas which have been known by some Pramāṇa or other, may come to be combined according to necessity, and hence, we can complete the sense by understanding an idea also. The Shloka-vartika goes a step further when it says:—

“पश्यतः श्वेतिमाह्वं ह्येषाशब्दं च शृण्वतः ।

क्षुरनिक्षेपशब्दं च श्वेतोऽश्वो ध्यावतीतिधीः ॥”

“A man who sees something white, hears the neighing of a horse and the noise of hoofs,—from these he conceives that a white horse is running.* This matter[†] has been fully discussed in the Nyayaratnavali.*

This difference is not, however, of any practical importance, so far as the subject-matter of the Mimamsa is concerned. The ninth chapter of the Mimamsa deals with Uha (substitution). If we accept Abhihitānvayavāda, we shall be able to understand all necessary things, and no Uha of words will be necessary. Hence, it may be contended,† that all the discussions regarding Uha are useless. To this the answer of the Bhattas is that in the case of Prakṛti (primary,) ceremonies, things are mentioned by words and, hence, we must repeat the same process in the case of the Vikṛti (derivative) ceremonies, too.

We notice the importance of the difference between these two theories when the value of the Vedānta system comes in for consideration. The Anvītabhidhanavāda excludes the Vedānta doctrines from the province of Karman. It recognises the authority of such sentences only where an action is the predominating element, and hence, the Prabhakaras construe the words of an Arthavāda text together with those of a Vidhi text.* According to the other theory, an Arthavāda has complete sense in itself, and hence, an entire Arthavāda text is simply to be combined with its corresponding Vidhi text.* The Abhihitānvayavāda does not ignore the importance of such texts which simply point out an existing thing, and hence, it does not stand against the authority of the Upaniṣad texts.

Once more we compare the two theories. According

* Nyāyamālā 1. 2. Adhi 2.

† " " " "

to the *Anvitabhidhāna* theory, words are regarded as valid owing to their connexion with an action, otherwise they will not be valid, because they give rise to the recollection of meanings, and remembrance, as we have seen, has no validity. According to the other theory, meanings are regarded as valid, and not words, no matter whether there be any connexion with an action or not. So, the *Bhāṣya* says that words stop on expressing their respective meanings, and that the meanings, being thus known, make up the meaning of the sentence.* So, there is an agreement between the two theories as to the point that the words convey their respective meanings; but while one holds that this conveyance is due to remembrance, the other holds that it is due to *Abhidhāna*. But this conveyance is not verbal cognition. Verbal cognition is the knowledge of the meaning of one word as connected with the meaning of another; according to the first theory, the knowledge is created by virtue of the words themselves, whereas according to the other, it is created by virtue of the meanings.

It is very strange that Dr. Jha while explaining *Anvitabhidhānavāda* says that no word can be comprehended as having any denotation when taken apart from an injunctive sentence,* and both Mr. V. S. Apte† and Dr. Keith‡ have made similar statements. But we

† Jaimini Sutra 1. 1. 25.

* Indian Thought Vol 11, 236.

† Apte's Sans. Eng. Dictionary,

* Karmamimamsa, P. 39.

have shown above that words do convey their meaning independently, but, for the sake of validity, they have depend upon other words of the sentence.

CHAPTER III. SECTION (A).

Atman.

In many of the sacrificial injunctions we find that the performers will enjoy results (heaven etc.) that will come after their death. Now, when the performer is dead, he cannot enjoy the fruit. But the statements of the Shruti cannot be false. There must be some such entity which must last even after the destruction of the body. This entity is called *Atman*, and has been regarded as something different from *Buddhi*, the sense-organs and the body. *

Buddhi is not identical with *Atman*—it is an instrument of cognition and not an agent. The same argument holds good in the case of sense-organs also. In such ordinary expressions as—"I who saw the book, am touching it now,"—the notion of only one cogniser is manifest though two sense-organs are spoken of † But it is impossible to identify two or more sense-

* *Shlokavartika*, *Atmavada*—Verses 5, 6, 7.

† *Shastradipika*—*Indriyatmabhedaprakaranam*.

organs whose forms and functions are quite different. It must, therefore, be admitted that there exists some other entity behind them. Again, the body is not Atman, because the Shruti indicates that Atman must persist after the dissolution of the body. Besides, the body changes with age,—the body of childhood is not the same as that of youth and the body of youth again is much unlike the body of old age. * But, in the midst of these changes—the self remains the same ; otherwise, how could one say,—“ I who saw my parents in my childhood, am seeing my grand-children in my old age ? ” Again, pleasure etc. cannot be the properties of the body. If the body be cut open, the inside will be found to be of a certain colour, because colour is a property of the body, but no such thing as pleasure or pain is ever found there.† Hence, there must exist some entity which is the basis of pleasure, pain etc., but which is different from the body. Various other arguments of this nature have been advanced in this behalf in other Âstika Darshanas and have been adopted by Kumârila. It is needless to cite all of them here.

Now, it may be of interest to enquire here, whether the Sûtras of Jaimini can furnish anything whereby the existence of an Âtman different from the body,

* Bhagavadgita, Chap. II., verse 12.

† Shloka Vartika, Atmavada, Sl. 100.

the sense-organs and Buddhi, can be established. The author of the Seshwara Mimāṃsā Darśana § 15 is of opinion that the Sutra, * पञ्च धर्मैर्विदुस्तद्वत्तु तद्वत्तु तद्वत्तु, etc., of Jaimini leads us to conclude that Jaimini himself gives an idea of an Atman which is different from the body, etc., because the three words (तद्वत्तु, तद्वत्तु, and तद्वत्तु) are used separately in the Sutra; again, "the word तद्वत्तु is in the genitive case which indicates that one belongs to the other, i. e. one is different from the other, and hence, from this Sutra, we learn that there is no identity (of Atman) with Buddhi. Atman is known by all means of knowledge to be the basis of Buddhi, and the expression तद्वत्तु shows that Buddhi has a beginning. Hence the word तद्वत्तु must mean some cogniser who has no beginning The definition of perception etc. will be stated in the Nyaya-Vistara. That may have only incidentally been referred to here or not." ‡ Thus, according to Sri Vedānta-Deshika, the real object of framing this Sutra is to show that Atman is different from Buddhi etc., as

§ Sri Vedānta Deshika.

* Jaimini Sūtras L. 1-4

॥ पुरुषस्येति मन्त्र-कथनात् तच्च सूचितम्
युजितो व्यतिरिक्तत्वमतय च सूचितम् ॥
तद्वर्तित्वेन सकलेः प्रमाणैरुक्तभनात् ।
सुदेर्जित्वेनेव सुदेर्जित्वप्रदर्शनात् ॥

also to prove the uselessness of perception as a means of ascertaining Dharma. The differentiation of Atman from Buddhi etc., he asserts, follows directly from the Sutra. Now, we cannot accept this position without a careful examination. In the first place, the Sutra does not contain any word denoting the body, as there are words denoting the sense-organs and Buddhi. So it cannot be said that the identity of Atman with the body is denied here. There are, no doubt, other means of disproving the identity of Atman with the body, but if other means have to be adopted for this purpose, they can similarly be had recourse to for disproving the identity of Atman with the sense-organs and Buddhi as well, and in that case, there will not be any necessity for depending on this Sutra.

Again, it is an accepted doctrine of the Seshwara Mimansa that Buddhi has no beginning : "In the case of God as well as in the case of souls, cognition is eternal, arises of itself, extends over all things and is valid, but its range is narrowed on account of various

अजातः प्रतिसन्धाता प्रोक्तः पुरुषशब्दतः ।

... ..

प्रत्यक्षलक्षणाद्यं तु वक्तव्यं न्यायविस्तरे ।

इदं तत् सूत्रतां मा वा पारम्पर्योपयोगतः ॥

—Seshwara Mimansa.

defects" * How then can the Seshwara Mimamsa support the view that Buddhi has a beginning? The author must either hold that the Sutra is erroneous or make some other interpretation. But in any case, he cannot, with the help of this Sutra, establish the existence of an Atman different from Buddhi etc.

The Mimamsakas, on the other hand, hold this Sutra to be meant for showing that perception etc. cannot determine Dharma. According to them, this Sutra does not help us to establish the existence of a non-corporeal Atman. Even the followers of Charvaka who never admit that there is a non-corporeal Atman—do not find fault with this Sutra, for the word Purusa can very well mean a body endowed with intellect. There is nothing in the Sutra to contradict this meaning. Hence, it is not at all safe to conclude that Jaimini intends to establish the existence of a non-corporeal Atman by means of this Sutra.

It is for this reason that Shabara Swami, in his commentary on this Sutra, does not say anything about Atman. He introduces the matter under the next Sutra—'दीपविद्युः' etc. † in connection with the explana-

* ईश्वरस्यैव जीवानामपि नित्यं ज्ञानं सततं सर्वविषयं प्रमात्मकं च, तत्तत्कर्मोद्दिष्टोपवशात् सद्बुचितविषयम्—
Seshwara Mimamsa.

† Jaimini Sutra I 1-5.

tion of the portion 'अव्यतिरेकम्' This portion means that all statements of the Shruti are true. Shabara cites a text of the Shruti—"the performer of a sacrifice goes to heaven" * and argues that as it is not possible for this body of flesh and blood to go to heaven, the existence of a non-corporeal Atman is, therefore, implied. But Shabara does not say that the idea follows directly from the letters of the Sutra; he gives a hint simply that it is borrowed by Jaimini from the Sutras of Badarayana, because the name of Badarayana occurs in the Sutra just after this portion. Shabara says that Jaimini mentions the name of Badarayana to show honour to the latter, and he implies thereby that this honour is shown by Jaimini with a view to acknowledging his debt to Badarayana in this connection. We shall next proceed to show that all the famous expositors of the Sutras and of the Bhasya are of opinion that the idea of the existence of a non-corporeal Atman is borrowed from the Vedanta Sutras.

Upavarsha, the first Vṛttikara of both the Purva and Uttara Mimamsa, states, when the question about the existence of Atman arises in the Purva Mimamsa,—"We shall speak about it in the Shāriraka." Had he thought the matter to be contained in the Jaimini

* स एव यज्ञायुधो यजमानोऽज्ञसा स्वर्गं लोकां याति ।

Sutras, he would not have postponed the writing of his *Vṛtti* for the sake of another system.

We have seen already what the commentator Shabara has done. He does not, in fact, express any opinion regarding the derivation of the idea of a non-corporeal Atman from the Sutras of Badarayana ; but it is only from the nature of his arguments that his position becomes clear, and the interpretation of his expositor Kumarila will also testify to it. Thus states Kumarila in his Sloka Vartika :

“इत्याह नास्ति क्वनिराकस्मिन्नात्मास्तिता भाष्यद्वय युक्त्या ।
दृढत्वमेतद् विषय बोधः प्रयाति वेदान्तनिषेवणे ॥”

—“The commentator (Shabara), desirous of refuting atheism, says this about the existence of Atman on the strength of arguments ; and the knowledge of this matter will grow firm by studying the Vedanta.” So, according to Kumarila, Shabara bases his theory on arguments and not on the letters of the Sutras of Jaimini. He also indicates that the Vedanta is the real source of this knowledge,

We next pass on to Shankara. Let us quote here his words to show what his view with regard to this matter is :

—“ननु शास्त्रप्रमुखे एव प्रथमं पादे शास्त्रफलोपभोगयोन्यस्य
देहव्यतिरिक्तस्य आत्मनोऽस्तित्वमुद्घान् । सत्यमुद्घान् भाष्यद्वयता

न तु तत्र आत्मास्तित्वे सूत्रमस्ति । इह तु स्वयमेव सूत्रकृता
तदास्तत्त्वमाक्षेपपुरःसरं प्रतिष्ठापितम् । इत एवाकृत्या-
चार्येण शबरस्वामिना प्रमाणनक्षणे वर्णितम् । अतएव च
भगवतोपवर्षेण प्रथमे तन्त्रे आत्मास्तित्वाभिधानप्रसक्तौ
शारीरके बक्ष्याम इत्युद्धारः कृतः ।

"One might say that in the beginning of the Shashtra (Purva-Mimansa) in the first pada, the existence of an Atman, which is different from the body and capable of enjoying the fruits mentioned in the Shruti, has been spoken of. It is true that the commentator (Shabara) has so held, but there is no Sutra regarding the existence of Atman. But here (in the Vedanta) the author of the Sutras himself (Badarayana) establishes that systematically. It is from this Sutra † that Acharya Shabara Swami has borrowed what he has stated in connection with his definition of valid cognition. It is for this reason that the revered Upavarsa says, when the question about the existence of an Atman arises, "We shall speak about it in the Shariraka."

According to Shankaracharya, the Purva Mimamsa and Uttara Mimamsa are different systems ; so he might say without any hesitation that the conception of a non-corporeal Atman follows from the Sutras of Jaimini, for if the same thing be treated in two different systems there will be no repetition. But the

Seshwara-Mimamsakas regard the two systems as one concrete whole. If they say that the existence of a non-corporeal Atman has been established twice in the same system (once by Jaimini and again by Badarayana) they will accuse Badarayana of having made a useless repetition. Such a charge against a Sutrakara is anything but fair. To safeguard the importance of the Sutra "एव चान्नतः शरीरे भावतु" † of Badarayana they ought to consider that the conception does not follow from the Sutras of Jaimini. But instead of doing that, the Seshwara-Mimamsakas have tried to adopt a middle course. They say that from the Sutras of Jaimini we learn that there is an Atman capable of going to heaven, and that from the Sutras of Badarayana we learn that Atman is eternal:

“पारलौकिकतामात्रमिह तावदपेक्षितम् ।

शरीरेके तु नित्यत्वं वाच्यं नित्यफलार्थिना ॥” *

This does not at all seem to be a reasonable solution. Such a distinction between *nitya* and *पारलौकिक* as is drawn here is futile, for it is absurd to imagine that Atman is capable of transmigration without first admitting that it is eternal. It is for this reason that Kumarila, while enumerating the attributes of Atman, allows at the outset that it is eternal, and then goes on to say that it is capable of assuming other bodies, i. e., fit for other worlds:

† Vedānta Sūtras III. 3-53.

* Seshwara Mimamsa.

Is Atman self-illuminated ?

As regards the self-luminosity of Atman, Kumarila says :—

“आत्मनैव प्रकाशोऽयमात्मा ज्योतिरिति रिति ।
अथाद्य इति सामान्यात् सर्वेणेति प्रतीयते ॥
आत्मज्योतिर्यच्चानात् परैस्त्वितिष्ठते ।

... ..

आत्मज्ञानाग्निनाभूतदृष्ट चेष्टानिरूपणात् ।
परैषामात्मविज्ञानमनुमानादुदाहृतम् ॥” †

—“It is stated that Atman is a light which illumines itself. The epithet अथाद्य apparently means that it is imperceptible to all ; but as the Shruti says that it is आत्मज्योति (self-illuminated), we conclude that it is imperceptible only to others (and not to itself). Seeing the efforts (of a person) which cannot take place without the existence of an Atman, others infer that he possesses an Atman.”

If we take the expression अथाद्य in the sense stated above, we shall have no difficulty in understanding the text of the Shruti, “अदृष्टो न हि गृह्यते”.

This clearly shows that Dr. Jha does not correctly represent Kumarila when he states,—“Kumarila holds that the soul is not self-luminous but known by mental perception (Shastradiipika p. 101).” • Dr. Jha cites

† Anuvāda—Verses 142-45.

• Indian Thought Vol. II. p. 254.

Shastra-dipika as his authority. There is, indeed, a passage in the Shastra-dipika where it is stated thus—“If Atman were self-luminous, it would shine in deep sleep also, but it does not shine at that time, etc.”; but the author of the Shastra-dipika is there trying to refute the arguments of the Advaitins who hold that the object of the cognition of “I” is not Atman. Had it really been his intention to deny the self-luminosity of Atman as understood by the Bhattas, then he would certainly have criticised the passage of the Shlōkavartika, “आत्मनैव प्रकाशोऽयम्”. Nowhere does Kumarila say that Atman is not luminous during deep sleep.

In the course of criticising the view that the cause of pleasure is thought of at the time of enjoying the pleasure, Kumarila says, “अपराह्मण्यमाने तु खापकाले सुखाशये” † where the expression सुखाशये might lead to some confusion with regard to its actual meaning, for it seems apparently to mean the substratum of pleasure, etc., i. e., Atman, and so the whole passage seems to mean—“during deep sleep Atman is not thought of, i. e. does not shine.” But here the question of Atman cannot arise at all. Atman may, indeed, be the substratum of pleasure, but it is by no means the cause of pleasure. We learn from the context that the discussion is about the enjoyment of pleasure and not about the cause of it; and Atman, therefore, has nothing to do with it. Let us

† Atmavada, verse 18.

now see in what sense the Nyayaratnakara takes the expression सुखात्. This expression implies, according to this commentary, that which gives comfort, i. e. bedding etc. The whole passage means, therefore, that in deep sleep, bedding and such other implements of pleasure are not thought of: in deep sleep, pleasure itself is enjoyed, though the instruments of pleasure are not thought of. So it is clear, that in deep sleep pleasure itself is enjoyed, though the instruments of pleasure are not thought of. But unless Atman is shining at that time, how can the enjoyment be possible? So according to Kumarila, Atman is shining at that time.

Now, Parthasarathi Mishra, the author of Nyayaratnakara, also, happens to be the writer of Shastradipika. If he does not find any passage in the Vartika indicating that Atman is not self-illuminated, how can he state in his Shastradipika that Atman is not so? It only proves that he does not correctly represent the view of Kumarila in his Shastradipika, although he says in his introduction to the work "कुमारिलमतेश्च वक्षिष्ये शास्त्रदीपिका" "I shall write this Shastradipika in accordance with the views of Kumarila."

Let us now ascertain the Prabhakara view on this point. In the Nyayavivaraṇa there is a purvapakṣa which proceeds on the assumption that Atman is self-illuminated. The author of the Nyaya-sūtra has taken this view for the view of Prabhakara. But the author

on the *Madhvatatparyachandrika** notices that this *Purvapaksha* in the *Nyaya-vivaranam* is not in accordance with the view of *Prabhakara*, as the self-luminosity of *Atman* is never admitted by *Prabhakara*. The *Gururajiyā*† which is a commentary on the *Chandrika* says on the same point;—"according to *Prabhakara*, cognition is self-luminous and *Atman* is only the basis of cognition. Had the *Purvapaksha* meant to follow *Prabhakara*, it would have taken its stand on that ground and not on the self-luminosity of *Atman* which is never admitted by *Prabhakara*." Thus we see that according to these eminent writers the *Atman* of *Prabhakara* is not self-illuminated, and that, when one of them—the author of the *Nyayasudha*—makes a contrary statement, the others are pointing it out. Dr. Jha accepts this view as that propounded in the *Prakaranapanchika*. We quote here his very words: "Thus, then, according to *Prabhakara* the soul is not self-illuminated.....it is cognition alone that is so. § Dr. Keith also restates the very same view: "In the view of *Prabhakara* cognition is self-illuminated, but this doctrine is not applicable to the soul." ||

* A work of the Madhwa School.

† A work by Vyasaraja.

§ Indian Thought, Vol. II p. 252.

|| *Karma Mimamsa*, p. 70.

Atman as consciousness and an object of cognition

Atman, again, is described in the Shlokavartika as ज्ञानवृत्तिस्वभावः i. e. of the nature of consciousness. In the Siddhantavindu of Madhusudana Saraswati, we find the passage—'जडो बोधात्मकश्च इति भाष्यः' * "the Bhattas hold that Atman is जड (object of cognition) and of the nature of consciousness." This passage has been thus explained in the Nyayaratnavali—"बोधश्च इति चेदर्थं चिदस्यो-
चिदस्य चिदमेव द्रष्टव्यम् ; अपिदमेव ज्ञानवृत्त्यादिरित्यादित्वेन न नह ज्ञानानि
इति प्रेतत्वं"

"Atman has two parts, one of which is चित् (conscious) and the other अचित्. By its conscious part, it is the cogniser and by the other part, it transforms itself into cognition, emotion, etc. and becomes the object of the experience 'I know myself.' From this it clearly appears that the Bhattas have been represented as holding that Atman is consciousness. From the Nyayaratnavali we also learn that the attributes, जडत्व (object of cognition) and consciousness, are not contradictory because atman is conscious by virtue of its चित् part and is जड (object of cognition) by virtue of its अचित् part. In the Siddhantavindu, the Prabhakara view is thus stated—कर्मा भोक्ता जडो विभुरिति प्राभाकराः.—the Prabhakaras hold that Atman is the agent, the enjoyer जड and omnipresent. The word जड is explained in the Nyayaratnavali as follows : 'स च ज्ञानवृत्त्यभिद्रव्यात् जडः' ✓

जानामीति चानाग्रयत्वेन स भाति, न चानरूपत्वेन"—"and he is said to be Jada, because he is different from consciousness; he appears as the substratum of the cognition, "I know", but not as consciousness."

In the Bhāṣya, Shabara Swami has propounded—"ज्ञानातिरिक्तः स्थायी ज्ञाता वर्तते"—"there is a permanent cogniser apart from ज्ञान." This raises a doubt as to whether Shabara, by thus distinguishing the cogniser from ज्ञान denies the identity of Atman with consciousness. But Shabara refutes here the Theory of Transient Cognitions (क्षणिकविज्ञानवाद) and does not assail the Theory of Permanent Consciousness (स्थिरविज्ञानवाद) at all. In the atheistic Darshanās there is a theory that an Atman is nothing but a single cognition; and as the acts of cognition are numerous, these Darshanās hold that there are numerous Atmans. Thus an Atman, according to them, is merely a technical name for an act of cognition, and does not mean anything which is permanent or eternal. Shabara contends that if each Atman be a separate cognition, there will be no connection or association between one Atman and another (i. e. between the cogniser and the rememberer), because it will disappear as soon as it takes place, and so the recollection of things will be impossible, and so forth. By the word ज्ञान Shabara means this sort of Atman or cognition. He holds that behind these short cognitions, there is a permanent cogniser, i. e. consciousness. We thus see that the Bhāṣyakara does not refute स्थिरविज्ञानवाद

and consequently, he is not against the view that Atman is consciousness.

The Bhasya says again—समयेः स भवति, नमात्रेण रक्षते प्रकुं दमसिक्तं वा। "It (Atman) is known by itself, it is incapable of being seen or shown by others." This statement can be cogent only if we take Atman to be of the nature of consciousness.

Again, in the following passage of the Shastra-dīpikā, we find that three distinct attributes of Atman are recognised :

“इति निरुः शरीरादिव्यतिरिक्तो मानसप्रत्यक्षबोधः प्रत्ययगम्यो ज्ञाता । कथं पुनर्ज्ञातुं शक्यत्वम् ?”

“The cogniser is something different from the body, etc ; it is consciousness (the notion of ‘I’) and the object of the cognition of ‘I’. But how is it that the cogniser itself becomes the object of cognition ?” This view is undisputedly quite in agreement with that of Bhatta. The author of the Shastradīpikā does not only say that Atman is the basis of cognition and the object of the cognition of ‘I’, but that it is consciousness (the notion of ‘I’) also. Dr. Jha, while stating the attributes of Atman, has omitted to mention that Atman is consciousness,—“He (Kumarila) holds the soul to be either the substratum, or the object of the notion of ‘I.’” * Probably, Dr. Jha has accepted the reading that is found in the Benares edition of the

* Indian Thought Volume II page 251.

INTRODUCTION TO THE PURVA MIMAMSA.

book—"मानसप्रत्यक्षरूपप्रत्ययगम्यो ज्ञाता" † In this reading the expression मानसप्रत्यक्षरूप is a part of the compound and qualifies ज्ञातृ; so it is not a separate adjective and does not qualify ज्ञाता. From this reading we do not get that Atman is consciousness (the notion of 'I'). Now, let us see how the Yukti-sneha-prapurani, a famous commentary on the Shastradipika, interprets it.

It proceeds to explain the text "कथं पुनर्ज्ञातुं ज्ञेयत्वम् ?" with the following words, "गूढाभिसन्धिः पृच्छति" "in asking the question the author has something in his mind." The text is plain enough; why then should the author have something in his mind? The commentator gives a full explanation of it in his सिद्धान्तचन्द्रिकागूढार्थविवरण, a commentary which he himself has written on his Yukti-sneha-prapurani. There he says,—आत्मनि ज्ञेयत्वे विषयतया ज्ञानत्वानुपपत्तिरिति भिसन्धिः—"If Atman is a thing that is known, it will be the object of cognition, and then its attribute of consciousness will be untenable;—this is what the author (of the Shastradipika) has in his mind." Now, the question about the untenability of Atman's attribute as consciousness would never arise in the author's mind, unless he admitted it before. But, according to the reading of the Benares edition, this becomes impossible. The Bombay edition, on the other hand, reads 'मानस-प्रत्यक्षरूपः ।' This is a separate adjective and qualifies ज्ञाता, and so it supplies the other attribute of Atman, namely,

consciousness. This reading, therefore, is consistent with the remarks of the author of the Yukti-sneha-prapurani, and should be regarded as the correct reading. Thus, we see that, according to the Shastradipika, Atman is the notion of 'I', the object of the cognition of 'I' and the basis of cognition.

It is true that the Shastradipika has, after an elaborate discussion, come to the conclusion that Atman is not consciousness * ; but it has done so only to refute the view of the Advaitins that Atman is consciousness, pure and simple ; and in fact it can never be the intention of the Shastradipika to refute the view of the Bhattas who hold that Atman is both जड as well as of the nature of consciousness. It might, however, be still contended that there is practically no difference between the Bhattas and the Advaitins in this respect, because, according to the Advaitins also, there is some sort of darkness (अज्ञान) covering Atman. But, in reply to this, it may be urged that the अज्ञान of the Advaitins is an imposed one, and not real ; and surely, the author of the Shastradipika does not deem it necessary to enter into a discussion about the reality or unreality of that अज्ञान in अद्वैतीमतः। As a Mimamsaka, he cannot but admit that there is अज्ञान in Atman ; but he cannot declare—he is ever so inclined to do so—that Atman is nothing but consciousness, for such a

* Bombay Edition, p. 129.

book—"मानसप्रत्यक्षरूपः प्रत्ययगत्यो ज्ञाता" † In this reading the expression मानसप्रत्यक्षरूप is a part of the compound and qualifies ज्ञातः प्रत्यय ; so it is not a separate adjective and does not qualify ज्ञाता. From this reading we do not get that Atman is consciousness (the notion of 'I'). Now, let us see how the Yukti-sneha-prapurani, a famous commentary on the Shastradipika, interprets it.

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conclusion would give rise to a confusion in the minds of the ordinary people who are fond of Karman. As a Mimansaka, therefore, he has refuted the view of the Advaitins only ; and that he has refuted no other view is clear from the very context of his discussion.

As regards the Prabhākara view of Atman as an object of cognition, Dr Jha says, "Kumarila holds that the soul is not self-luminous, but is known by mental perception which latter fact Prabhākara denies." This "latter fact" undoubtedly means the cognition of Atman by mental perception. But we should point out here that the statement of Dr. Jha goes against the Prakaraṇa-panchika. True it is, that according to the Prabhākaras Atman enters into all cognitions of external things, but they do not mean that Atman is never cognised independently of the cognition of external things. This sort of cognition of Atman which concerns Atman alone (निर्विकल्प), is acknowledged by them. The Prakaraṇapanchika states that all cognitions of external things (सर्विकल्प) are preceded by a cognition of Atman (निर्विकल्प), that although the cognition of Atman has always been existing, still it has not been existing in connection with the external thing perceived, and that therefore, the cognition of an external thing takes place according to the Principle of Continuous Cognitions (धारावाहिक व्याय). * The cognition of Atman in the shape,—

* "आत्मनः प्रमादत्तान् निर्विकल्पकवृत्तभाविनश्च सर्विकल्पस्य

'I know myself' exists permanently within a man. When he sees an external thing, such as a book, his cognition is of the shape—'I know this book',—i.e. he knows that there is his self and that there is the book as well. It may now be asked—if the cognition of the self be permanently present in us, the self is a thing already known; why then, should one know it afresh (i.e. have a fresh cognition of the self) when one perceives an external thing? To this it may be answered that though undoubtedly the self is a thing already known, still it is not known in connection with the particular thing perceived. For the sake of this connection, therefore, a particular cognition of the self is necessary. The Principle of Continuous Cognitions may be cited here to explain this. I see a stick once, twice, thrice, and so on; one might contend that there should be no cognition of the stick when I see it for the second time, etc. because it is a thing already known to me by virtue of its having been seen before. But that there is actually a cognition each time the stick is presented to my eyes. When I see it for the second time, I do know that I see it a second time; when I see it for the third time, I do know that I see it for the third time; and so on. Each succeeding occasion is a new occasion, and in connection with each new occasion, we have

गृहीतयादित्वेऽपि धारायाद्विकन्यायेन मामास्त्वं वेदितव्यम् ॥

really a fresh cognition of the thing presented. This is known as the Principle of Continuous Cognitions.

Thus, we see that according to the Prabhakaras Atman is known by 'mental perception.' The Prakaraṇa-panchika does not only assert this, but also gives a sufficient description of the relation that subsists between the समिक्लप and निर्विकल्प cognitions. *

Atman as the Basis of Cognition.

According to the Bhāttas, Atman is the substratum of cognition which is nothing but a product of Atman. Ramanuja also accepts this view of Bhāttas. But according to Ramanuja, cognition which is an attribute of Atman is eternal and is capable of expansion and contraction ; † while the Bhāttas hold that cognition is a product (परिणाम) of Atman, which arises through Pramāṇas (the means of knowledge). As regards the view that cognition is caused by Pramāṇas, there is no difference between the Bhāttas, the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas. According to the Prabhakaras also, cognition is a product of Atman. So the Prakaraṇa-panchika states, "Cognition of objects is temporary. Here Atman is the constituent cause and the contact of Atman with the Manas is an auxiliary

* Benares Ed. page 56

† Seswara Mimamsa Darśana.

cause." † Atman is said to be a constituent cause because it converts itself into a particular state called cognition. The Naiyayikas and the Vaisheshikas have accepted Arambhavada ‡ and hence, it is not necessary for them to hold that cognition is a product of Atman. There is another point of difference also. According to the Naiyayikas and the Vaisheshikas, Atman is illumined by cognition and one cognition is illumined by another cognition. Thus they do not recognise that cognition is self-illumined. The Prabhakaras do not believe in the self-luminosity of Atman but believe in that of cognition. We shall see, later on, that the Prabhakaras are not all unanimous on this point. According to (some of) them, three things appear in a cognition,—cognition itself, Atman and the object (विषयभान्). † Kumarila, however, differs from this view. According to him, Atman is self-illumined, and so it is not to be cognised in the cognition of objects, and cognition itself is inferred. It is only the objects,

† “विषयावबोधस्तावत् कदाचित्को दृश्यते तस्य चात्मा
 समवायिकारणम्..... वाद्यरूपादिग्रहे च सन्निकर्ष-
 चतुष्टयं वारणम्, आत्ममनःसन्निकर्षः.....”

Prakarana Panchika, pp. 52, 53

† ‘That an effect not already in existence is produced through the activity of causes which are existing.

† Prakāraṇa panchika pp. 152, 53 ’

therefore, that appear in a cognition. Kumarila does not recognise the self-luminosity of cognition, because he contends that if cognition itself be self-luminous, the objects will appear as pure manifestations of the cognition, and will not exist as real objects, and consequently, there will remain no difference between this view and Vijnana-vada. § It is really very difficult to see how the Prabhakaras will justify the independent existence of objects if they maintain the self-luminosity of cognition.

Though the Bhāttas hold that Atman is the substratum of cognition, they never admit that it is the substratum of the 'I'—element in cognition. But Prof. Keith in his 'Karma Mimansa' says,—“The soul he (Kumarila) holds to be the substratum of the 'I' element in cognition, and this appears to be practically identical with Prabhakara's view that the soul is the substratum of the self-illuminated cognition and the 'I' element in it.” † Now, we must examine whether the Bhāttas view is practically identical with that of the Prabhakaras in this respect, as Prof. Keith holds it to be. If, indeed, the Bhāttas held that Atman is cognised in the cognition of external objects, the above statement—“this appears to be practically identical with Prabhā-

§ Shloka Vartika, Shunya Vada, Verse 233.

† Karma Mimansa, p. 71.

elements appear as distinct objects of cognition.

Hence, we see that the Doctrine of the Appearance of Three Elements (Triputibhanam of the New School of Prabhakaras) does not rest on a firm ground. It is for this reason that the author of the Nyayaratnavali says that the old school of the Prabhakaras does not propound such a doctrine. In the Nyayaratnavali, it is plainly stated that the old school of the Prabhakaras does not admit that cognition and the cogniser are the objects of cognition, as our uses are possible by virtue of identity (तादात्म्य) and inherence (समवाय) respectively. †

The renowned Mimamsaka, Murari Mishra, has, however, taken a different view on this point. He, too, does not accept the doctrine of त्रिपुटीभानम्. According to him, there arises, at first, a cognition of the 'jar', and then the knowledge in the shape "I know the jar" follows (अनुव्यवसाय). So, Murari Mishra holds that the knowledge of cognition is an after-effect of cognition itself. This view is to be gathered from Mathuranatha's famous commentary on the Tattwa-chintamony, * as no work of the author is available now-a-days. It is clear, then, that he is not a follower of the New School of the Prabhakaras as he does not accept त्रिपुटीभानम्; nor can he be said to be a follower of the Bhatta School simply

† Kumbhakona Ed. p 18.

* Bib. Ind. Pratyaśakhaṇḍa p. 152.

because of his not holding that cognition is known by inference. His doctrine of *चतुर्विधाज्ञा* is quite a new doctrine. We have just now stated on the authority of the *Nyayaratnavali* that the *विदुर्दोषाद* was not accepted by the old school of the *Prabhakaras* but no indication of the existence of any such doctrine as *चतुर्विधाज्ञा* in that school can be obtained. *Matibhaznatha* states the view of the *Prabhakaras* as follows : “गुरुमते च यं वदति मयापारं दृशं”—in the view of Guru there is cognition in the shape—‘this is a jar.’ It is evident that he refers to the view of the old school of the *Prabhakaras*. So, practically, there are three different views on this point : the first is the doctrine of *विदुर्दोषाद* (of the New School of the *Prabhakaras*); the second view (of the *Bhittas* and the Old School of *Prabhakaras*) accepts neither the *विदुर्दोषाद* nor *चतुर्विधाज्ञा*, while the third accepts *चतुर्विधाज्ञा*. This new course adopted by *Murari* is probably responsible for the proverb, “गुरुविदुर्दोषः दृशः.”

Thus, at length, we see that the conclusion of *Kumarila* is that the cognition of *Atman* takes place only in the inner perception of *Atman*, and not in the cognition of external things. So he says in the *Shloka-Vartika*—

• “अहं विदुर्दोषादज्ञातं विदुर्दोषादज्ञातं विदुर्दोषादज्ञातं”

—“The consciousness,—‘I know’ refers to the cogniser.” It becomes clear, therefore, that *Atman*, according to *Kumarila*, is cognised without the cognition of external

things, or, in other words, Atman is not to be described as "the substratum of the 'I' element in cognition," as Prof. Keith puts it.

The Prabhakara view further investigated.

Both the Bhattas and the Prabhakaras admit that cognition is a product (परिणाम) of Atman ; but while the former hold that cognition is an object of inference, the latter are of opinion, as has been stated by various writers, that it is self-illuminated. Now, the question arises as to whether the self luminosity of cognition is actually admitted by the Prabhakaras. Prabhakara, while explaining the passage — अर्धविषया हि प्रत्यक्षबुद्धिर्न द्वि-विषया * (it is the object that is perceived and not the cognition), says in the Brhati — अतः सिद्धमानुमानिकत्वं बुद्धेः — 'thus it is established that cognition is a matter of inference, ‡ Shalikanatha, too, suggests in the Prakaraṇa-panchika that there are two kinds of cognition, one of which is an object of inference and the other self illuminated : किं तर्ह्यनुमायते ज्ञानम् ? ननु न तत् संदिदः स्वयमकाशया भित्तमुपलभ्यते ? सत्यम्, अतएवानुमीयते । ननु किं तदिति ? न तद् विज्ञः । सं-विदुत्पत्तिकारणमन्तःकरणसन्निकर्षाख्यं तदित्ययमस्य परितुष्यतानाशुभता । † — "What, then, is that cognition which is inferred ? No such thing as is different from the self-illuminated Samvit

* Shabara Bhasya, Ben. Ed p. 9.

‡ Brhati M. p. 13.

† Prakaraṇa Panchika p 63.

सुदितकषायाणामिदं कथनीयं न कर्मसङ्गिनाम् । आह-
 च भगवान् द्वेपायनः 'न बुद्धिभेदं जनयेदज्ञानां कर्म-
 सङ्गिनाम् इति रश्चस्याधिकारि ।" *

—'The statement that the expressions 'I' 'mine' etc. indicate a misconception of Atman should be made to those who have subdued their attachment to worldly objects, and not before those who like to stick to karman ; and the great Dwaipayana has said 'You must not create a confusion in the minds of ignorant people who are attached to Karman.'

The knowledge of the true nature of Atman as free from अङ्कार and मङ्कार is prejudicial to the cause of sacrificial performances and hence, the Mimamsakas do not prefer it. We find here exactly the same thing stated briefly by Prabhakara as is stated at great length by Shankaracharyya in his Adhyasabhashya.

Now, we should ascertain here the meaning of the word, Samvit, which is nowhere clearly defined in the Mimamsa text books. The extract from the Brhati just quoted seems to imply that Samvit is really to be regarded as a form of Atman. In the Prakarana-panchika, we find that both Samvit and Atman have been characterised as 'self-illuminated'. We have already cited the passage in which Samvit is so described, and here we quote the other passage which describes Atman

in a similar way : "अनर्थं प्रत्यक्षं सुखदिग्दिव आत्मवति प्रमादनिर्दिष्टविदुः । ननुप्रतिनिधिं प्राप्नुवन्त्या, आत्मप्रत्यक्षेन विवाङ्मोक्षोपपत्तेन च ननुत्तरेः" † — 'there are some who preach that Atman, like pleasure, etc., is known by mental perception, but the revered Prabhakaras think that this view is not reasonable. Atman is known because it is self-illuminated and because it is involved in the cognition of external things.' This goes to establish that Samvit is identical with Atman.

But Prabhakara is unwilling to introduce this idea into the Mimamsa. His attitude is clearly understood from the following passage of the Brhati :

"प्रमादरूपता च ज्ञानस्य ज्ञानागङ्गनीया एव ज्ञानागङ्गित-
ज्ञातुः युक्तहेतुं नागङ्गित इतिप्रशङ्कत्वात् । ‡

"It should not be supposed that Jnana is Pramatra (cogniser), for such a supposition has never been made, and it is quite in the fitness of things that it has not been made, for they are fond of karma." Thus, we see that though Prabhakara has every respect for the Vedanta doctrine, he is still unwilling to promulgate it in the Mimamsa. He, however, thinks it proper to characterise Atman as the substratum of jnana which is a product of itself, and so he says in the Brhati :

† Prakarana panchika, p. 152.

‡ Brhati Ma. p. 25.

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इह तु सर्वज्ञेयप्रमादतद्व सविदुपन्यस्ता *

"In the Mimamsa, Samvit is to be regarded as the cogniser of all objects of cognition "

In this passage, Samvit, being characterised as प्रमाद, is distinguished from cognition, and so, the whole passage is to be taken as implying that Atman, which is the substratum of cognition (an object of inference) is Samvit (consciousness) Atman is the substratum of the cognition which is an object of inference, but not the substratum of any self-illuminated cognition. That this is the conclusion of Prabhakara appears from the following passage of the Brhati :

यदपि ज्ञादतेव ज्ञानाद्व न शक्यते वक्तुमिति.....

तदपि प्रत्युक्तं कामं निज्ञानमपह्नूयते नार्थ इति । †

—"If it be said that ज्ञाद is not possible without ज्ञान the answer would be that we may rather suppress ज्ञान than objects."

Here, we see that the suppression of cognition is regarded as preferable to the suppression of objects. This sort of preference could never have been given to objects if cognition had been regarded as self illuminated. So we think that cognition is regarded here as an object of inference, as is evident from the following passage

* Brhati Ms. p. 31.

† Brhati Ms. p. 32.

of the *Bhāṣya* : “*चक्षुरेव हि प्रवक्ष्यते विविचिता*” ; otherwise the above statement of the *Bṛhāti* would be meaningless. We see, therefore, that the conclusion—that according to *Prabhakara*, *Ātman* is the substratum of self-illuminated cognition,—though it finds favour with many authors, is untenable.

Thus we see that *Samvit* (consciousness) is self-illuminated, and is the same thing as the cogniser, i.e. *Ātman*. We also know that cognition is a product of *Ātman* (*Parinama*) and is not *Ātman* itself. Cognition is not, therefore, the same thing as *Samvit* (consciousness).

The passage of the *Bṛhāti*—“*चक्षुरेव हि चक्षुः सदेवा भवति न चक्षुरा*”—is thus translated by Prof. Keith : “As expounded by *Prabhakara*, consciousness (*samvit*) which is self-illuminated is cognised, but not as an object of cognition, but as cognition.” * He has translated the word ‘*Samvit*’ as ‘consciousness’ but he has taken the word ‘*Samvedya*’ as meaning ‘an object of cognition.’ But it seems better to render the passage thus : ‘Consciousness is cognised’ but not as an object of consciousness.” By saying that consciousness is not an object of consciousness, it is meant that it is an object of cognition. There is another passage in the *Bṛhāti* which states this clearly : “*चक्षुः न चक्षुः क्षिप्तं प्रवेष्टुं*” A distinction between the cognition of an external object

* *Karma Mimamsa* p. 20.

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and that of consciousness is expressed here. An object is both Prameya and Samvedya whereas consciousness is only Prameya. That which is an object of Vrtti or cognition is Prameya, and that which is connected with consciousness is Samvedya. To safeguard an independent existence of external objects, the Bhattas deny the self-luminosity of cognition, and so the passage—
“एकसंवेद्यविषयेव हि एका संविद् न संवेद्यद्वयविषया—”
of the Brhati means,—“at one time, Samvit connects itself with one object, and not two.” Now, consciousness or Samvit is self-illuminated, so Pramanas cannot give rise to it; but Pramanas give rise to Vrtti or cognition, and when Vrtti arises, consciousness shines or becomes reflected.

This view is the same as that of the Advaitins. It also indicates that no appearance of external objects is possible without a connection with consciousness. We should notice that here the Mimamsaka touches on the Vedanta doctrine that there is no separate existence of the phenomenal world as apart from the existence of Atman. Prabhakara, however, who is a supporter of the sacrifices, cannot go so far as to substantiate it plainly, but still he says in the Brhati “वद परं ब्रह्मविदामेष निश्चयो यदुपलभ्यते तदसत्यम्, यन्नोपलभ्यते तत् तत्त्वमिति, नमस्तेष्व, विदुषां नोत्तरं याच्यम्।” * “But if this be the conclusion of those who know Brahman that all that is known is false and that

* Brhati Ms. p 30.

which is not known is true, I bow to them (i. e. I do not challenge their conclusion)—no opposition should be made against wise men." From this, it clearly appears that at heart, Prabhakara was not opposed to the Vedantins, but he could not openly accept their doctrines. We have said before that, if the Prabhakaras regard cognition as self-illuminated, it would be difficult for them to avert the Vijnana-Vada. But if the conclusion which we now arrive at be accepted, the Vijnana-Vada will be easily averted. The difference between the Vijnana Vada and this view of the Prabhakaras is that according to the Vijnana Vada all external objects are forms of Vrtti which is momentary, whereas according to this view the objects are connected with consciousness through the medium of Vrtti. So the Vijnana-Vada does not stand in the way.

Here, we should also notice the difference that exists between the Bhatta view and the Vijnana Vada. Samvit is known by the Vaijnanikas as the Alaya-vijnana and Vrtti as the Pravrtti-vijnana. Now, if the Vaijnanikas admit that Alayavijnana is a permanent thing, that external objects are objects of the Vijnanas, and that the Pravrttivijnana is the product of the Alayavijnana, there would be no difference between the Bhatta theory and the Vijnana Vada. In the view of the Bhattas, there is an unconscious counterpart (अविद्यन्) of consciousness (Atman) which may be regard-

ed as the same thing as the Antahkarana, and by means of which Atman is transformed into the shape of the Vṛtti. But the Vaijnanikas do not admit the existence of such a counterpart. Hence it is not possible for them to hold that the Pravṛtti-vijnana is a product of the Alaya-vijnana. Thus, in the Bhatta view, Atman is treated as जड़ or Prameya. What will, then, be the distinction between Atman and an ordinary thing? The answer is that unlike other things Atman is not Samvedya (object of consciousness). It is, therefore, regarded as consciousness. So, they say that in the Bhatta view Atman is both जड़ and consciousness. This is also the purport of the passage—"संविद्यैव हि सवित् संवेदा....."

So, we see that in the Prabhakara view, too, cognition is an object of inference, and consciousness (Atman) is self-illuminated. There is, then, no difference between the Prabhakara view and the Bhatta view in this respect. But the Prabhakara view is not so represented by the author of the Madhawa-tatpariya-Chandrika and other writers. We do not understand why it is so. The author of the Nyayaratnavali asserts on the authority of the Tattwa-Chintamani that there were two schools of the Prabhakaras—one Prachina and the other Navya, and that the older school did not accept the doctrine of Triputibhāna.* It is probable that

† Nyayaratnavali p 18.

“स्यातामत्यन्तनाशोऽस्य कृतनाशाकृततामसी ।

न त्ववस्थान्तरप्राप्ती” * .

“If Atman has an absolute end, performances will go for nothing, and things will occur which are not the results of past deeds. But Atman does not perish simply by undergoing changes.” It is not change but absolute destruction that makes a thing transitory. But Atman is not liable to absolute destruction. Hence there is no objection to regarding it as eternal. If all are agreed that a thing should be treated as transient because of its changeableness, let it be so regarded. All that the Bhāttas want to assert is, that Atman is not subject to destruction, and that, the transitoriness which is due to destruction should not be ascribed to Atman. Thus, Kumārila says in the Shlokavartika :

“नानित्यशब्दाच्चलसात्वतो विनिवायते ।

विक्रियामात्रवाचित्वे न ह्युच्छेदोऽस्य तावता ॥ *

“If mere changeableness be the cause of transitoriness, Atman may be called transitory, But this does not by any means imply a destruction of it (Atman).” This shloka makes the position of the Bhāttas clear by stating that even the eternal Atman is subject to changes, such as cognition, etc. This view appears in the doctrines of the Shuddhādvaita, the Tantrika and

* Atmavada v 23.

* Atmavada, v, 22.

the Sankhya-Patanjala systems. According to the Shuddhadvaitins, God evolves himself into the form of the world, but he is eternal all the same. The Tantra also propounds that Shakti evolves herself but is still eternal. Similarly, the Sankhya-Patanjala and the Pishupata systems hold that Prakriti, though eternal, is evolved into the shape of the world. The arguments advanced on this subject by all the three systems are the same as those of Bhatta. Even the Vaisheshikas and the Naiyayikas admit that the eternal Atman is the substratum of cognition which is transitory.

Atman is omnipresent.

The followers of Shri Ramanuja preach that Atman is of the size of an atom. This view of theirs is deduced from the following passage of the Shruti : "सर्वतोऽपि स एव हि देवः" "The most excellent being is perceived as the point of an awl." If Atman be atomic in size, how can it feel pleasure, pain, etc. all over the body? The answer would be that it can do so through the medium of Jnana which is a property of its own and which is capable of contraction and expansion. They cite the example of a lamp to illustrate this view. The flame of a lamp is a pretty little thing, but it can illumine many things by means of its rays of light which are capable of expansion. So, there is no harm in assuming that Atman is atomic in size. But it should

be discussed here whether this Jnana which is an attribute of Atman is different from Atman or is identical with it. If it be regarded as different, an experience of pleasure or pain at a certain part of the body will belong to Jnana and not to Atman, and so, Atman will not be able to feel pleasure or pain. Jnana cannot serve as a medium (Vyapara) of Atman, for, in that case, it must be supposed that it is caused by Atman, † as the light of a flame which illumines various articles is itself caused by the flame. But Ramanuja regards Jnana as eternal and independent and not as a product, and so, he cannot successfully propound that Jnana is a medium of Atman. If it now be supposed that Jnana is not different from Atman, another difficulty will arise. Jnana, according to them, has contractions and expansions. If cognition be regarded as identical with Atman, these expansions and contractions will be attributed to Atman itself. But Atman, which is an atom according to them, is incapable of expanding or contracting. To effect expansions and contractions a large number of particles is necessary. But, as an atom has no particles, it cannot expand or contract. Hence, the Jainas propounded that Atman is of the size of the body. They hold that the subtle form of Atman is capable of expansion and contraction. When it is born as an ant

* “तज्जन्मस्ये सति तज्जन्मजनकत्वं व्यापारत्वम्।”

it will expand itself as much as is necessary to cover the body of the ant ; and, when, in another birth, it is born as an elephant, it will expand itself more, so as to cover the big body of the elephant. The advantage of this theory is that, according to it, we can explain how pleasure or pain, generated in any part of the body, is felt by Atman. But anything which is made up of component parts, as a jar or a piece of cloth, is liable to destruction. In assuming that Atman is of the size of the body, which expands and contracts, the Jainas cannot but admit that Atman consists of parts. So, it is not possible for them to support the eternal existence of Atman. It is for this reason that in the Sutra "एतद् एव ब्रह्मसंज्ञं परम्." † of the Uttara-Mimamsa, the Advaitins establish the omnipresence of Atman by refuting the Jaina theory (that Atman is of the size of the body). But Ramanuja utilizes this Sutra for propounding his theory of the atomic size of Atman by refuting the Jaina theory. We do not understand why Ramanuja assails the Jaina theory at all. His objection is that, according to the Jaina theory, Atman is capable of expansion and contraction, and, hence, it cannot be eternal. When he admits that cognition, which is an attribute of Atman and which is capable of expansion and contraction, is eternal, why can he not hold that, that Atman (of the Jainas) which is capable of contrac-

tion and expansion is eternal? So, the theory of Ramanuja is practically no improvement upon the Jaina theory. *

Hence, the Bhāttas assume that Atman is omnipresent. Although Atman is all-pervading, and individuals are numerous, still, what is known by one person is not known by another, because there is a particular demarcation of each individual which is due to different merits, demerits, etc. The passage, “आकाशवत् सर्वगतश्च नित्यः,” “Atman is all-pervading and eternal like ether,” of the Shruti recognises the omnipresence as well as the eternal existence of Atman. That text of the Shruti which describes Atman as being of the size of the point of an awl does not really refer to Atman itself. When we say that a man is dead, we do not mean that his Atman is dead, but the physique of the man, which is a disguise (वेषाधि) of his Atman, is dead. Similarly in this passage, the word ‘Avara’ does not mean Atman itself, but it means Manas which is also a disguise of Atman. We do not find any necessity for imagining an atomic size of Atman. If it is done with a view to distinguishing Atman from Brahman, we must say that it is unnecessary, for the Naiyayikas have successfully proved the omnipresence of Atman without ever holding that it is identical with Brahman.

* This matter has been fully discussed by Umamaheswara Śastry in his *Virodha-virodhini*.

We ought to point out here that this theory of the omnipresence of Atman does not rest upon the Sūtras of Jaimini but upon the Vedānta Sūtras. We have seen above what different deductions have Shankara and Ramanuja made from the Sūtra "एतन्मन्त्रोऽयं ब्रह्मसूत्रः". It is not proper to expatiate upon it here, but it will suffice to notice that Kumarila has not accepted the theory of the atomic size of Atman. He describes Atman as "एतन्मन्त्रोऽयं ब्रह्मसूत्रः" "all-pervading entity," and he also declares that the knowledge of Atman will be developed by the study of the Vedānta. Hence, it is clear that the theory of omnipresence is the proper deduction from the Vedānta Sūtras (in his opinion).

Atman as the Agent and the Enjoyer.

In the Sāṃkhya-Patanjala doctrine, Atman is described only as the enjoyer. But one who does not do anything cannot produce any fruit and, consequently, cannot enjoy anything. So, those who admit that Atman is the enjoyer must admit first that it is a doer or an agent.

We have shown before that the difference between the view of the Bhāttas and that of the Naiyāyikas is, that while the former regard Atman as consciousness, the latter hold that it is not so. If we accept the view of the Naiyāyikas as correct, we shall not be able to explain such texts of the Śruti as "विज्ञानं यम तदुक्तं"

"Consciousness performs sacrifices," etc., where the word *Vijnana* clearly denotes *Atman*. It is used here in the nominative case, and so, it is the agent of the performance. So, the view of the *Bhattas* is quite consistent with this and other similar *Shruti* texts.

We may also briefly indicate here some other points of difference which exist between the view of *Bhatta* and the views of other systems. The *Bhattas* differ from the *Charvakas* in holding the view that *Atman* is eternal ; from the *Pashupatas* and *Jainas* in holding that *Atman* is omnipresent ; from the *Bouddhas* in maintaining the doctrine of the permanent consciousness of *Atman* ; and from the *Sankhya-Patanjalas* in holding that *Atman* is a doer as well as an enjoyer.

There is really no difference of opinion between the *Mimamsakas* and the *Advaitins* regarding these attributes. But both *Bhatta* and *Prabhakara*, though they approve of the view of the *Advaitins*, do not like to introduce that view into the *Karma-Mimamsa*. We have said this once before. We cite below, once again, certain passages which show their tendency in this respect :

“प्रमादरूपता च ज्ञानस्य अनाशङ्कनीया एव, ज्ञाना-
शङ्कितत्वात्, युक्तञ्चेदं नाशङ्कितं कर्मप्रवणत्वात् ।” *

“यदुक्तमहङ्कारममकरावनात्मनि आत्माभिमानाविति

* Vide p. 111.

चुद्धितस्यावापानिदेतत् कथमोषम् न कर्ममङ्गलम् इत्यु-
पगच्छते । आह च तन्मतम् उपपायनं, 'न बुद्धिर्मेद जनयेद-
पानं कर्ममङ्गलम्' इति रथव्याधिकारे ।" †

"यदि पर तद्वनिदानमेष निवयो यदुपनम्यते तदमत्यम् ।
नोपनम्यते तत् तद्वनिति, ममज्ञेभ्यः, विदुषा नोत्तरं
दायम् ।" ‡

"इत्याह नास्मिन्निराकरिषु राजानिति भाव्यछदस युद्धम् ।
इदमनेतद्विषयस्य बोधः प्रयाति वेदान्तनिषेधेन ॥" §

Now, it may be asked that if Kumarila and other Mimamsakas approve of the view of the Advaitins, why do we find such passages as "एतेन उपनिषदो व्याख्याताः" etc., in the Tantravartika and other works which indicate that the Upanisad texts are Arthavadas ?

The sentence 'एतेन उपनिषदो व्याख्याताः' of the Vartika is explained in the Nyayasulha in the following way :

"तत्र च संभारिद्वयानप्रतिपादनाभिप्रायम् । यथैवादि-
त्यन्तमुक्तं निगूढात्प्रामाण्यं अभ्युदयनिःसंयन्तार्यतया साधु-
मन्दाद्यदर्थे वधानात्पत्त्यात्, निगूढार्थप्रतिपादनपराणामप्यु-
पनिषदान् उपाधनाधिपिपेक्षतया बोधनागच्छेन उपादान-
सम्भवात् बोधनाच्चनप्रतिपातप्रामाण्यानाधनं सङ्गतम् ।" •

† Vide p. 109.

‡ Vide p. 114.

§ Vide p. 87.

• Nyayasulha p. 25 (Ben. Ed.)

"This statement is made with reference to those Upanisad texts only which describe the Samsari (agent and enjoyer) Atman and not to those texts which speak of an Asamsari (released) Atman, because the knowledge of the Asamsari Atman, Saguna (immanent) Brahman or Nirguna (transcendental) Brahman as giving rise to the attainment of heavenly bliss or final beatitude, will be described (by Kumarila) in the Sadhushabdadhikarana. Even the Upanisad texts which are statements of fact are supplements to the injunction for worship, and so they may be included under 'Chodana'. Hence it is reasonable to hold that they possess that authoritativeness which is enunciated in the Chodana Sutra."

In the Sadhushabdadhikarana which is referred to in the Nyayasudha Kumarila says : "अप्रकरणगतत्वेन अनेकान्तिक-
क्रतुसम्बन्धासम्बन्धाच्च न , अन्न-खादिर-सुववाक्यादिफलश्रुतिवर्धवादत्वम्" †
"These (Upanisad) texts are not found in the context of any sacrificial injunction, nor do they describe things which are restricted exclusively to sacrifices, and so, they are not to be treated as Arthavadas like the Phalashruti passages regarding Anjana, Khadira, Sruva, etc. Arthavadas are generally found in the context of some sacrificial injunctions, and they eulogise or condemn something which is to be used or rejected in a sacrifice. The Upanisad texts are not of this kind.

† Tantravartika p 241.

There are also other Arthavadas which are not found in the context of any particular injunction, but they praise or condemn something whose only use lies in sacrifices, such as Juhu, etc., and on that account they are connected with all sacrificial injunctions. But the Asamsari Atman, Saguna Brahman or Nirguna Brahman has nothing to do with any sacrifice. Hence the Upanisad texts which speak of this Asamsari Atman, the Saguna Brahman or Nirguna Brahman, are not Arthavadas.

The above explanation of the Nyayasudha makes it clear that Kumarila is not of the opinion that all Upanisad texts are Arthavadas, and that he does not assail the view of the Advaitins who regard Atman as Asamsari (released). So it is not proper to suppose that Kumarila disregards the Advaita Darshana because he has said that Upanisad texts are Arthavadas. Parthasarathi Mishra also favours this view. In the Shastradipika we find the following :

“यानि पुनरतिकर्तव्यताविशेषयुक्तानि उपासनात्मकानि
ज्ञानानि विधेयन्ते तेषां क्रतो दृष्टापयोगाभावात् अदृष्ट-
फलत्वम् । अदृष्टं च फलं वाक्यशेषात् द्विभिर्धं, अभ्युदयरूपं
निःश्रेयसरूपं च” *

“The precepts relating to worship which are laid down together with rules of procedure, are found to be of no

* Shastradipika I 1. 5.

use to the sacrifices, and therefore they (are supposed to) produce unseen merits. From the remaining portion of the sentence we learn that an unseen result is of two kinds—attainment of heavenly bliss, and final beatitude,.....” There is only this difference between the opinion of Parthasarathi and that of author of the Nyayasuddha, that the former, by asserting that the knowledge relating only to worship produces the attainment of heavenly bliss, etc., concludes that Kumarila recognises the value of that Darshana only which deals with Saguna-upāsana, while the latter indicates that Kumarila recognises the worth of Advaita Darshana also. But there is no difference of opinion regarding the point that all Upanisad texts are not Arthavadas.

The above-mentioned Darshana dealing with Sagunopāsana is not, however, the same as the Ramanuja, the Pashupata or the Madhwa Darshana, for these Darshanas acknowledge the atomic size of Atman, but the author of the Shastradipika holds Atman to be omnipresent.

From the above discussion, another point becomes clear. The authors of the Nyayasudha and the Shastradipika are decidedly of the opinion that the Bhettas are theists and nothing but theists. We may suppose that the distinction between the Bhettas and other theists is that the former hold that Upāsana itself will produce

its proper fruit, whereas the latter preach that God will award the fruit due on an Upasana. There is another fundamental distinction : while all other theists declare that liberation is achieved through Jnana, Kumarila holds that it is produced by Jnana and Karma combined.

We see, however, that the position of the Vedanta Darshana will not be affected even if all the Upanisad texts are regarded as Arthavadas. Kumarila admits that even the Arthavadas serve as authorities for things which cannot be known from any other source or which are not opposed to anything ascertained by any other means of proof. It is for this reason that all the Mimamsakas accept the Arthavada—"वाचा विद्वन्निबद्धा" as an authority for the conclusion, that sound is eternal, while explaining the Sutra, 'Linga-darshanachcha' in the Shabdanityatwadhikarana. †

Moreover, the texts which establish the existence of an Asamsari Atman may be construed as eulogising the Samsari Atman, and may still be regarded as the authorities for proving the existence of the Asamsari Atman. The Upanisad texts speak of the Asamsari Atman. When Kumarila notices an eulogy of the Samsari Atman in them he does not mean to deny that these texts describe an Asamsari Atman, but he simply means that such texts aim at eulogising the Samsari

Atman. But how can the Samsari Atman be praised by the texts which describe the Asamsari Atman ? To this, the answer would be that Jaimini has laid down a principle that where there is an eulogy of one correlative (सम्बन्धी) it may be intended for the other correlative also. In the passage, "Take out fire by means of Vetasa and Avaka twigs ; water is cool," though water is praised as cool, the praise is really intended for the twigs that grow in water. So, the texts which tell us that Atman is Asamsari are meant really for praising the Samsari Atman.

Hence, the Uttara-Mimamsa will not lose its status as an independent Darshana even if all Upanisad texts be regarded as mere Arthavadas, nor will an ascertainment of the nature of Atman which is fit for performing sacrifices be impossible. This is what is meant by Kumarila when he says in the Arthavadadhikarana that the Upanisad texts are Arthavadas. He does neither intend to condemn the Vedanta Darshana nor does he want to establish that the Samsari Atman cannot possess the attributes of the Asamsari Atman. The passage of the Tantra-vartika in the Sadhushabdashikarana, which we have quoted above, bears this out.

At the time of studying the Purva-Mimamsa, we come to know that Atman acts and enjoys the fruits of its actions, but that must not lead us to reject the other conception of Atman, viz, that it is Asamsari, which

is also derived from the Shruti, though it stands in the way of the performance of sacrifices. This is the view of Kumarila, and the following verse of the Shloka-vartikashows[†] that it is so :

“इत्वाह नास्ति च न निराकारिण्यु
 रात्मास्ति तां भाष्यकृद्वय युक्ता ।
 इदं त्रमेतदपि पश्य यो धः
 प्रयाति वेदान्तनिषेधेन ॥”

Kumarila states here clearly that the knowledge about Atman will be developed by studying the Vedanta (the Upanisads). The purport of this statement is that there are certain attributes of Atman which cannot be conceived at the time of the performance of sacrifices, but which can be conceived with the help of the Vedanta. Thus, it appears to be the view of Kumarila that the acceptance of the apparent meaning of the Upanisad texts which is prejudicial to the performance of sacrifices is not advisable. But it should by no means be asserted that Kumarila deprecates the Vedanta Darshana, merely on the basis of his statement, that the Upanisad texts are Arthavadas.

This shows another point of difference between the view of the Bhettas and that of the Naiyayikas. The Naiyayikas hold that Atman is an agent, while the

† S. V. Atmavada, v. 148.

Bhettas hint that this character of Atman is imaginary, though they do not give any pronounced opinion.

We must not forget; that the Prabhakaras are also of the same opinion. We have already cited some passages from the Bṛhati which are to this effect. †

So, we do not find any difference between the view of the Mimamsakas and that of the Advaitins so far as the practical aspect of the Advaita doctrines are concerned. The Advaitins admit that Atman, though it is of the nature of consciousness, is to be treated as 'jada' or 'covered'; because it is not perceived by others. They admit the eternal existence and omnipresence of Atman. They also recognise its character; as an agent etc., for all practical purposes. It is for this reason that the Advaitins openly declare that the doctrine of the Bhettas holds good for all practical purposes—"व्यवहारे साध्यः",

† Vide pp. 124, 25.

denies the existence of God as the Creator. In the third chapter of the Uttara-Mimamsa Sūtras, discussions are made only about Sādhana, and it is not probable that a denial of Creatorship would be introduced there. Such discussions are made in the second chapter of the Sūtras, and, if Badarayana thought that Apurva was the cause of the creation of the world according to Jaimini, he would certainly have spoken of that in that chapter. But in the second chapter we find no such Sūtra. This fact clearly shows that the difference between Jaimini and Badarayana is only with regard to Phalāsādhana, and not with regard to Kartṛtva. Thus, we can conclude that theism has the approbation of Jaimini so far as he is represented by Badarayana.

In the beginning of the fourth chapter of his Karma-Mimamsa, Prof. Keith says : "Though the Mimamsa is so deeply concerned with the sacrifice, it has no belief in the doctrine that the rewards of offerings are to be expected either from the deities to whom the offerings are directed to be made or from a God as creator, or apportioner of reward or punishment." The purport of this statement is, that the apportionment of fruits is the same thing as creation, and that, if God be not regarded as the apportioner of fruits, he should not be regarded as the Creator. This statement follows from a consideration of a passage of Shankaracharya's commentary on the Sūtra "पूर्व तु बादरायणो हेतुव्यपदेशात्". *

That passage runs as follows :

"तदेव चेन्नरस्य फलहेतुत्वं यत् स्वकर्मोपपत्त्याः प्रजाः सृजति"

"God is regarded as the cause of fruits inasmuch as he creates beings in accordance with their own actions."

With reference to the same Sutra, the Bhamati observes ;

"न हि जातु सृष्टिपिण्डपञ्चादयः कुम्भकाराद्यनधिष्ठिताः

कुम्भाचारम्याय प्रभवन्ती दृष्टाः....."

तस्यादधेतनं यन्नो वा अपूर्वं वा न धेतनानधिष्ठितं स्रतन्मं
प्रकार्यं प्रवर्तितुमुत्तममर्थे ।"

"Lumps of clay, etc., are never seen to produce pots, etc., unless they are handled by potters and others. So, an action or *Apurva* which is insentient cannot independently discharge its own functions unless it is guided by a sentient being....." By citing the examples of "lumps of clay etc.," the author of the *Bhamati* makes it clear that *Apurva* cannot produce a fruit unless it is regulated by a sentient being. It is admitted on all hands that here the view of *Jaimini* forms the *Purva Paksa* and that of *Badarayana* forms the *Uttara Paksa*. In the *Uttara Paksa* it is established that God is the cause of fruits in so far as he creates things; i.e., God is the apportioner of fruits or the Creator. From this it appears that in the *Purva Paksa* view (doctrine of *Jaimini*) the production of fruits by *Apurva* is the same thing as the creation of the

things of the world, and that God has nothing to do with it. If this be not regarded as the view of Jaimini, there would remain no connection between the Purva Paksa and the Uttara Paksa. So it seems that there is a denial of God as the Creator, in the view of Jaimini. Prof. Keith takes this to be so : "The Vedata Sutra (III 2, 40 *) expressly negatives the idea that in the Jaimini's view there was divine intervention in this regard, and the atheism of the Mimamsa is regarded with such unanimity as to render it impossible to explain it away." †

Now, from the Sutra, "कर्मं जैनिरित एव" it is ascertained that in Jaimini's view, Dharma is the cause of the fruits. We ought to determine, in the first place, what the word 'fruit' means. From the following extract from Shankaracharya's commentary on the sutra "फलमत उपपत्तेः" ‡ we get a description of 'fruit' :

“स्यादेतत् । कर्मं विनश्यत् स्वकाल एव एतानुरूपं फलं जनयित्वा विनश्यति, तत् फलं कालान्तरितं कर्मा भोक्ष्यत इति तदपि न परिगृह्यति । प्राग् भोक्तृकसम्बन्धात् फलत्वानुपपत्तेः । यत्कालं हि यत्सुखं दुःखं वात्मना भुज्यते तस्यैव लोके फलत्वं प्रसिद्धम् । न ह्यसम्बन्धस्यात्मना सुखस्य दुःखस्य फलत्वं प्रतीयन्ति लौकिकाः ।”

* Probably he mistakes it for 41.

† Karmamimamsa, p 61.

‡ III 2 38.

"It may be that an act, which is about to cease, ceases after producing its proper fruit in the course of its occurrence. The agent will enjoy that fruit at some other time. This view is not satisfactory, because a fruit is no fruit till it comes to be enjoyed by the agent. It is a well-known fact that pleasure or pain is called the fruit when it is experienced by a man; that pleasure or pain, so long as it is not connected with the man, is not regarded by people as a fruit." Vachaspati Mishra explains this idea thus in his Bhamati :

न हि स्वर्गं चात्मानं लभतामित्याधिकारिणः कामयन्ते किन्तु
भोग्योऽस्वाद्यं भवत्विति । तेन यादृशमेभिः कास्यते तादृशस्य
फलत्वमिति भोग्यत्वमेव सत् फलमिति । न च तादृशं
कर्मन्तरमिति कथं फलं सदपि स्वरूपेण ।"

"Agents do not desire that paradise should be enjoyed by itself, but they desire that it should be an object of enjoyment to them. So, what they desire becomes a fruit when it comes to be enjoyed, and it is not another act of that kind. How can it, therefore, be regarded as a fruit even when it exists (not enjoyed)?" From this, it appears that Karman is to be regarded as the cause of the fruit, if it brings about the enjoyment, and surely Badarayana understands this to be the view of Jaimini. The idea that, according to Jaimini, Apurva only is the cause of the creation is never conceived by Badarayana. Had Badarayana taken that to

be the view of Jaimini, he would have refuted it in the second chapter where the views of the Samkhya and other Darshanas have been refuted, and not in the Sadhanapada. From the very fact that this matter has been dealt with in the Sadhanapada, it appears that the dispute between Badarayana and Jaimini is with regard to God as the apportioner of fruits, i e, as a Sadhana or means of bringing about the enjoyment of fruits, and not with regard to God as the creator of the things of the world as they exist, i e., which are not in the state of being enjoyed. Shankaracharya, too, while explaining the the Sutra फलमत उपपत्तेः * says :

“तस्यैव ब्रह्मणो व्यवहारिष्यामीश्वीशितव्यविभागाऽवस्थायामयमन्यः सभावो वर्ण्यते”

“This another function is ascribed to the same Brahman, which prevails so long as the division into the controller and the controlled continues for practical purposes.” By this statement, Shankaracharya brings forward the view that God is not only the controller but the apportioner of fruits also. Thus, it becomes clear that the Sutra “धर्मो जैमिनिरत एव” * is meant to show nothing but the fact that, in the view of Jaimini, God is not the apportioner of fruits. In the same Sutra, Shankaracharya says :

* III 2, 38.

* III 2, 40.

“इयंस्तु फलं ददातीत्यनुपपन्नम् । यविचिषस्य कारणस्य
विचित्रकार्यानुपपत्तेर्वैयर्थ्येनैष्टं स्यमसम्भवात् ।”

“But, that God gives fruits is not reasonable, because an unmixed cause cannot produce effects of a mixed character, and because partiality and cruelty will arise.” On this point, the Bhamati says :

“कर्मभिर्वा युनायुमेः कार्यदेधोत्पादे रागादिमत्तुपसङ्ग
इत्याशयः”

“The purport of this is that, if good or bad acts produce consequences of two kinds, there will be a susceptibility.” If acts produce consequences through the pleasure or displeasure of God, God will be liable to partiality and cruelty. So, in order to keep God free from all susceptibilities, we must admit that acts produce consequences through *Apurva*, and not through the pleasure or displeasure of God.—This is what is understood by the author of the Bhamati to be the view of Jaimini.

Here, we must notice that at the time of refuting the view of Jaimini, Shankaracharya says that the apportioner of fruits and the creator are the same :

“तदेषु च ईश्वरस्य फलदातृत्वं यत् स्वप्नमांशरूपा. प्रजाः सृजति

From this, it becomes clear that God cannot be regarded as the creator unless he is taken to be the apportioner of fruits. Now, the sentence, यत् स्वप्नमांशरूपा. प्रजाः सृजति,

contains the word यत् which indicates that the statement is an अनुवाद i.e., a repetition. An Anuvada is possible only in the case of a thing of which we have known already, and not in the case of a thing of which we know nothing. But, if God were not regarded as the creator of the world in the doctrine of Jaimini, it would by no means be possible to mention that matter as an accepted fact at the time of referring to his doctrine. Jaimini and Badarayana dispute only over the manner of clearing God of the charges of partiality and cruelty. Jaimini holds that God Himself does not award rewards or punishments which come through Apurva; while Badarayana holds that God Himself awards rewards and punishments, but that He is not guilty of any partiality or cruelty, for He acts in accordance with the acts done by individuals. So, we see that there is no dispute regarding the creatorship of God at all.

There can arise no doubt, therefore, regarding the existence of God in Jaimini's system. The mere fact that Jaimini denies an intervention on the part of God in the matter of the apportionment of fruits does not amount to a denial of the existence of God. In support of our conclusion, we quote here the opinion of Prof. Max Muller: "Here, then, we see the real state of the case as between Jaimini and Badarayana. Jaimini would not make the Lord responsible for the injustice that seems to prevail in this world and hence,

reduced everything to cause and effect, and saw in the inequalities of the world the natural result of the continued action of good or evil acts. This surely, was not atheism, rather was it an attempt to clear the Lord from those charges of cruelty or undue partiality which have so often been brought against Him. It was but another attempt of justifying the wisdom of God, an ancient *Theodicee*, that, whatever we may think of it, certainly did not deserve the name of atheism" *.

After these discussions, we cannot but reject the sweeping statement of Prof. Keith which is as follows : "The atheism of the true Mimamsa is regarded with such unanimity as to render it impossible to explain it away (as does Max Muller etc)." †

There is a tradition also, which ascribes atheism to Jaimini. In the Sutra, अमर्त्यमित्र एव, the doctrine of Jaimini, as we have seen above, seems to be represented as establishing Dharma as the cause of rewards and punishments to the exclusion of God. Most probably, the origin of the above tradition lies here. Again, while supporting the view that God is the cause of rewards and punishments in the Sutra, अमर्त्यमित्र एव, Shankaracharya has proposed two *Purvapakhas*. The first of them runs thus :

“आदेतत् । कर्म विनश्यत् स्वर्गाच्च एव तानुत्तमं फलं जम-

* Six Systems, p. 277.

† *Dharma Mimamsa*, p. 61,

यित्वा विनश्यति, तत् फलं कालान्तरितं कर्त्रा भोक्ष्यत इति,”

“An act, which is about to cease, ceases after producing its proper fruit during the course of its occurrence. The agent will enjoy that fruit at some other time.” The second one is as follows : ‘अथोच्येत, नाभूत् कर्मानन्तरं फलोत्पादः, कर्मकार्यादपूर्वाङ्गवेदिति” “If you contend that the fruit may not directly follow the act but that the act produces an Apurva which gives rise to the fruit etc” We have discussed the first Purva-paksha already and have shown that the cause (apportioner) and the creator are different (in the view of Jaimini). Consequently, though God is not regarded as the cause (apportioner) of the fruits, still it cannot be said that He is not the creator. But the second Purva-paksha goes so far as to ascribe even the creation of the world to Karman which is insentient. The effect of making such an assumption is that God as a creator is ousted, and atheism gains ground. It may seem probable that second Purva-paksha also has been framed in accordance with the view of Jaimini. From this also the notion may have arisen that Jaimini was an advocate of atheism.

But we must notice here that there is no reason for supposing that the second Purva-paksha is based on Jaimini's view. Had Badarayana understood Jaimini's view to be atheistical he would have framed the Sutra, धर्मो जैमिनिस्त एव in another way. In the view of Jaimini, as represented here, Dharma is regarded as the cause of

the fruits on the strength of the Shruti texts and not on account of the non-existence of God. Had Badarayana known Jaimini to be an atheist he would certainly have framed this Sutra as, *अथैवात्मिकमात्रम्*. But he has not done so. From this we infer that the second Purva-paksha does not represent the view of Jaimini. Even if we accept Badarayana's opinion that the apportioner of fruits is the same as the creator, it might still be suggested that Karman (and not God) is both the maker and apportioner of fruits. This suggestion gives rise to the second Purva-paksha. The second Purva-paksha is, therefore, a mere suggestion, and not an independent Purva-paksha such as is required to be refuted separately by the Sutra, *कर्मणोऽप्यपत्तेः*. The first Purva-paksha is the principal Purva-paksha. It clearly states that the creator and the apportioner of fruits are different. So we can safely conclude that, in the view of Jaimini, God is the creator, but that he is not the apportioner of fruits. There is, therefore, no basis for the notion that Jaimini's system is atheistical.

Next, we come to Kumarila and Prabhakara, the principal expounders of the system of Jaimini. Prof. Keith accuses them also of atheism: "The full development of the doctrine (atheism) is, as usual, to be found in Prabhakara and Kumarila" • So we must carefully examine if Kumarila and Prabhakara are really

* Karma Mimamsa, p. 61.

supporters of atheism.

The views of the Prabhākaras regarding God are summarised by Dr. Jha in the following words : "The Prabhākara denies a creator for the Universe. Even though he admits that the Universe is made of constituent parts, and, as such, it must have a beginning and an end in time, yet he finds no reason for believing that the Universe, as a whole, had a beginning at any one point of time, or that it would all come to an end at any one point ; hence if the constituent factors of the Universe have a beginning, they must have beginnings one after the other ; in fact this is what is actually found to be the case in everyday experience. Thus then, if it were true that certain factors of the Universe are brought into existence by an ultra-mundane Supervisor of Dharma-Adharma, this could not be true for the entire Universe as a whole. For instance the bodies of all men and animals are found to be produced by the functioning of the parents, and not by a supervising agency ; and this fact will enable us to infer the same with regard to the bodies of all animals, past and future also." †

Dr. Jha states next the views of Kumārila very briefly : "Kumārila's views with regard to God are found in the Shlokavartika, Sambandhaksepaparihara. He also denies the creation (shloka 47) and dissolution

† Ind. Thought, Vol. II, p. 269,

(63) of the universe as a whole (113); he bases his denial of the creator on the same grounds as that of the 'omniscient person' (47-59, 114-16) [†]

We must point out, here, that this denial of God has been made by Kumārila, Śhaṅkara or any body else in the chapter on Sambandhakṣhepaparīkṣā only with a particular object, and that this is not an absolute denial. They have made this denial only to show that even God has no independent control over the Vedas as is held by the Nyaya-Vaiśeṣikas. They also apprehend that if they accepted the view of the Naiyāyikas that the existence of God as the creator is to be ascertained by inference and that the Vedas are not uncreated, it would not be possible to support the existence of God. The simile, *वृक्षवत्*, which is used by Kumārila in the *Śloka*, "वृक्षवत् सर्वज्ञः च ययुः परमहंसः," "the assumption of the existence of the creator should be rejected like the omniscience of Buddha"—is very significant. In *Nyayaratnamālā*, the passage is explained thus :

"यथा च वृक्षादेः सर्वज्ञत्वं पुरुषत्वाद् असमदादिवत् निषेध्यम्
एवं प्रजापतेरपि सत्त्वं ।"

"as the omniscience of Buddha cannot be proved from such a statement as 'Buddha is omniscient' because he was a man like ourselves, so is the creatorship of Praja-

[†] *Ibid.* *Thought*, Vol. II, p. 262.

3 INTRODUCTION TO THE PURVA MIMAMSA

pati, (the Lord of creation).” The commentator means thereby to say that the truth of this theory (Prajapati’s creatorship) cannot be proved by means of arguments. The further significance of this verse has been stated in the first chapter of this work.

While criticising the views of the Naiyayikas, Kumarila has let fall hints which indicate his belief in the existence and creatorship of God. That refutation is very lucidly presented by Prof. Keith which runs as follows : “The Nyaya-Vaishesika, accepting the doctrine of atoms on the one hand and of the periodical creation and destruction of the world on the other, had found it necessary to introduce the conception of a creator, in order to secure in some measure a mode of bringing about the renewal and destruction of the combinations of the atoms and their connection with souls. But Prabhakara and Kumarila alike deny absolutely the validity of the belief in the periodical creation and dissolution of all things ; they accept a constant process of becoming and passing away, but they find no ground for the systematisation of the process, so as to produce cycles of evolution and involution of souls. Experience, Prabhakara urges, shows us the bodies of all animals being produced by purely natural means ; we can argue hence to the facts of the past and future, and need invoke no extraneous aid. Moreover, the whole conception of God supervising the

merits and demerits of men, is idle ; God cannot perceive merit or demerit by perception, since they are not perceptible, nor by the mind, which is confined to the body it occupies. Supervision also is impossible, even had God the necessary knowledge ; it must take the form either of contact, which is impossible, as merit and demerit being qualities are not subject to contact or inherence, and plainly a man's qualities can not inhere in God. If the argument is adduced of the analogy of the carpenter, it may be replied that on this basis the creator would have to be an embodied spirit, and no embodied spirit can affect such subtle things as the atoms or merit and demerit. Nor is it conceivable that the atoms should themselves act under the will of God, for no parallel to such activity is known to us, and if it were possible, it would follow from the eternity of the will of God that creation would be unceasing." † There is not the slightest doubt that the last sentence of the above extract is a paraphrase of the following verse which is found at the end of the refutation of the atomic theory in the Shloka-Vartika : "नयाम् परमात्मदेशात्कः कम् नदिह्यम्" ‡ "It is not possible, therefore, that atoms should act under the will of God" Now the statement that the atoms do not act under the will of God, will have a significance only when it is admitted that Kumarila recognises the existence of God and his

† Karmamimamsa, pp. 61, 62.

creatorship but not his will as the cause of creation.

Thus, according to Kumarila, God's will plays no part in the matter of creation. In the following verses of the Shlokavartika Kumarila expounds this view :

"ईश्वरेच्छा यदीष्येत संवत्सरात् लोककारणम् ।

ईश्वरेच्छावशित्वे च निष्फला कर्मचोदना ॥

न चानिमित्तया युक्तमुत्पत्तुं हीश्वरेच्छया ।

यद्वा तस्या निमित्तं यत् तद् भूतानां भविष्यति ॥" †

"If you want to introduce the will of God, that itself will be the cause of the world. Under the paramount will of God, Karman will shrink into insignificance. It is not also reasonable that God's will arises without any cause. That (Adṛsta) which may be suggested as its cause may as well be the cause of the world." So, we see that Kumarila simply asserts that the will of God has nothing to do with creation, but he denies neither His existence nor His creatorship.

Prof. Keith says again : "If, again, it is alleged that the creation was for his amusement this contradicts the theory, that he is perfectly happy and would involve him in much wearisome toil" * We should bear in mind that this statement is a reiteration of the fifty-sixth-verse of the Sambandhakṣhepaparīhara, which is a refutation of the view of the Naiyāyikas only.

† Sambandhakṣhepaparīhara, verses 72, 73.

* Karṣamīmamsa p 63.

But this attack is not directed against the Sutra, "लोकवत् तु भी राक्षेव्यम्" "(This creation is) his mere play as (we find) in the ordinary worldly affairs" of the Uttara-Mimamsa. || The very same view is expressed by the Naiyayikas and the Vedantins. But Kumarila attacks the Naiyavikas and exempts the Vedantins. This fact is very significant. The only difference between the two-systems is that the former has tried to prove the existence of God by means of arguments and the latter has tried to derive the idea of God from the Shruti. There is no dispute that the Vedanta Sutras are based on the Shruti. In his commentary on the second Sutra of the Uttara Mimamsa, Shankaracharya has said, "वेदान्त-प्रामाण्यद्वयार्थत्वात् सूत्राणां" "the Sutras are meant for culling the Vedanta flowers (i.e. the fine conclusions of the Upanisads)." The Sutras deal with the utterances of the Upanisads and do not involve themselves in mere argumentation. Now the real attitude of the Mimamsaka becomes clear. If anybody tries to prove the existence of God by means of arguments, the Mimamsaka will advance counter-arguments to attack him, but if anybody tries to derive the same thing from the uncreated Shruti, the Mimamsaka will make no objection. He denies that God who is the result of human deliberations, but he does not deny that God who is found in the uncreated Shruti. This is certainly not atheism.

It is said, that "God is perfectly happy," and so there is no reason as to why he should make the creation for the sake of amusement (Lila). But if we assume that God makes the creation in accordance with the respective acts of individuals, we shall be in a position to say that the creation is not for his amusement. In fact the Mimamsakas have so assumed. Those who preach that the creation is for the amusement of God will bear the brunt of the above attack. But the Mimamsaka stands at a safe distance. He regards God as a supervisor or judge. Just as a supervisor or judge acts in accordance with fixed rules of law, so God administers in accordance with our Karma.

But both Dr. Jha and Dr. Keith have said that no supervision on the part of God is possible. We have quoted before what Dr. Keith has said on this matter, and we quote below a few lines from Dr. Jha's work : "Nor is there any force in the Logician's arguments that our Dharma-Adharma must have for a supervisor a being possessed of intelligence higher than our own, because the Dharma-Adharma of the body that is the product of these must always belong to the same intelligent being to whom the body belongs ; any being however, intelligent, can never have any knowledge of the Dharma-Adharma of any other being ; hence the ultra-mundane 'God' can have no knowledge of the Dharma or Adharma of the being born as man,

animals etc., and without such knowledge he could not exercise any intelligent control over them ; 'God' could not perceive Dharma by his senses, as Dharma is absolutely imperceptible ; nor could he perceive it by his mind alone, as the mind by itself cannot perceive things outside the body, and the Dharma of all beings born in the world would always be outside the body occupied by the mind of the perceiving person, 'God'.

Then again it becomes necessary to examine the character of the 'supervision' that 'God' is said to exercise over Dharma and Adharma. (a) This supervision cannot be of the nature of contact or conjunction, because Dharma and Adharma being qualities are not capable of conjunction, which is possible for substances only. (b) Nor could it be in the form of Samavaya or inherence, as the Dharma-Adharma inhering in other souls could not inhere in the God." *

But we do not think that this is the true view of the Mimamsa. God's supervision consists in an investigation into the Dharma and Adharma performed by the individuals. By these words, 'Dharma and Adharma', the Mimamsaka does not mean 'Apurva', but simply the performance of sacrifices, etc. Such performances, when made by one person, can be seen by another. So it cannot be said that God cannot perceive Dharma and Adharma by perception. If Dharma and Adharma

* *Iqd Thought*, Vol. II pp 259, 60.

do no mean Apurva, it becomes unnecessary to examine further the character of the supervision of God, as both Dr. Jha and Dr. Keith have done. God remembers the acts done by individuals and makes his creations in accordance with those acts. In his *Bhatta Chintamani* *Gaga* Bhatta has given us just the same conclusion. He states that such texts of the Shruti as, तदैवत, etc., point to the Adrsta (of individuals). In the Upanisads, there are such texts, as "तदैवत" "He (God) considered," "सोऽकामयत" "He desired," etc. The purport of such texts is that God creates in accordance with the previous acts of individuals. *

We point out once more that all these arguments of Kumarila which have been reproduced by Dr. Jha and Dr. Keith were adduced by him for refuting the views of the Nyaya-Vaisheshikas only, and that he does not deny the creatorship of God.

This affords a solution of the problem of creation and dissolution. The Mimamsakas never admit an original creation or a total dissolution taking place at one point of time, but they hold that creation and dissolution are perpetually going on. On this point the conclusion of the Vartika is as follows :

“तस्मादद्यवदेवात् सर्गप्रलयकल्पना ।

समस्तत्रयजन्माभ्यां न सिध्यत्यप्रमाणिका” †

* Bhattachintamani, Ben. Ed. p. 36.

† Sambandhaksepaparihara, v. 113.

"Hence creation and dissolution take place as (they are taking place) to-day : there is no authority to prove that the whole (world) is created or destroyed at one time." But Kumarila is ready to believe that God is the cause of such creation and dissolution if only it is taken for granted that the Vedas are uncreated. If the Vedas are regarded to be a creation of God, the difficulty will be that we shall not be able to accept as true all that is said there about God. So we shall have to depend upon inference for ascertaining such things. But inference is not possible in such cases where no parallel examples are known from our experience. We cannot, therefore, obtain any correct knowledge of God by adopting this process. What Kumarila wants to propound is that this difficulty will not arise if the Vedas be eternal and independent, for then the statements will lie beyond all suspicion and so will require no verification.

It seems to be the principal motive of Kumarila in attacking the theories of the Naiyayikas, the Samkhyas, the Bouddhas and others, to refute their view that the Vedas are a composition. Had they not held so, Kumarila would not only have not attacked them but would have somehow or other supported them. The following extract from the Tantra-Vartika will corroborate the truth of the statement :

"यायेताः प्रधानपुरुषेखरपरमाणुकारणादिप्रक्रियाः सृष्टि-

प्रकृत्यादिरूपेण प्रतीतास्ताः सर्वा मन्त्रार्थवादज्ञानादिव दृश्या-
मागच्छन्तसूक्ष्मद्रव्य-प्रकृतिविकारभावदर्शनेन च दृष्टव्याः ।
प्रयोजनञ्च, स्वर्गयागाद्युपायोत्पादकज्ञानम् । सर्वप्रलयो-
पवर्णनमपि देवपुरुषकारप्रभावप्रविभागप्रदुर्गन्तार्थम् ।—सर्वत्र
हि तद्वस्तेन प्रवर्तते, तदुपरमे चोपरमतीति । विज्ञानसाध-
नचणभङ्गनैरात्म्यादिवादानामपि उपनिषत्प्रभवत्वम् विप्रयेषु
आत्मान्तिकं रागं निवर्त्तयितुमित्युपपन्नम् सर्वेषां प्राप्ताख्यम् ।
सदञ्च च यत्र कालान्तरकप्रत्यादृशदानोपभवासभावश्च
श्रुतिमूलता । *

"The actions of the causes—Pradhana, Purusa, Ishwara, or the atoms—which are known as the creation and the dissolution, are to be understood from the Mantras and the Arthavadas, as well as from an observation of the natural and decomposed conditions of visible objects, gross or fine. The object is to obtain knowledge of the distinction between the effect and cause, such as the heavenly bliss and sacrifice etc. The description of the creation and dissolution is also meant to distinguish the influence of Daiva from that of Purusakara, —Daiva is the motive power in all cases, and all cease when that ceases. Even the Vijnanavada the Ksana-bhangavada, the Nairatmyavada, etc., have their origin in the Upanisads, and their object is to check an excess

of attachment to the objects of the senses, and hence their authority is admitted. And in all the cases, where the effect takes place at a distant time and consequently is incapable of being ascertained at present, the Shruti is to be depended upon."

Here, Kumarila clearly states his opinion that all the doctrines which occur in the Bouddha Darshanas, etc., have their origin in the Upanisads, and that for this reason they constitute an authority on Dharma. By this opinion it is implied that if the Bouddhas and others recognised Dharma as resting on the authority of the eternal Vedas, he would readily accept their decision. His denial of the existence of God is nothing but a protest against the doctrine of the Naiyayikas who have worked out the existence of God independently of the Shruti. So, from such an act of denial, it must not be supposed that Kumarila is a supporter of atheism. It is true that he has not separately substantiated theism. But it was not necessary for him to do so. To him who is an earnest believer in the Shruti, the existence of God is nothing less than a self-evident truth, and there is no reason why he should make a special attempt to establish it. Still it cannot be said that he is silent with regard to his real opinion, for he has avowed it in the passage :

* "तस्मात् प्रागपि सर्वेऽसौ स्रष्टुरासन् पदादयः।

,

एवं ये युक्तिभिः प्राहुस्तेषां दुर्लभमुत्तरम् ॥ *

"All the words, etc. must have, therefore, existed before the creation. It is very difficult to find an answer against those who hold this by force of arguments" The author of the Nyayaratnakara explains this passage as follows :

“एवं स्रष्टुर्वेदपूर्वत्वं साधयतां न किञ्चिदुत्तरम् भवति, तेन सत्यापि सर्गे सुसम्प्रबुद्धन्यायेन अनादिरेव वेदव्यवहारः ॥”

"There is no answering those who urge in this way that the Vedas had existed before the Creator. So, even admitting that there was a creation, the Vedas may be regarded as eternal according to the Supta-prabuddha-nyaya." In the Shastradipika this view is corroborated in the most unequivocal terms :

“नित्यत्वे हि वेदानामवसिते तत्प्रामाण्यवलेन ईश्वरस्य अपरिच्छेदो महिमा सृष्टिप्रलयौ च सिध्येयुर्न वा । वेदांस्तु अनादृत्य दृष्टानुसारेण पर्वत इव अनुमानम् अत्यन्तालौकिकार्थे प्रवर्त्तयताम् उपेक्षा एव इत्युत्तरम् इत्युपरस्यते ।” ॥

"If the eternity of the Vedas be admitted, the unlimited greatness of God and the creation and dissolution (by Him) may or may not be established. But to them who, in disregard of the Vedas, make inferences

* Sambandhaksepaparihara, . 116, 117.

॥ Shastradipika p 331 (Ben Ed.)

regarding the most supernatural things on the basis of the knowledge derived from experience, as in the case of the mountain,—we must assume an air of indifference—that is our answer, and no more."

Again, all possible doubts regarding Kumarila's belief in the existence of God will be removed if we look at the benedictory verse of the Shlokavartika where he makes reverence to God, and at the following statement made by himself in the Grahaikatwadhi-karana :

‘ब्रह्मज्ञेति यच्च दं शास्त्रं वेदाख्यमुच्यते ।

तदप्यधिष्ठित सर्वमेकेन परमात्मना ॥’ †

"This Shashtra called the Veda, which is Brahman in the form of sounds is watched over by God alone."

This is corroborated by the author of the Mimamsa-nyayaprakasha (a leading exponent of the Bhatta school) who says :

“यः कल्पः स कल्पपूर्वक इति ज्ञायेन संसारस्य अनादितात्
ईश्वरो गतकल्पोयं वदं स्मृत्वा उपदिशति ।” *

"According to the theory that one Kalpa is preceded invariably by another Kalpa the world (is regarded) as having no beginning. Hence (we conclude that) God reproduces from his memory the Vedas of the last

* † Tantra Vartika, p 719

• Mimamsa nyayaprakasha, para I.

Kalpa and teaches them."

In the Prakaranapanchika discussions have been made about these things just in the same spirit as in the Vartika. There, too, the denial of the existence of God has been made only in connection with the refutation of the theory that the relation between words and their meanings is creational. We quote here the very first sentence of that chapter (Sambandhaksepaparihara) of the Prakaranapanchika :

“तत्र शब्दार्थसम्बन्धं पौरुषेयं प्रचक्षते ।

जगदीश्वरनिर्माणं वदन्तो वेदवादिनः ॥”

“Those teachers of the Vedas who maintain that the world is a creation of God declare that the relation between words and their meanings is Pouruseya, i. e. creational.” If it be admitted that God created the whole world, then it would be assumed that he created words, meanings, as well as the relations existing between them. But the Prabhakara wants to refute the theory that the relation between a word and its meaning is a creation ; and in order to carry out this refutation he denies in the first place that the world is a creation of God. The Naiyayikas and the Vaisheshikas have held that in the beginning of the creation, God established the connection between words and their meanings. This theory of theirs is attacked in the chapter on Sambandhaksepaparihara of the Prak-

tanapanchika just in the same manner as in the Vartika. So in the Prabhakara view, too, there would be no bar to admitting the existence of God if it only be assumed that the relation between words and their meanings is without any beginning.

Thus it becomes clear that there is no difference between the Bhatta and the Prabhakara views regarding the existence of God, etc. The Paramanu-vada has been exploded by both these schools but they have not denied the existence of God. So, we do not find any truth in the statement of Dr. Keith, that the full development of Jaimini's atheistic doctrine is found in Prabhakara and Kumarila.

In the writings of some Indian commentators, too, we find that the Mimamsakas have been represented as denying the existence of God. In the Siddhantavindu, the following passage is found :

“नास्ति सर्वज्ञत्वाद्युपेतं ब्रह्म । आमायस्य क्रियार्थत्वेन
तत्र तात्पर्याभावात् । किन्तु यागधन्यादिवत् सर्वज्ञत्वादि-
दृष्ट्या जगत्कारणं परमाखादि जीयो वा उपास्य इति
मीमांसकाः । *

“The Mimamsakas say that there is no God endowed with omniscience, etc. Because, the Vedas, which exist for sacrificial purposes, have nothing to do with Him. But as Speech is likened to a cow, so either the

atoms, etc., or Atman, may be regarded as endowed with omniscience, etc. and worshipped." This passage has been thus explained in the Nyayaratnavali :

“तथा च यतो वा इत्यादिश्रुतेः, यतः परमाखण्डादेर्जीवाद्
वा, जगदुत्पत्त्यादिकं तत्सम्बन्धवादिदृष्ट्या उपासीत इत्यथ
इति भाषः ।”

“Again, owing to such texts as, यतो वा etc., the word यतः means the atoms, Adṛsta or Atman, from which the creation etc., of this world takes place. The purport is that it is to be regarded as endowed with omniscience, etc., and worshipped.”

But these Mimamsakas can by no means be identified with Kumarila and his followers ; for we know that Kumarila has clearly refuted the theory of atomic creation, has recognised by adopting प्रतिज्ञावचनाद् * the authoritativeness of such Vedic texts as deal with existing things, has admitted the existence of God on the authority of the uncreated Vedas, and has recognised God as an object of worship. ‡ We need not make any separate remark regarding the view of the Prabhākaras. In this view also, the rule that Vedic texts exist for enjoining performances which is based on the Sūtra, आद्यास्य क्रयार्थत्वात्, etc., † will not be violated,

* Vide p. 80

‡ Vide p. 126

Jaimini Sūtra I, 2, 1.

if God is regarded as the object of the Injunction of Worship, for the Injunction of Worship is also an injunction. We have said before that no particular view regarding God is found in the *Brahmi* or any other work of the *Prabhakaras* and that it is the same view as has been accepted by *Kumarila* that is found in the *Prakarana* *panchika* etc. *Kumarila* clearly avows *Seshwara* *vada* in the *Sadhu shabdadhikarana* by stating that both sacrifice and worship are necessary for effecting liberation. Still the refutation of the inferential existence of God which is made by *Kumarila* at great length is the cause of the above remarks that we find in the *Siddhantavindu* and other works.

The Body of God.

Now, when the *Mimamsakas* admit the existence of God as the creator, they ought also to admit, that God possesses a body, for creation would never be possible without a body. But *Kumarila*, while refuting the doctrine of atoms, shows by arguments that the existence of a body of God cannot be proved. His view is briefly stated by Dr. Keith in the following lines: "He (*Kumarila*) ridicules the idea of the existence of *Prajapati* before the creation of matter, without a body, how would he feel desire? If he possessed a body, then matter must have existed before his creative activity, and there is no reason to deny then, the exis-

tence of other bodies.” *

But, here also, we must not forget that Kumarila denies the existence of such eternal body of the creator as is proposed by the Naiyayikas. The Naiyayikas derive the idea of God by inference, which, however intelligent it may be, must necessarily depend upon human experience. But men have never come across any eternal body anywhere. Hence, Kumarila says that we cannot ascertain an eternal body of God by inference. But if the Vedas be supposed to be uncreated, and if the idea of God is derived from such Vedas, then Kumarila would not raise his voice against the existence of any kind of body of God which may be described there. He does actually describe God as having some sort of body in the benedictory verse of the Shlokavartika. †

We should consider one thing more in this connection. There are texts of the Shruti such as, वज्रहस्तः पुरन्दरः etc., which indicate that gods also have bodies. Why have then the Mimamsakas held in the Devatadhi-karana § that the gods do not possess physical forms ? Here, in the first place, we should point out that this denial of the existence of the physical forms is not the object of the Mimamsakas. The fourth Sutra of the

* Karma Mimamsa, p. 61.

† Vide, p 167.

§ Jaimini Sūtras 1x I. 6-10.

Devatadhikarana is worded thus :

“यदि वा गन्धपूर्वत्वाद् यज्ञकर्म प्रधानं स्याद् गुणत्वे
देवतायुतिः”

“Or, the performance of sacrifices is the prominent element, because it follows directly from the words of the Vedas, and the deities have a minor position.” * By this Sutra, Jaimini only lays down that the deities serve as subordinate elements in sacrifices, but he does not say a word indicating the non-existence of their physical forms. So, we ought to inquire as to why this negation has been made by the Mimamsakas in this Sutra.

In the Uttara Mimamsa, there is a Sutra :

“विरोधः क्षमं स्याति चेन् नानेकप्रतिपक्षेर्द्वैतानाम्” †

“(If you argue that) there would be a contradiction so far as the sacrifices are concerned. No;—because, it is found (in the Shruti and Smṛti) that one deity can assume many forms.” In the first part of this Sutra, the non-existence of physical forms of gods is suggested by Shankaracharya and others under the apprehension that it would not be possible for the gods who are an Anga of the sacrifice to complete the sacrifice by appearing in their actual physical forms. The idea that the Gods are an Anga of the sacrifice is borrowed

* Jaimini Sutra ix. 1. 9

† Vedanta Sutra i. 3. 27.

from the Sūtras of Jaimini, and from this it may have been presumed that the idea of the non-existence of the physical forms of the gods also comes from Jaimini. By the last portion of the Sūtra, “अनेकप्रतिपत्तेर्देवनात्”, it is established that the physical forms of the gods are no bar to their serving in the sacrifices. But this conclusion of the Uttara Mimamsa must not lead us to suppose that, in the view of the Purva Mimamsa, the gods have no physical forms. A consideration of the Sūtra, “सधादिष्वसन्नावादानाधिकारं जैमिनिः”, * of the Uttara Mimamsa will corroborate the view that Jaimini does not deny the existence of the physical forms of gods. This Sūtra tells us that, in the view of Jaimini, the gods are not entitled to study the Brahma-vidyā, because they are not entitled to study the Madhuvidyā, etc., (and not because they have no bodies). Had Jaimini been regarded to be of the opinion that gods had no bodies, then, it would have been unnecessary to frame a Purvapakṣa, as it is not possible for the bodiless to make a study. But a Purvapakṣa has been framed to represent his view which rests on a quite different ground altogether. Does not this fact make it clear that Jaimini did not deny the existence of the physical forms of the gods ?

In the Shāstradīpikā also, Parthasarathi Mishra has propounded, in the passage “सत्यपि विद्यते.....” § that the

* Vedānta Sūtra I. 3. 31.

§ Shāstradīpikā, p. 580 (Nirnayasagar Ed.)

gods serve in the sacrifices, even after assuming that they possess physical forms. So, Parthasarathi has solved the difficulty that was raised in the *Devatadharma-karana*. Still, as a matter of fact, elaborate discussions are found in many treatises of the Mimamsa which aim at denying the existence of the bodies of the gods. What may be the reason of making this attempt?

There is a doctrine of the Mimamsakas that the letters of the Mantras are unalterable. If a single syllable is omitted, or transposed, or if in the place of a particular word any synonym of it is used, the Mantra will be defective and will not produce the desired effect. Hence, it is necessary that a Mantra should be correctly pronounced. The sacrificer and the priests are not required to see that the gods are present at the time of the performance, but they should only take care that they commit no mistake in uttering the Mantras. They have nothing to do with the gods as actual persons, but they have only to deal with their names. Hence arises the belief that the gods exist in names, and the Mimamsakas have arrived at the conclusion that the gods are identical with their respective names. In order to arrive at this conclusion, they have adduced various arguments to show the difficulties lying in the way of admitting the existence of the bodies of the gods. But their main object is not to deny the existence of the bodies of the gods, but to

assert that it is the names of the gods that are of all importance to us. Had it been the object of the Mimamsakas to establish the view that the gods are nothing but names, then they would not have propounded in the Stotra-shastrādhikarāṇa,* that the Stotras are meant not to mention the gods, but to describe the qualities that are to be found in the gods. It would be absurd to hold that the qualities that are praised in such Mantras, as, अग्निं त्वा गूरु नोत्तमः, etc., belong to gods who are nothing but sounds. Hence, we must come to the conclusion that in the view of the Purva Mimamsa, the gods are not absolutely identified with their names. The doctrine, that the gods are names, is propounded simply to arouse an excessive feeling of reverence towards the Vedic Mantras and the names of the gods that are found in those Mantras ; but truly speaking, no such identity exists. So, we do not think that there will be any opposition, if we state that, in the true view of the Mimamsakas, the gods are regarded as corporeal beings. The same conclusion has been arrived at in the Nyayamayukhamālīkā, as well as in the Seshwaramimamsa Daishana.

God as an Object of Worship.

Like other theistic systems of Indian philosophy,

* Adhikarāṇa II. 1. 5.

the Purva Mimamsa also preaches that God is an object of worship. We have already seen that, in the Sadhushabdadhikarana, Kumarila has decided that the worship, etc., of the Saguna (God) is also conducive to the attainment of heavenly bliss or salvation. We have also seen that this view is supported in the Nyayasudha and the Shastradipika. Again, in the very beginning of the Shlokavartika, Kumarila makes reverence to Shiva :

“विगुह्यानदेष्टाय त्रिवेदोदिव्यसत्तये ।

त्रेयःप्राप्तनिमित्ताय नमः सोमार्धधारिणे ॥”

“Reverence to him whose body is made of pure knowledge, whose divine eyes are the three Vedas, who is the cause of the attainment of bliss, and who wears a digit of the moon.” This verse shows that Kumarila supports Seshwaravada. Were he not in favour of Seshwaravada, it would be anything but relevant. An attempt has actually been made in the Nyayaratnakara to interpret it in another way : “It is the sacrifice to which the reverence is made here. The sacrifice requires correct knowledge for its performance, is made known by the Vedas, contains cups and pots of Soma-juice and is the cause of the attainment of heavenly bliss, etc.” But the commentator has not omitted to give the purport of the other interpretation also, which is as follows :

“श्लोकवार्तिकमारम्भसु श्वाभ्यामिदं नमसाभये ।

विश्वेखरं महादेवं स्तुतिपूर्वं नमस्यति॥”

“Desiring to begin the Shlokavartika, he bows to Mahadeva, the lord of the universe with the object of reaching the end safely.”

God is described here, as the cause of the attainment of bliss. How can this statement be consistent with the view of the Mimamsakas who never admit that God's favour is in any way instrumental in producing bliss ?

There is only one possible way of making the passage, श्वेत्प्रतिविनिश्चाय, consistent, and that is as follows : God is to be regarded as the general cause of bliss, and not as the particular or special cause. By “the general cause” we mean that he becomes the cause of all enjoyments only by creating the necessary things. We have discussed this fully before. Simply the act of Namaskara (reverence) will bring a safe termination by generating an Apurva. If we take the above expression in this sense the question of God's favour will not arise and consequently there will be no difficulty.

We should notice here the peculiarities of the epithets of God that are found in the above verse. From the expression, ‘त्रिविदो-द्वित्र्यचक्षुषे’ “the three Vedas are His divine eyes,” we learn that in all His activities God

depends upon the knowledge derived from the Vedas. So, in creating the world, God had recourse to the same resource. Hence, it is implied that the Vedas could not be a creation of God. The other epithet, 'अमृतमयः', "He who wears a digit of the moon", shows that He has a body. That this body is not made of the usual stuff is indicated by the first epithet, 'ज्ञानमयः', "His body consists of pure knowledge." This epithet is apparently meant to denote that His body is composed of extraordinary elements, but has also a further significance. *Jnan* is opposed to *Avidya* or Nescience, and it is implied, therefore, that God's person is beyond the influence of Nescience. So, we get here an inkling of the doctrine of the Advaitins who hold that God is *Nirguna* (free from qualities) and is of the form of pure consciousness.

In this connexion, it is necessary to point out that the following remark of Dr. Keith does not touch the Advaitins: "Kumarila, however, does not content himself with refuting the *Nyaya-Vaisheshika* doctrine; he attacks equally the *Vedanta*, on the simple ground, that if the absolute is, as it is asserted to be, absolutely pure, the world itself should be absolutely pure. Moreover, there could be no creation, for nescience is impossible in such an absolute. If, however, we assume that some other cause starts nescience to activity, then the unity of the absolute disappears. Again, if nescience is natural, it is impossible to remove it, for that could be

accomplished only by knowledge of the self, which on the theory of the natural character of nescience, is out of the question." * This statement is nothing but a reiteration of the verses :

“पुरुषस्य तु पुरुषस्य नाशद्वया विवर्ततिर्भवेत् ।

... .. ” †

Here the word, Purusa, does not mean Ishwara, for we find in the following passage of the Tantra-vartika that the two words, “इश्वर” and “पुरुष”, have been used by Kumarila, side by side in the same sentence, “प्रधानपुरुषेश्वर-परमाशु-कारणादिप्रक्रियाः...” ‡ This leaves no doubt that Kumarila uses the two words in different senses. Here, the word “Purusa” does not mean ‘Niguna Brahman’ of Advaita philosophy, for the Advaitins have neither used it anywhere to denote Nirguna Brahman, nor do they admit that Nirguna Brahman subjects itself to evolution. The theory of the Advaitins is that the world is a Vivarta (illusion) of Brahman. Under these circumstances it cannot be said that the passages, पुरुषस्य ..., are meant to refute the doctrine of the Advaitins. The author of the Shastradipikā also interprets the verses, पुरुषस्य ..., as refuting the Advaita doctrine. But, if any such Advaita doctrine ever existed, we must say that it is now lost to us. We do not know what that doctrine is, which he supports in the passages, “केचित् तु

* Karma-mimamsa, pp 63, 64

† Sambandhakṣepaparihara 82 87.

‡ Tantravartika, p 81.

“निरुद्धः...”† It is true that in the Sutra, भोक्तृत्वमेव ब्रह्मणोऽव्ययं सत्त्वं • of the Vedānta, it is propounded that the world is an evolution of Brahman. But this theory is a *prima facie* one and holds good for practical purposes only. Shankaracharya has shown in his commentary on the very next Sutra, तदव्ययं ब्रह्मणोऽव्ययं •† that the Vivarta-vāda is the real and proper theory of the Vedānta. On a consideration of all these things, we are able to say this at least that the view, stated above by Dr. Keith, has nothing to do with the Advaita doctrine as propounded by Shankara. So, the suggestion that the said benedictory verse of Kumarila indicates an inclination towards the Advaita doctrine, stands unchallenged.

Again, in his commentary on the Samanvaya Sutra, § Shankaracharya makes a clear representation of the view of the Mimamsakas regarding the purport of such Upanisad texts as describe Brahman in the paragraph beginning with the words—“अथ चरे चरतिष्ठते” There he sets forth that the Mimamsakas have construed the Vedānta texts as representing God as an object of worship :

“कार्यविधिप्रयुक्तस्यैव ब्रह्मणः प्रतिपाद्यमानत्वात् । आत्मा वा चरे द्रष्टव्यः, न आत्मा अव्ययतपात्मा भोऽन्वेष्टव्यः न

† Shastradīpikā (Ben Ed) p 316.

विजिज्ञासितव्यः, आत्मैव उपासीत, आत्मानमेव लोक-
मुपासीत, ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति, इत्यादिषु हि विधानेषु
सत्सु, कोऽसावात्मा ब्रह्म इत्याकाङ्क्षायां तत्स्वरूपसमर्पणेन
मय्ये वेदान्ता 'उपयुक्ताः,' नित्यः सर्वज्ञः सर्वगतो नित्यदृष्टो
नित्यशुद्धबुद्धसुखभावो विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्म इत्येवमादयः ।
तदुपासनाच्च शास्त्रदृष्टोऽदृष्टो मोक्षः फलं भविष्यति । कर्त्तव्य-
विध्यननुप्रवेशे तु वस्तुमात्रकथने हानीपादानासम्भवात् ।”

As a deity is an Anga of a sacrifice so God is an Anga
of worship. Now, Shankara would never have made
such a representation if he knew that the Mimamsakas
rejected the worship of God. So, from this discussion
also, we gather that God is an object of worship to
the Mimamsakas.

SECTION (C).

Liberation.

Now, we proceed to ascertain the Bhattacharya and
Prabhakara views of Liberation. Let us see in the
first place what Dr. Jha has said on this matter :

“There does not appear much difference on this
important point between Kumarila and Prabhakara.
The Bhattacharya view of Liberation we find stated in the
Śālokavārtika, chapter on Saubandhakaśepaparihāra,
Śālokas 103-110, in the following words—

For those that have realised the real character of the soul, all their past karma having been exhausted by experience, and there being no further karmic results to wipe off,—there is no further body, as the soul is burdened with a body for the experiencing of the results of karma—therefore one desiring Liberation should not engage in such actions as are either prohibited, or are enjoined with a view to material results, but he should continue to perform those that are prescribed as necessary duties, in order to avoid the sin of the neglect of such duties" †

It is necessary to notice here that this statement has been made in the *Vartika* for refuting the *Saṃkhya* doctrine that the knowledge of the distinction (between *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa*) is the means of attaining Liberation. This is stated clearly in the *Nyāyaratnākara* under the verse 110, which runs as follows—"Therefore a man, who desires Liberation, must not stand still after having acquired the power of discrimination,

“तद्विज्ञानात्मतत्त्वानां भोगात् पूर्वाक्रियाक्षये ।

उत्तरप्रचयामन्नाद् देहे नोत्पद्यते पुनः ॥ 108

कर्मजन्योपभागाद्यं शरीरं न प्रवर्तते ।

तदभावे न कश्चिद्भित्तुस्तथावतिष्ठते ॥ 109

मोक्षार्थं न प्रवर्तते तत्र काम्यनिषिद्धया ।

नित्यनैर्मिच्छकैः कृत्वात् प्रत्यक्षयिष्यमथा ॥” 110

† Indian Thought Vol II, 1-58

"आत्मज्ञानं हि संयोगपृथक्त्वात् क्लेशयंपुरुषार्थत्वेन ज्ञायते, तेन विना परलोकफलेषु कर्मसु प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तासम्भवात् (क्लेशयत्वं); तथा च य आत्मा अपञ्चनपादमा विजरो विनृत्युः etc. etc., सोऽन्वेष्टव्यः स विजिज्ञासितव्यः.....तथा, प्रात्मानम् उपासोतेति..... स्रष्टात्मज्ञानविधानापोक्षिता-युदय-निःश्रेयसरूपफलसम्बन्धः....., तथा, स सुखं यं वर्त्तयन् यावदायुष ब्रह्मलोकमभिसम्पद्यते, न स पुनरावर्त्तते इत्युपन्यासवृत्तात्मक-परमात्मप्राप्तयश्चाफलवचनं (च वर्त्तते इति पुरुषार्थत्वम्)न च ज्ञानविधानेन कर्मसम्बन्ध-सारणम् । प्रत्याश्रमवर्णनियतानि नित्यनैमित्तिककर्माणिपि युवेकतदुस्तिष्ठयार्थम् अकरणनिमित्तानागतप्रत्यवायपरि-हारार्थञ्च कर्त्तव्यानि ।" *

"The knowledge of the soul is, by reason of the *Samyoga-pṛthaktva* maxim, known, to be both *Kratwartha* and *Purusartha*. Without that knowledge any inclination or disinclination regarding the performances which bear fruit in the next life is impossible. (Hence, it is to be regarded as *Kratwartha*). On the other hand, there are injunctions for acquiring the knowledge of the soul which clearly require a connexion with heavenly bliss or final beatitude as their fruits:—"That soul which is free from sin, lecrepitude, death,..... he is to be sought after, he is to be known," and "Worship Atman," as well as the

text,—“He passing his whole life in this manner is sure to attain Brahmaloaka, he comes back no more”,—which states that the attainment of Paramatman is the goal from which there is no turning back. (Hence, it is to be regarded as Purusārtha). But by this prescription of knowledge the connexion of Karma is not barred. The compulsory and the occasional duties which have been enjoined for the respective Varnas and Ashramas should also be performed to destroy the sins committed in the past and to prevent the sins that will accrue from their omission.” In this extract Kumārila clearly explains his own view. So, there remains no doubt that according, to him, both Jnana and Karma are necessary for attaining Liberation. In the Nyayasudha we find a further explanation of the same view:—

“ज्ञानकर्मणीः कर्मणा ज्ञानं बाध्यताम्, तुल्यबलत्वाद् वा विकल्पोऽस्तु, विरोधपरिहाराय वा अज्ञाङ्गोभावः परिकल्प्यतां, न तु निरपेक्षविहितयोः समुच्चयो युक्त इत्याशङ्क्य आह, न च ज्ञानविधानेन इति । अयमाशयः—अवान्तरकार्यैक्ये सति बाधो विकल्पो वा स्यात्, इह तु कर्मणां पूर्वकृतपापनाशः अवश्यविहिताकरणनिमित्तपापपरिहारप्रयोजनत्वात् । निर्गुणात्मज्ञानस्य च तत्त्वप्रकाशनप्रयोजनत्वात्, नावान्तरकार्यैक्यमस्ति । न च बन्धहेतुकर्मक्षयान् मोक्षसिद्धेः तत्त्व-

प्रकाशनालयेऽयं यद्वापि, यत्वापि पुनरुक्तकर्मस्यैव कर्तव्य-
 मोक्षत्वानिमानिदृशो निर्वापारत्वाद्युपपत्तिः, यद्यपि
 यद्यपिदं यन्मार्गोः कर्तव्यः प्रवृत्त्यात्, तद्विद्वत्तत्वेऽपि य-
 मोक्षत्वानिमानिदृशेरेवेतितायाः सत्प्रकाशमं विना
 यद्यपिपत्तिः। अतः यद्यपिरत्वाद्येनैवात् न वायविकयो,
 निवर्तमानत्वात् न यद्वाकीभावः सम्भवति इति पारिमेच्यात्
 समुच्चय एव युक्तः।” ०

“As between Jnana and Karma, let Jnana be barred by Karma, or let there be an option owing to an equal importance of both, or to avoid a conflict let one be subservient to the other,—but as the two have been enjoined quite *interactively* of each other, it is not proper to combine them. Apprehending this (question) he (Kumarila) says, ‘by this prescription of knowledge the connexion of Karma is not barred.’ The purport is this;—if the intermediate steps be the same, an obstruction or an option may take place. But here the intermediate steps are not the same, for Karma is required for destroying the sins committed in the past as well as for preventing the sins which may accrue owing to the non-performance of necessary duties, and the knowledge of Nirguna Atman is required for showing the true state of things. It should not be apprehended that it will be unnecessary to know the

true state of things if Liberation takes place on the exhaustion of Karma which is the cause of bondage. The notion, 'I am the doer' or 'I am the enjoyer', lingers even after the exhaustion of the acts done in the past, and so, it cannot be said that there is no activity. Therefore, there is every likelihood of some such Karma taking place, which is the cause of bondage. In order to prevent this, it is necessary to put a stop to the notion, 'I am the doer' or 'I am the enjoyer;'—and that is never possible without a knowledge of the true state of things. Then, the intermediate steps being different, there is neither an obstruction nor an option. A subservience is not (also) possible, because the ways are different. Hence, the only course that remains open is combination—which is accepted as reasonable." This view has been further supported by the following quotation from the *Bṛhat-tika* :

“नित्यनैमित्तिकैरेव कुर्वाणो दुरितक्षयम् ।

ज्ञानं च विमलोकुर्द्वयभ्यासेन च पाचयन् ।

वैराग्यात् पञ्चविज्ञानः कैवल्यं भजते नरः ॥”

“Destroying his sins by means of the performance of compulsory and occasional duties—purifying his knowledge and maturing it with repeated efforts—a man, whose knowledge grows consummate owing to absence of worldly desires, will attain Liberation.”

From a consideration of all the above passages

we derive the following net results.—the performance of compulsory and occasional duties exhausts the acts done in the past and prevents the sins which might accrue if they were not performed; experience consumes the acts that have already begun to produce results; and the knowledge of the soul prevents the occurrence of any future Karma by destroying egoism, 'I am doing' etc., It is now clear that the word, "कृतकर्म" 'past karma' of the 108th verse does not mean the same thing as the word, 'कर्म', 'sin', occurring in the 110th verse. The former means those Karmas that have begun to produce results, while the latter means those past Karmas which have accumulated, but are still in a potential condition, as well as the sins that are likely to arise from a non-performance of duties. It appears at first sight that there is likelihood of being a connexion between the expressions, 'आत्मज्ञानम्' "those that have realised the real character of the soul," and 'उत्तमज्ञानम्' 'there being no further accumulation,' and, from the passages quoted from the Tantravartika and Nyayasudha we learn that there is a definite connection.

So, we see that knowledge is as much necessary for destroying Karma as the performance of compulsory duties, and thereby it serves as a necessary means for attaining salvation

In the Bhatta-chintamani the necessity of both Jnana and Karma is admitted, but there is some

difference as regards the details :

“अतएव ज्ञानकार्मणोः समुच्चयेन जनकता । ज्ञानेन सञ्चिता-
नामुत्पन्नधर्माधर्माणां नाशः, नित्यकर्मभिश्च तदनुत्पत्तिः ।
अन्यथा नित्याकारणजन्यप्रत्यवायेन शरीरात्पत्तिप्रसङ्गात्,
तस्माद् उभयोरपि शरीरोत्पत्तिप्रभाव-सम्पादकतया
भावजनकता ।” *

“It is for this reason that Jnana combined with Karma produces (Liberation). The merits and demerits that have accrued already are destroyed by Jnana; and any fresh accretion of them is prevented by the performance of compulsory duties; otherwise, the sin arising from the non-performance of compulsory duties might cause the assumption of the body. As both tend to stop corporeity, both are the cause of Liberation.”

Again, apprehending that knowledge alone might be regarded as sufficient to cause Liberation, the author of the Bhatta-chintamani says :

“ज्ञानवतोऽपि विहिताननुष्ठाननिषिद्धाचरणभ्यां प्रत्य-
यायोत्पत्तेः” †

“Even a man who possesses knowledge may incur sins by neglecting necessary duties and performing

* Bhattachintamani (Ben Ed) p 57.

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prohibited acts." From this it follows that the performance of compulsory duties stops the procreation of bodies. So, according to the *Bhotta-chintamani*, knowledge destroys what is already accumulated, and Karma puts a stop to the future growth; but according to the *Nyayasudha*, it is Karma which makes an end of what is accumulated and knowledge prevents the future growth.

In the above extract the word *Jnana* is used in the sense of *Upasana* and not in the sense of the knowledge of the Nirguna Atman. This becomes clear from the concluding paragraph of the same chapter which we should also quote here :

"तवाप्युपनिषज्जन्मात्मज्ञानं दृष्टोपयोगित्वात् क्लृप्त्यर्थम् ।
उपासनात्मकं तु दृष्टोपयोगाभावात्, "सर्वान् कामान-
वाप्नोति, न स पुनरायत्तंत" इत्यादि वाक्येषाञ्चाभ्युदय-
फलकं चेति विवेकः । अतः सिद्धो ज्ञानकर्मसमुच्चयः ।"

"In that case, too, the knowledge of the soul that is obtained from the Upanisads is *Kratwartha*, because it is necessary for visible objects; but that knowledge which is of the form of *Upasana* has got no visible use, and there are such supplementary clauses,—“He realises all desires” and “He does not come back,”—hence it is concluded that it (*Upasana*) has heavenly bliss or Liberation as its goal. So, the combination of *Jnana*

and Karma is established" But, unless the word 'Jnana' in the last sentence is taken in the sense of Upasana, this conclusion would by no means be appropriate.

Thus, we see that the Bhattachintamani again differs from the Nyāyasūtra. According to the former, Upasana and Karma are to be combined, whereas according to the latter, the knowledge of the Nirguna Atman is to be combined with Karma.

In the Shāstradīpikā also the conclusion is that both Jnana and Karma are necessary. We quote here the line embodying the conclusion :

“ननु आत्मज्ञानम् कर्तव्यम् ? सत्यम्, पुरुषार्थमपि च तत्,
संयोगभेदात्” *

“Is the knowledge of the soul Kratvartha? Yes, and it is Puruṣārtha also by an application of the Samyoga-prthaktva maxim.” But the Shāstradīpikā, too, uses Jnana in the sense of Upasana, for it is so stated in the very same place:

“यानि पुनरितिकर्तव्यताविशेषयुक्तानि उपासनात्मकानि
विधेयन्ते तेषाम् अभ्युदयनिःश्रेयसोभयफलत्वम् ।”

“Those which are enjoined with respective details as being of the nature of Upasana have both heavenly bliss and beatitude as their results.”

Here, we should notice the difference that exists

* Shāstradīpikā, (Rom. Ed.), p. 131.

between this view of the *Shastradipika*, and the corresponding view of the *Vishistadvaita* system. The *Vishistadvaitins* hold that *Karma* is required for producing the knowledge which is preliminary to *Upasana*, and that *Upasana* alone is the cause of Liberation.

It is well known that in the *Advaita Bhasya* as well as in the *Vishistadvaita Bhasya* this doctrine of the combination of *Jnana* and *Karma* is refuted. But there has arisen a good deal of trouble regarding the precise meaning of the word '*Jnana*.' If '*Jnana*' is the same thing as *Upasana*, then it has been useless for the *Advaitins* to refute the doctrine of the combination of *Jnana* and *Karma*, for they are never against admitting the possibility of the combination of *Upasana* and *Karma*. On the other hand if the word possesses the meaning which the *Advaitins* attribute to it, then it has been useless on the part of the *Vishistadvaitins* to refute the doctrine, for their conclusion (that *Upasana* alone is the cause of Liberation) has nothing to do with it. So we see that various philosophers have taken the word, *Jnana*, in various senses. Be it as it may, we have after all no doubt as to the fact that *Kumarila's* doctrine is one of the combination of *Jnana* and *Karma*.

Prof. Keith has made certain observations in this connexion which are not consistent with the views of the leading authorities referred to above. At one place

he says :—"That, consistently with the main view of the Mimamsa, he (Kamarla) cannot admit that the Vedic texts, which seem to connect freedom from return with knowledge of the soul, mean that knowledge produces directly this result" : We do not know on what foundation this statement rests, but it clearly goes against the conclusion of the *Tantravartika* and *Nyayasudha* cited above.

In the same paragraph he makes another remark in the following words :—"It is on the contrary only possible to counteract the accumulated result of past deeds by working off the consequences" If by 'past deeds,' Prof. Keith means those deeds only which have begun to fructify, then there is nothing to say against his statement; but if he means that Karma which has simply accumulated but has not begun to fructify, then in the light of the conclusions shown above his view cannot be regarded as correct, inasmuch as it is the performance of compulsory duties and not experience that consumes such an accumulation. Neither the *Nyayasudha*, nor the *Bhattachintamani* holds that a past accumulation is consumed by experience.

In continuation of the above extract Prof. Keith further observes :

"The function of knowledge, therefore, may prevent further accumulation of merit and demerit, it cannot

annul what has been accumulated. So Kumarila attaches only an indirect value to knowledge of the self as a factor in sacrificial performance."

This statement is self-contradictory. If it is once admitted that knowledge prevents further accumulation of merit and demerit, how can it again be said that it has an indirect value? We do not think that there is any difference in point of usefulness between two things of which 'one annuls past accumulation and the other prevents future accumulation. Both past and future accumulations are equally strong obstacles, and that which serves to remove either of them must be supposed to have a direct value. We have seen above, that this is the conclusion of the standard commentaries also.

It has been noticed above that Dr. Jha refers to a verse of the Shlokavartika which shows that Liberation is not to be achieved by knowledge. It runs thus :

“आत्मा ज्ञातव्य इत्येतन् मोक्षार्थं न च चोदितम्” *

"This text—'Atman should be known'—is not enjoined with reference to Liberation." This text, however, does not stand in our way. Unfortunately, Dr. Jha has not paid any attention to the context. In this verse, Kumarila intends to propound that a knowledge of the soul is subservient to Karma inasmuch as it seems to

* Sambandhaḥsepaparaḥara, v 103.

induce a man to perform Karma. He means to say that, unless a man knows his own interests, he will not be inclined to perform Karma. But this soul is the Samsari soul, as has been described by us in the chapter on Atman. The Nyayasudha also speaks to the same effect :

“आत्मा ज्ञातव्य इत्येतन् मोक्षार्थमिति एतच्छब्दप्रयोगेन संसारिरूपात्मज्ञानस्य मोक्षार्थत्वनिरासेन कर्मप्रवृत्तिहेतुता उक्ता, असंसारि-रूपात्मज्ञानस्य तु कर्मप्रवृत्तिरर्थत्वायोगात् । ‘सुखार्थतैव युक्ता’ *

“Therefore, by the use of the word, ‘एतत्’ in the passage — आत्मा ज्ञातव्यमित्येतन्मोक्षार्थं न च चोदितम् — it is indicated that a knowledge of the Samsari Atman is not necessary for Liberation, and so, it is established that it serves to create an inclination towards Karma. But a knowledge of the Asamsari Atman is not necessary for creating an inclination towards Karma, and so it is Purusartha.”

There is still another passage which seems to express a contrary view:—

“कर्मक्षयो हि विज्ञानादित्येतच् चाप्रमाणवत्” †

“There is no authority for the statement that Karma comes to an end through the influence of knowledge.”

* Nyayasudha (Ben. Ed.) p. 326.

† Sambandhaksepaparihara, v. 96.

But really there is no inconsistency. It means that knowledge alone is not enough to destroy all sorts of Karma. In fact, it destroys the notion—"I am the doer," etc., which is the mother of all future Karma.

So the Mimamsakas can not but regard the passage,

"ज्ञानाग्निः सर्वकर्मणि भस्मसात् कुरुतेऽर्जुन "

"Oh Arjuna, the fire of knowledge reduces all Karma to ashes," of the Bhagavad-Gita as a formal statement. In the Nyayasudha, it has actually been so characterised :

"कर्मनागार्थत्वेन ज्ञानविध्यनुपलब्धेः, ज्ञानाग्निः सर्वकर्मणि भस्मसात् कुरुतेऽर्जुन इत्यादि-श्रुतेषु औपचारिकत्वेन उपपत्तेः" *

"No injunction is found which enjoins knowledge for destroying Karma, and the Smṛti texts such as—

"O Arjuna, the fire of knowledge reduces all Karma to ashes," etc, can be explained as figurative expressions."

According to the Sāṃkhya doctrine, knowledge in the shape of discrimination between the Prakṛti and Puruṣa is the cause of Liberation; according to the Advaita doctrine, mere knowledge of Atman is the cause of Liberation; and according to the Bhattacharya doctrine, a combination of knowledge and Karma is

* Nyayasudha, (Ben Ed.) p 329.

the cause of Liberation.

There is, thus, a difference between the Bhatta view and the Advaita view in this respect. Though we have shown before that there is no difference between the views of the two systems regarding the form of Atman or the existence of Nirguna Brahman, yet this difference does not create any conflict, as the matters are quite different. There may have been an agreement as to the conceptions of Atman or God, but that is no reason why they should be agreed upon the means of Liberation, too. Or, it may be supposed that there is an agreement of opinion. It may be that Kumarila really prefers knowledge, but outwardly propounds that Karma and Jnana are of equal importance, only to create reverence for Karma. If this view is accepted as correct, there will remain no difference at all between the two doctrines. We shall presently try to show that Kumarila's conception of Liberation is not different from the Advaita conception.

The Prabhakara view of the process of attaining Liberation is the same as the Bhatta view. Dr. Jha has given a description of the process in accordance with the view of the Prabhakaras. It tallies exactly with the doctrine of the combination of Jnana and Karma. It is given in the following lines of Dr. Jha, which are a literal translation of a paragraph of the *Prakaranapanchika*:

"As to how all this comes about, the following explanation is given:—(1) First of all, the man becomes disgusted with the troubles that he has to undergo during mundane existence;—(2) finding the pleasures of the world also to be invariably accompanied by some sort of pain, he comes to lose all interest in, and longing for, pleasures also;—(3) he turns his attention towards Liberation;—(4) he ceases to perform such deeds as are prohibited and which lead to trouble, as also from those that are prescribed only as leading to some sort of happiness here or hereafter;—(5) he attenuates all previously accrued dharma and adharma by undergoing the experiences resulting from them;—(6) he destroys the sole receptacle or abode of his experiences by the knowledge of the soul, along with such auxiliaries as contentment, self control, and so

“यः खलु सांसारिकस्यो दुःखेभ्य उद्भिन्नः, तदनुपपन्नशेषेभ्यश्च सुखेभ्योऽपि गतसृष्टः, मोक्षाय उत्तिष्ठते, स तावद् वन्धहेतुभूतेभ्यो निषिद्धेभ्यः प्रत्यवायहेतुभूतेभ्योऽभ्युदयसाधनेभ्यश्च निवर्त्तमानः सन्, उत्पन्नपूर्वैर्धर्माधर्मैर्लतावपि भोगेन क्षयं नयन्, शमदमश्नश्चर्याङ्गापहङ्गितेनात्मज्ञानेन, न च पुनरावर्त्तते इत्यपुनरावृत्तये चोदितेन, निःशेषकर्माशयं नाशयन् मूच्यते ; न चापुनरावृत्तेर्यथादतया वर्णनम्, आत्मज्ञानस्य अपरायणात् ।” Prakaranapanchika, p. 157.

forth,—all of which are laid down in the Scriptures as tending to put a stop to the further return of that soul into the world;—and it is only when all this has come about that the soul is free. The Vedic texts speaking of the non-return to this world, cannot be regarded as mere Arthavada, because the knowledge of the soul not being laid down as subservient to anything else, the result spoken of must be regarded as a qualification for the man entitled to that knowledge." *

So we agree fully with Dr. Jha in the opinion that there does not appear to be much difference on this important point between Kumarila and Prabhakara, but we cannot bring ourselves to accept the statement.—“and ‘not by knowledge’ adds Kumarila, etc,” as correct.

What is Liberation ?

We have hitherto tried to ascertain the process of attaining Liberation as promulgated by the Mimamsakas, and we shall now proceed to determine what they understand by the term ‘Liberation’.

There are some who think that, according to Kumarila, Liberation consists in the enjoyment of constant bliss. They believe that Manas exists in Liberation. This view has been cited in the

* Indian Thought Vol. II, pp. 257-58.

Shastradipika. † But the author of the Shastradipika as well as some others are of opinion that Liberation is of a negative character. They hold that there cannot be an enjoyment of bliss as Manas does not exist at that time, and that it is nothing but a mere cessation of pain. But to us the view that Liberation means the existence of Atman by itself as characterised by the cessation of all pain, appears to be the true view of Kumarila, for this view is propounded in the Tantravartika and the Nyayasudha. In the Tantravartika we find :

“न स पुनरावर्त्तत इत्यपुनरावर्त्तनात्मकपरमात्मप्राप्तिरवस्था-
फलवचनम्” *

“the text—‘He does not come back’—indicates the result in the shape of the attainment of Paramatman which is nothing but non-return.” This expression, ‘attainment of Paramatman’ of Kumarila, has thus been explained in the Nyayasudha :

“गरीरसम्बन्धोपाधिककर्तृत्व-भोक्तृत्वात्मक-संसारिरुपावस्था-
परित्यागेन अकर्तृभोक्तृत्वात्मका-संसारिरुपनिजादस्याया एव
परमात्मप्राप्तिरूपत्वेन, तस्या अप्रत्याया अजन्यत्वाद् युक्तम-
वयवम्”

† Shastradipika, (Rom. Ed.), p p 126-27.

* Tantravartika, (Ben. Ed.) p 241.

"The attainment of Paramātman means nothing but the existence of Asamsari Atman, as it is without any such notion, as 'I am doing', 'I am enjoying', etc; which is brought about by shaking off the Samsari form which is possessed with the sense, 'I am doing', 'I am enjoying,' etc, and which is characterised by its connexion with a body. As that condition is not artificial, it is to be regarded as eternal." From this it follows that Liberation is the same thing as the pure existence of Atman marked by freedom from pain. This freedom from pain can be brought about by the annihilation of Karma and not by a power of discrimination as is propounded by the Samkhyas.

This view is not inconsistent with the purport of another statement of Kumarila,—

“न ह्यभावात्मकं सुखा मोक्षनित्यत्वकारणम्” †

"Liberation cannot be regarded as eternal unless it is of a negative character,"—for (in this view) it is not admitted that the pure state of Atman is possible without cessation of pain. The above verse is meant to refute the view of the Samkhyas, in which happiness is supposed to spring directly from the power of discrimination; but it is not directed against those who hold that Liberation which is a pure state of Atman is due to the annihilation of Karma and cessation of pain. The latter do not assert that Liberation is a

† Sambandhaksepārihara, v. 107.

state of Atman consisting in the enjoyment of happiness, which is a thing that is caused. Herein lies the significance of the qualifying clause, "अपुनरावृत्त्ययम्" "consisting in non-return," used in the Tantravartika. It indicates that the non-return which is established by the Upanisad text, "He does not come back," is the same thing as the attainment of Brahman. The Nyayasudha expresses this clearly in the following words:—

"अपुनरावृत्तेऽपि ब्रह्मप्राप्तिर्भावेदनिर्वाणाय अपुनरावृत्त्यात्मकता उक्ता" †

"It is said to consist in non-return only in order to do away with the distinction between non-return and the attainment of Brahman"

Kumarila regards Liberation not as mere cessation of pain, but as the *Asamsari* state of Atman in which there is no such sense as 'I am enjoying' 'I am doing', etc. According to the view in which Liberation is cessation of pain, Atman does not lose such notions as 'I am doing', 'I am enjoying,' etc, etc, and is not Nirguna (as in the view of the Naiyayikas), whereas, according to the other view, Atman loses such notions and is Nirguna at that time. The following extract from Prof. Keith's work shows that he accepts this latter view as the original view of the Mimamsa : "The final condition, then, of man will be the persistence

† Nyayasudha (Ben Ed) p 323.

of pure consciousness, but without cognition or feeling of any sort." •

If it is supposed that the author of the *Shastradipika* means that Liberation is the state of Nirguna Atman characterised by cessation of pain, then, there will remain no difference between the two views, though he says that it is cessation of pain.

The Advaitins also regard Liberation as the state of Nirguna Atman marked by cessation of pain. So, there is no difference in this respect between the Advaitins and Kumarila. The Bhattas, unlike the Prabhakaras, do not deny the authoritativeness of those Vedic texts which speak of existing (सिद्ध) things, and hence the Bhattas feel no difficulty in recognising the pure state of Nirguna Atman which is otherwise known as the State of the Highest Bliss. The Prabhakaras regard only those texts as authoritative which lay down duties. So, it is not possible for them to conform to the view that Atman in the state of the Highest Bliss is free. In the *Prakaranapanchika*, we find that this view has been refuted on the ground that it is not the function of the Vedic texts to state perfect (सिद्ध) things. We quote here the exact words :

“परमानन्दताभ्युपगमोऽपि नन्दफल एव, न च प्रमाणमपि तत्रैव अवक्तव्यते, युतोनां सिद्धवस्तुबोधकत्वाभावात्” *

* Karmamimamsa, pp 73, 74.

† Prakaranapanchika, p 153.

"It is no good admitting the attainment of the state of the Highest Bliss, nor is there any authority on this point, as the Vedic texts do not stand for describing perfect things." From this we understand that, in the Bhatta view, it is possible to regard Liberation as the state of the Highest Bliss. According to the Prabhakaras, the mere cessation of pain is Liberation. So, there is a distinction between the two views. Dr. Jha has said that both are agreed as to their view of Liberation. † But, on a consideration of all the views cited and discussed above, it is not possible for us to accept this observation of Dr. Jha as valid.

It is necessary to point out here that the state of the Highest Bliss and enjoyment of happiness are not the same thing. The following passage of Kumarila shows that enjoyment of happiness is not a permanent thing:

“सुखोपभोगरूपस्य यदि सोचः प्रपद्यते ।

स्वर्गे एव भवेदेव पर्यविण, क्षयो च सः ॥” *

"If it is admitted that Liberation consists in the enjoyment of happiness, it will merely become another name for paradise,—such a thing is transient." But the state of the Highest Bliss is a permanent thing. So, the above statement of Kumarila does not stand

† Indian Thought, Vol II, p 259

* Sambandh-ks-ppa rihara, v. 105

in the way of recognising such a state as Liberation. This has also been indicated in the passages of the *Nyayasudha* quoted above.

Dr. Jha has observed that there is an agreement between the two schools regarding the conception of Liberation and that there is a difference as regards the process of attaining it. We, on the contrary, find that there is a difference of opinion regarding the conception and that there is an agreement regarding the process.

PART II.

**Application of Mimamsa Maxims
to Hindu Law.**

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The importance of the Mimamsa rules as regards the interpretation of the Hindu Law is very high. We cannot make a better estimate of it than what Sir John Edge* has done with reference to a question of Hindu Law arising before him. "The question is," says he, "how is the text of Vasistha to be construed. It must clearly be construed according to the rules for the construction of the texts of the sacred books of the Hindu Law, if authoritative rules on the subject exist. That rules for the construction of the sacred texts and law of the Hindus do exist cannot be disputed, although those rules have been frequently overlooked or not referred to by Judges or English text writers, probably because they are in Sanskrit, and have, so far as I am aware, not yet been translated. That they are rules of the highest authority is obvious from the manner in which they have been referred to by Mr. Colebrooke."*

It is a matter of regret that though Mr. Colebrooke pointed out the importance of the Mimamsa rules of interpretation long, long ago, still proper attention was not paid to them by the Courts of Justice in subsequent times. A proper application of these rules might have produced different results in many a Hindu Law

* Chief Justice, Allahabad High Court.

* Ind. Law Reports, 14 All. p. 70.;

case. Rules of interpretation possess an importance in respect of the Hindu Law, much greater than in respect of the law of any other country. The Hindu Law has never been regarded as man-made law. It is contained in the sacred books. The administration of it has always been more or less in the absolute charge of learned men who were to derive the law from the texts only. So, interpretations were necessary at every step, which could never be carried on consistently without fixed rules of interpretation. It may be said that the Mimamsa rules were framed for the purpose of construing Vedic passages only, and so, they are not applicable to the civil law. To this two answers may be given. In the first place, the law contained in the texts of the Smṛtis is presumed to follow entirely from the Vedas. According to the orthodox theory, all texts of the Smṛtis had corresponding texts in the Vedas, many of which are now lost.† The distinction between the sacred law and the secular law is not recognised by the orthodox Hindu mind. The Smṛtis are regarded as an offshoot of the Vedas. Hence, the Mimamsa rules which are applied to the Vedic texts are also equally applicable to the Smṛti texts. Secondly, a rule is always a rule. It will, as a matter of course, govern a case which comes within its purview, no matter whether it is a question of sacred or secular law. The logic of the Mimamsa is the logic of law, and is capable of a very wide application. In fact, all commentators and digest-makers

† *Adhikāraṇa* I. 3, 1.

of the Smṛtis have copiously cited the maxims of the Mimamsa in their works for settling controversial points.

We find the following statement in the commentary of Shabara in the topic on the authoritativeness of the Smṛti texts. "Hence those (injunctions) which have apparent objects in view are authoritative on that ground, and those which have no apparent objects are to be supposed to have been based on Vedic texts."*. Now, by this statement, it is not meant that all such Smṛti texts as enjoin the following of one's preceptor, etc., are not based on the Vedas, merely because their objects are apparent; but even such texts are to be supposed to have had a Vedic origin without which no Niyama would be possible. The Tantravartika also says to the same effect :

“यत्तु भाष्यकारेण दृष्टार्थत्वात् प्रामाण्यमित्युक्तं, तत् पूर्व-
पक्षवाद्यतिशयार्थम् । एतदुक्तं भवति यास्तावद् अदृष्टार्थाः स्मृत-
यः ताः कथंचिदप्रमाणीकुर्याद् भवान्, इमाः पुनर्गुर्वनुगमनादि
विषयाः कथमिव अप्रमाणं भविष्यन्ति ।”*

"In stating that certain things are authoritative because they have apparent objects, the commentator intends to silence his opponents. The position may be explained thus,—‘you may not recognise the authority of those texts which do not indicate any apparent object, but how can you ignore the value of those texts which prescribe the following of one's preceptor, etc., (which indicate apparent objects)’?”

* Adhikarana I. 3. 1.

* Tantravartika Bom. Ed., p. 78.

A duty which produces a worldly benefit attracts people naturally, and one may not like to know whether it has any other sanction or not. But, if we consider the matter from another point of view, the existence of a further sanction will be manifest. What would be the consequence if you omit to perform such a duty? Would an omission end in a mere loss of the expected benefit, or produce a sin also? The following extract from the Nyayasudha makes the point clear.

“निष्पन्नविधिरप्यनुष्ठीयमानस्य गुर्वनुगमनादे हर्षार्थत्वा-
योगाद् भवश्यकल्पतार्त्तन्यधानुपपत्ते रकरणनिमित्त-प्रत्ययाय-
पहिहार्यत्वावसायात् तस्य च अनन्यप्रमाणत्वाद् वेदमूलत्व-
सिद्धिः ”*

—“To such acts, as the following of one's preceptor, etc., which are performed even by people who have finished their educational career, no earthly motive can be ascribed. But the compulsory character of such duties cannot be otherwise established than by holding that it is necessary to avoid the sin that would accrue from non-performance, and, as there is no other authority to warrant this conclusion, it is admitted that the texts prescribing such duties have had a Vedic origin.”

It is enjoined in the Smṛtis that a pupil must follow his preceptor and so forth. So long as the preceptor teaches the pupil, the latter is certainly interested in pleasing the former by following him, etc. But when the course is finished, and the pupil does not want any

further favour from his preceptor, there is no necessity for 'pleasing the latter. But in fact it is found that people who have finished their educational course behave themselves in the same manner towards their ex-preceptors as they did when they were students. They would never do so unless such duties were compulsory. But this idea of compulsion can emanate only from the Vedas and from no other authority, and hence, such injunctions of the Smṛtis are supposed to have a Vedic origin.

Now, we see that the duty of following one's preceptor is not only compulsory for a pupil who has to win favours from his preceptor but it is also compulsory for one who expects no such gain. If the duty be not carried out, a sin would accrue to both alike. Hence, it is concluded that a Vedic sanction is to be supposed for all injunctions of the Smṛtis having or not having apparent objects. Those injunctions, which deal with tangible, worldly objects, are ordinarily regarded as 'secular law,' while those injunctions which deal with no such objects are regarded as 'religious law,' But both of them, as we have seen above, are to be regarded as offshoots of the Vedic law.

The sage, Yajnavalkya, has made it binding upon kings to try cases in accordance with the rules of Dharmashastra, as will appear from the following passage:

“व्यवहारान् नृपः पश्येद् विद्वद्भिर्ब्राह्मणैः सह ।

धर्मशास्त्रानुसारेण क्रोधलोभविवर्जितः ॥” *

"The king shall try cases, together with learned Brahmanas, according to the Dharmashastra and without giving vent to anger or greed." Yajnavalkya himself has drawn a distinction between Dharmashastra and 'Arthashastra.' It is clear from the manner in which he has used the expression 'Arthashastra', and also from the interpretations of the Mitaksara, that it means those rules of law which entail visible worldly objects. Vijñaneshwara has interpreted it as धर्मशास्त्रात्मकं न च पर्याप्तं i.e. it is nothing foreign to Dharmashastra but is a part of it. Still, apprehending that some cases might be tried as cases of secular law according to the principles of common sense, etc, Yajnavalkya enjoins that all cases are to be tried according to the law of Dharmashastra. But the law of Dharmashastra is an offshoot of the Vedic law which is interpreted and adjusted according to the rules and principles of the Mimamsa. These rules and principles, therefore, are to be adopted for interpreting and adjusting the law of Dharmashastra also. Now, the law of Dharmashastra includes rules of pure religious Law as well as rules dealing with worldly objects. Hence, the rules and principles of the Mimamsa are to be applied to both of them. The Mimamsa maxims are particularly to be applied to cases in which there arises a conflict between different Smṛti texts. The following line of Yajnavalkya Smṛti shows the importance that is attached to the Mimamsa maxims.

"स्मृत्योर्विरोधे न्यायस्तु चलवान् व्यवहारतः" *

* Vyavahara v. 21.

INTRODUCTION TO THE PURVA MIMAMSA.

"When Smṛiti texts conflict with one another, the principles or decisions of the Mimamsa, which have been adopted in practice, will prevail." The word, 'Nyaya' seems to mean ordinary rules of practice or equitable principles, but on a proper consideration we cannot accept this meaning as correct. It is not fair to suggest that ordinary rules of practice or equitable principles should be regarded as the decisive factors in settling disputed points of religious law. Had 'Nyaya' meant ordinary rules of practice or equitable principles, it would not have been necessary to use the two words, 'Nyaya' and 'Vyavahara,' having the same meaning, in the same sentence. But our interpretation of the word is free from such a difficulty. The maxims of the Mimamsa are not strange things, but they have been arrived at by applying the general principles of logic to various knotty cases of Vedic law. It is for this reason that in the Mitaksara the word 'Nyaya' has been interpreted as being of the form of general rules and exceptions. Just as the rulings laid down by the higher courts of law are accepted as authorities for settling points of modern law, so the Nyayas of the Mimamsa which have been actually adopted in practice are invoked for settling points of Smṛiti law. That 'Nyaya' means a Mimamsa maxim or decision is borne out by the following passage of the Bhāttadīpikā,—“सन्न्यायविरोधे अतिर प्रमाणम्” if a Smṛiti text conflict with a 'San-nyaya' it loses its binding force." The expression 'san-nyaya' has been explained in the Prabhavali† as nothing other than a Mimamsa-nyaya.

* Prabhavali, I. 3. 5.

In the Shastradipika also it has been held that such texts of the Kalpa-Sutras, as जायन्मिः पत्नीः संयाजयन्ति etc, have no binding authority, inasmuch as they go against the decisions of the Mimamsa. Besides, it is not at all probable that such a high importance should have been attached to popular maxims or principles. Hence, we conclude that in the above passage of Yajnavalkya—अपुत्रोर्विरोधे न्यायस्तु the word Nyaya does not mean a popular or equitable principle but a maxim or decision of the Mimamsa.

Thus, we see that we have to depend upon the maxims and decisions of the Mimamsa for the interpretation of Smṛti law and for reconciling its conflicting views. We shall next proceed to show how the Mimamsa Nyayas are actually applied to concrete cases. "Adoption," says Prof Keith, "affords a fruitful field for the application of Mimamsa principles." We propose, therefore, to interpret certain Smṛti texts relating to adoption in the light of the Mimamsa principles. The text of the Smṛti, which speaks of adoption, runs thus:

“अपुत्रेणैव कर्त्तव्यः पुत्रप्रतिनिधिः सदा”

“A sonless person must always take a substitute for a son.”

The expression ‘aputrena,’ here, is in the masculine gender. The question strikes one at once as to whether a male person only is entitled to adopt, or the expression includes a female also. Exactly the same question arose in the case of the Vedic injunction, स्वर्गदामो यजेत “one who desires to enjoy heaven’ shall

perform a sacrifice." There, too, the expression, स्वर्गकासः is in the masculine gender. The Adhikarana in which the matter has been discussed is thus summarised in Shastradipika-

“तत्र पुलिंगनिर्देशात् पुंस एवाधिकारिता ।
प्रकृत्यर्थतया लिङं संख्यावन्नाविवक्षितम् ॥” *

“As the word denoting the agent is characterised by the masculine gender, a male person only is entitled (to perform a sacrifice); the gender is included in the meaning of the base, and so, it cannot be said that the gender is not intended as the number.” This is the Purvapaksa or the *prima facie* view of the case.† On this the conclusion is—

“प्रकृत्यर्थोऽपि खल्वेतदुद्देश्यस्य विशेषणम् ।
संख्यया तुल्यनीतित्वान् न विवक्षां प्रपद्यते ॥”

—“Though this (gender) is included in the meaning of the base, still it qualifies the subject (and not the predicate); its position is in no way different from that of the number, and hence, it is not intended.” Thus, this Adhikarna removes the ineligibility of a wife so far as the performance of a sacrifice is concerned, and there can be no objection to applying the same principle to the case of adoption, too.

Now, another question arises here as to whether this eligibility would be joint or separate. On this point a discussion has been made in the next Adhikarana* and the decision is that the wife alone is not entitled to

† Shastradipika VI. 1; 3.

* VI. 1. 4.

perform a sacrifice. So, in the case of adoption, too, the wife alone would not be entitled to adopt. In the Adhikarana referred to above, it has been first argued that the husband and the wife are separately entitled to perform a sacrifice, as the expression, Swargakamah (one who desires to enjoy heavenly bliss), is in the singular number. But this argument is not satisfactory. To complete a sacrifice the husband and the wife have to perform certain specific duties as *प्राग्वक्ष्यम्*, etc, and so, they have to depend upon each other, and, if they proceed separately the performance of each will be defective. Hence, the conclusion is that the right to perform a sacrifice is a joint right. From this it follows that a wife by herself has no right to perform any duty in which the co-operation of the husband is necessary. But the digest-makers have decided that a wife who has obtained permission from her husband is entitled to adopt. The authority for this decision is the following text of Vashistha :

“न स्त्री पुत्रं दद्यात् प्रतिगृह्णीयाद्वा, अन्यत्र अनुष्ठानाद्भर्तुः।”

“the wife must not give or take a son in adoption without the permission of her husband.” This text clearly implies that with the permission of the husband the wife is competent to adopt. So, a special provision is made by this particular Smṛti text and not on any general principle.

It may be asked here if the performance of a sacrifice and the adoption of a son are exactly similar cases in so far as the co-operation or the mutual help of the husband

and the wife is necessary. To this the answer would be that co-operation is as much necessary in the one case as in the other. The following passage throws some light on this matter—

“अग्न्याधानादिकं तत्र कृत्वाज्योत्पवनान्तकम् ।

दातुः समक्षं गत्वा तु पुत्रं देहीति याचयेत् ॥”

“After performing all the rites from Agnyadhana up to Ajyotpavana, (he) shall approach the giver and beg with the words ‘Give your son ’ ”

The rite, Agnayadhana, that is mentioned in this passage is possible only in the case of a husband who possesses the sacred fire as well as the wife, and not in the case of the wife.

In the Shastradipika we find a decision which is embodied in the following words :

“प्रोषिते अन्यकर्मव्यापृते वा यजमाने ये ताव-

दाज्यावेक्षणादयः तेषु अध्वर्यादयः कर्तारः” +

“If the sacrificer has gone to a distant place or is engaged in any other sacrifice, the Adhvaryu and others (priests) will be entitled to perform the (his) rites of Ajyaveksana, etc.” On the strength of this statement it may be maintained that a wife whose husband has gone to a distant land is entitled to adopt, as her husband is alive and as his fire is present. But when the husband is dead, how can his widow who does not possess, nor has the capacity to possess, the sacred fire, be allowed to per-

form a ceremony in which the use of the sacred fire is compulsory. After the death of the husband the widow cannot cherish the sacred fire for her own sake. On the other hand a man whose wife is dead, may, if he so likes, preserve the sacred fire for his own sake, which will be regarded as a representative of his deceased wife. Hence it may rather be possible for such a widower to adopt.

Thus we see that according to the decisions of the Mimamsa a wife is only allowed to exercise her right to adopt a son jointly with her husband. In the text "माता पिता वा दद्यातां यमद्विः पुत्रमापदि"* "the son whom the father and the mother give in distress," of Manu, the word, वा has been taken to mean 'and,' for, otherwise the use of the verb in the dual number, 'दद्याताम्' would not be appropriate; and so this text points to the joint right of the husband and the wife. The text, "दद्यान् माता पिता वायं स पुत्रो दत्तको भवेत्"* "the son whom the father or the mother gives will become the adopted son," seems to establish a separate right for the father as well as for the mother. But in fact it is not so. The words, father and mother, do not mean here any father or any mother, but they are to be taken in a qualified sense. The word, father, means, as we have shown above, a father whose wife is dead, but who still preserves the sacred fire, and the word, mother, means a mother whose husband has gone to a distant place. We do not obtain anything else from the decisions of the

* Manu IX, 168.

* Yajnavalkya, Vyavahara, 130.

Mimamsa. In the Mitaksara the word, mother, has been taken to include a widowed mother also. [This view of the Mitaksara is not based on any decision of the Mimamsa but is obtained by combining this text of Yajnavalkya with the text, “मयत्र अनुजानाद भर्तुः”]

At any rate the commentators have not regarded this text of Yajnavalkya as establishing the existence of a separate right of the mother. The interpretation of the Mitaksara shows that the mother cannot exercise her right independently. In it the word, ‘mother’ has been interpreted as a mother whose husband is either dead or gone to a distant place, and who is permitted by her husband. If the mother possessed an independent right it would not be necessary to put all these qualifications. The Mitaksara does not even say that the mother can give in the presence of the father with his permission. The observation of Mr. Golap chandra Sarkar-‘in any view of the Law, the wife is competent to give her son in adoption, when her husband is alive, and is capable of giving his consent, only with his assent’ *will be consistent with Mitaksara, only if by the word ‘alive’ he means “मौलितः,” otherwise there will be an inconsistency. The Mitaksara adds a third alternative, “उभया वा” or by both the parents.’ We have said above that this view only is in accordance with the Mimamsa doctrine of the joint eligibility of a married couple, while a separate exercise of the right by the mother after her husband’s death follows from some Smṛti texts only.

* Hindu Law of adoption p. 276.

As regard, the right of the mother Mr Golap Chandra Sarker further says: "According to the ancient law, however, the father had in addition to the natural right the *patria potestas*, and the mother's status was similar to that of a minor wanting discretion; hence the father could exercise the right of gift, independently of the mother, who could not exercise such a right unless her want of discretion were supplied by the assent of her husband: this appears to be the substance of Vasistha's text. + These remarks of Mr. Sarker are quite in harmony with the ancient rules of practice. If a wife is disobedient her husband is entitled to perform a sacrifice without her co-operation; but when the husband is unwilling the wife cannot ignore him and proceed to perform a sacrifice without his help. A woman is not allowed to enjoy so much freedom. The text, न स्त्री स्वातन्त्र्यंति, 'a woman is not worthy of freedom,' stands in her way. But although a man, whose wife shows disobedience, is allowed to perform a sacrifice independently of his wife, still neither a bachelor nor a widower, who does not preserve a sacred fire, is ever allowed to perform a sacrifice. There is no reason why the same rules should not apply to the case of adoption.

In the texts of Manu and Yajnavalkya we find the words, दद्यात्तम् and दद्यात्, both of which are derived from the root, दा, which means to give. Hence it follows that the status of the boy as an adopted son is due to,

* Hindu Law of adoption p. 76.

दत्त Now it may be asked here whether this status of the boy would arise at all, if he is made over by a person who is not permitted by the Shastras to do so. To answer this question it becomes necessary for us to ascertain in the first place whether the sonship of an adopted son is merely a social status or it is the result of a religious sacrament. Vijnaneshwar is silent on this point; but in the Vyavahara-mayukha it has been held that the sonship of an adopted son is *Adṛsta*, because such a son is not produced by the combination of seed and blood. Neither any commentator nor any digest-maker has ever challenged this conclusion. Hence we may take it for granted that it is approved of by all, by reason of the maxim that what is not prohibited is accepted. When it is said, that the status of an adopted son, which is an *adrsta* something, is caused by a gift, it is implied as a matter of course that the gift includes all ceremonies up to the acceptance. The mere act of acceptance cannot create this *adrsta* or invisible sonship. So the Dattaka-homa and other religious rites are required to be performed. These rites are regarded as parts of the act of acceptance.

Again if the sonship of an adopted son is regarded as *Adṛsta* it will be possible only in the case of such a boy as is recommended in the Shastras for this purpose. He, with regard to whom gift and acceptance are prescribed, is the only person fit for the consecration. In the injunction “मुद्गान् प्रोचति” “sprinkle water upon the Mudga-beans.” the act of sprinkling water is regarded as a consecration, and Mudga-beans are the object fit

for it. If Mudga be not available, can Masa, which is a similar corn, be used instead of it? There is a rule in the Mimamsa that, if an article is not available, a similar article may be used in its stead.* So Masa which can serve all the practical purposes of Mudga-beans might be used instead of it. But it has been held in the sixth chapter* of the Mimamsa that Masa cannot be so used, because the use of Masa in a sacrifice is prohibited by a special text, 'अदक्षिणं न मज्जादक्षः कोद्रवाः' "Masa, Chanaka and Kodrava are not fit to be used in a sacrifice." It was argued that Masa would be used here not as Masa but as (a substitute for) Mudga, and so, Masa might be allowed. But that argument has been refuted by the counter-argument that, whether Masa comes as Masa or as a substitute for Mudga, it comes to be used in a sacrifice, and, when its use in a sacrifice is prohibited, it can not be used on any account. So, though Masa can meet all the apparent purposes of Mudga, still it cannot be used in a sacrifice, and why? Because there is an invisible element involved. When Masa is declared to be unfit, it is understood that the invisible merit arising from the sprinkling of water will not be produced in Masa, and hence, the sacrifice will be defective; otherwise, there could be no earthly objection to using Masa in the absence of Mudga.

Similarly, a child, such as an only son, whose gift and acceptance are prohibited in the Smṛti texts, is not fit for adoption. Such a child may be competent for

* Mimamsādhikarāṇa VI. 3. 4.

* Mimamsādhikarāṇa VI. 3. 6.

all tangible purposes, but when he is declared unfit by the Shastras we must understand that his gift and acceptance will not create the necessary invisible element of the status of an adopted son. By making the gift, the father may lose his dominion over the child, and the taker may acquire a dominion over him, (i.e., he may be regarded as a chattel or a slave of the taker) but he will not become the taker's son. He will neither be entitled to offer Pindas nor to inherit the properties of the taker. In the Dattaka-Mimamsa it is decided that an adopted son of whom all the sacramental ceremonies up to the ceremony of tonsure have been performed in the natural father's family will become a slave of the adopter, and not a son. From this it follows that mere gift and acceptance cannot confer the status of sonship on an adoptee in whose case gift and acceptance are prohibited. Medhatithi says that the sonship of an adopted son, etc, is due to an unseen merit, and that, just as wifehood is created by the performance of particular religious rites, so is the sonship of an adopted son.

It might be suggested here that, by the violation of a prohibition, a sin only would be committed, but the due result would not be annulled, for in the Adhikarana relating to the performance of a prohibited act* it has been decided that such a performance would only produce a sin. In that Adhikarana the injunction that is discussed is 'न कलंजं भक्षयेत्' "do not eat Kalanja." It would be absurd to suppose that if anybody violates

* Adhikarana VI 2, 5.

this prohibition and eats Kalanja, he will not feel the natural results of eating the thing, viz, satisfaction, nutrition, etc. Hence, it is concluded that in this case a violation would cause sin only. By applying this principle it might be argued that in spite of a prohibition, gift and acceptance would cause sonship. But this argument would be very cogent if the sonship of an adopted son were a perceptible something like the satisfaction due to eating. But we have shown above that it is not so. A tangible result may be produced by any man at any time by adopting a proper process of performance, but as regards an invisible result we cannot know from our experience how it is to be produced. Hence, we can by no means assert that an act performed by a person who is not permitted by the Shastras or at a time which is not recommended, will produce an invisible result. In the Bhamati we find--

“नहि अनधिकारिणा समर्थेनापि कृतं कर्म फलाय कल्पते
वैश्यस्तोम इव राजस्यव्रतणाम् ।”

“An act done by a person, who, though able, is unauthorised, is not supposed to produce the result like the Vaisya-stoma performed by the Ksatriyas or Brahmanas.” A Brahmana or a Ksatriya is quite able to perform the sacrifice which a Vaishya is entitled to perform ; but the former is not authorised to perform it. So, if a Brahmana or a Ksatriya performs it, the proper result will not be achieved. The same decision is made in the Purva-Mimamsa regarding the performance of a sacrifice by a Shudra. In the Apashudradhikarana* it has been held that a Shudra is not

* Mimamsadhikarana VI. 1. 7.

authorised to perform a sacrifice. If an act done by an unauthorised person could produce the proper result, there would be no reason why a Shudra should not be able to achieve the desired result by performing a sacrifice; and then, there would be no necessity for introducing this Adhikarana at all.

So, we see that there is a clear difference between the eating of Kalanja and the gift and acceptance in adoption.

In the Vishwajit sacrifice, the sacrificer is required to give away all that he possesses. But it has been decided in the Mimamsa* that one's father and similar other relations cannot be given. On this point the Shastradipika observes:

“स्वत्वत्यागपूर्वकं हि परस्वत्वापादनं दानं, न च दीयमानोऽपि पिता न पिता भवति ।”†

“A gift is the creation of the right of another person after relinquishing one's own right; a father will not become no-father even if he is given away.” From this it follows that a mere gift neither extinguishes nor creates fatherhood, sonship, husbandhood, etc. One can give or sell a box or a table to another person, and by the transaction the right of ownership that belonged to the former will be transferred to the latter. But it is not possible to give or sell a wife so as to make her the wife of another person. If a mere gift or an acceptance

* Mimamsadadhikarana—VI. 7, 1.

† Shastradipika Bom. Ed. p. 510.

could create sonship, there would be no necessity for the performance of Homa, etc.

The following text of Vashistha implies, that the sonship of an adopted son is different even from ordinary sonship:

“शुक्रशोणितसम्भवः पुरुषो मातापितृनिमित्तकः, तस्य प्रदानविक्रयपरित्यागेषु मातापितरौ प्रमथतः ।”

“a person is the product of virile seed and uterine blood, caused by the father and the mother; the father and the mother are competent to give, to sell or to abandon him.” From the epithet, ‘शुक्रशोणितसम्भवः’, we understand that it is only the natural parents who are competent to give or to sell, and that, when the parent-hood is due to any other cause, a gift or a sale is not permitted.. In the case of adoptive parents this natural cause is wanting, and hence, they cannot give away the adopted son again in adoption, In ordinary sonship there is a natural element present, whereas the sonship of an adopted son is a pure creation of the Shastras. So an adoption is possible only in a case where it is allowed by the Shastras, and, as there is an invisible element involved, we must strictly follow the letters of the texts. Therefore, if a particular time or a particular person is selected or recommended by the texts, our assumption should be that the transaction will be invalid if it is not made at that time or by that person.

PARYUDASA.

Some writers have made elaborate discussions to determine the exact character of the text—

“न त्वेधेकं पुत्रं दद्यात् प्रतिगृहीयाद् वा ।”

Dr. J. N. Bhattacharya regards this text as a Paryudasa. "If the parents," he says, "possessed any natural right in their children, then the prohibition could be treated as a prohibition proper, for there can be a prohibition with regard to only such an act as might be done out of natural power or impulse. But if it is admitted that the parents have no natural right, then the conclusion is unavoidable that the prohibition with regard to the gift of an only son is a Paryudasa."* Now, it may be asked, what would be the difference in effect between a prohibition proper and a Paryudasa? Exactly the same question has been discussed in the Adhikarana dealing with the passage "न कलान्जं नृणां"† It has been decided there that if the passage is regarded as a Paryudasa (viz, eat everything excepting kalanja), a violation of the exception will not cause sin; but if the passage is regarded as a prohibition proper, sin will be committed on violation. Similarly, in the case before us, if the rule be regarded as an exception, viz, 'give a son other than an only son,' the gift of an only son will produce no sin; but if it is regarded as a prohibition proper, viz, 'do not give an only son,' the gift of an only son will produce a sin (which will vitiate the Adṛsta element).

The Mimamsakas regard a negative clause as a Paryudasa only when there is either of the two following obstacles standing in the way of regarding the prohibition as a prohibition proper. Where the leading

* Bhattacharya's Hindu Law, p. 175.

† Mimamsadhikarana VI. 2. 5.

clause in a certain connexion is a direction for the performance of some positive duties, and there is a subordinate negative clause regarding the nonperformance of some of these acts, the negative clause is not to be regarded as a prohibition proper, but as a Paryudasa (exception). In such a case the leading clause indicates that the whole matter is of a positive character. So, if any negative clause comes under it, it seems to be a revolting element. To avoid this difficulty the Mimamsakas take it as a Paryudasa. Again, 'when by construing a negative rule as a prohibition proper an option becomes inevitable, it is construed as a Paryudasa. An option means two different alternative courses. When all commands are supposed to proceed from the same authority it is not desirable that there should be commands of a contrary nature. Hence, options are generally repulsive to the Mimamsakas, and they try to avoid them by all means. So, if a prohibition is likely to give rise to an option, they try to convert it into a Paryudasa, or an exception to the first injunction. These two are the only causes which necessitate the conversion of a prohibition into a Paryudasa. We give below two typical, undisputed instances of Paryudasa and compare the prohibition of the gift of an only son with them. The first instance is "नैवेद्यमदद्यात्" "do not see the sun rising," This prohibitory clause is found in the midst of the details of Prajapati-vrata. Here, the leading clause enjoins the observance of a particular vow

* Mimamsadbhikarana IV 1. 3.

which requires the carrying out of some positive details which are mentioned in the subordinate clauses under it. This negative clause cannot be taken apart from the rest, as it is clearly laid down in that particular connexion. So the Shastradipika says :

“उपक्रमे श्रुतं कर्म वाचि व्रतपदं यतः ।

तदन्वयवलात् कर्म विशेषोऽप्यत्र चोद्यते ॥

तेन लक्षणयाप्यत्र पर्युदासः ।”

“As the word ‘Vrata’ denoting a duty is mentioned in the beginning (the leading clause), and with reference to that a particular duty is enjoined by it (the subordinate clause), it is a case of *Paryudasa* even by implication.” The negative clause must be construed with reference to the positive leading clause, and so, it cannot be allowed to retain its negative character. But this principle does not apply to the case of the gift of an only son, for the negative clause, “नत्वे दैकं etc.” does not stand under any leading clause imposing any positive duty.

Our second instance is “यजतिषु वेद्यजामहं करोति नागुयाजेषु” “in all sacrificial offerings a particular Mantra is to be uttered—not in the *Anuyāja* offerings.” Here, the second portion, which is a negative clause, prohibits the uttering of the Mantra in certain offerings which the first portion enjoins. The uttering of a particular formula cannot be the outcome of any natural impulse. So, the prescription as well as the prohibition are made here by the sacred texts. Hence, an option arises. To avoid this unpleasant result the-

prohibition is regarded as an exception. The *Shastra-dipika* summarises the case thus :

“यत् एव विकल्पोऽयं प्रतिषेधे प्रसज्यते ।

अत स्तत्-परिहाराय ययुः^{*} दासाश्रयो वरम् ॥”^{*}

“An option arises if it is regarded as a prohibition; so, in order to avoid it, it is better to have recourse to a *Prayudasa*.”

Mr. K. L. Sarker has cited a case from Raghunandana's Digest which we may discuss here for the better understanding of the difference between a prohibition and an exception.

The text discussed by Raghunandana is—“The *Parvana Shraddh* must be performed during the new moon, but not in the night.” Here the expression “but not in the night,” forms an exception (*Prayudasa*). Suppose, a man performs the *Shraddh* during the new moon, but in the night. The effect is that he gets no benefit from the performance of the *Shraddh*. But he commits no positive sin.”† No man feels any natural impulse to perform a *Shraddh*. The direction for its performance is obtained from the *Smṛti* texts.

The texts at first enjoin that it should be performed during the new moon, but then prohibits its performance in the night. There is no question here of any negative clause standing in the midst of a roll of positive duties. We are only to ascertain whether there is any likeli-

* *Adhikarana* X. 8-1.

† *Mīmāṃsā Rules*, p. 333.

hood of an option taking place. If the performance in the night-hours is supposed to be enjoined by the texts, then its prohibition will bring about an option ; but if it is supposed to be depending on the performer's sweet will, there will be no conflict between the texts, and the prohibition will be regarded as a prohibition proper. Raghunandana and the author of the Karmapradipa think that the idea of the performance in the night-hours is obtained from the Shastras, and hence, they conclude that, the prohibition is an exception to the injunction. The author of the Karmapradipa is of opinion that, as the performance of an excepted act does not produce any sin, no sin will be committed by performing a Shraddh in the night-hours of the new moon. But the Mimamsakas think otherwise. The principle has been discussed in the Bhattadipika in connexion with the injunction “न प्रदक्ष्यन् प्रहज्यात्” * According to it, the period of the new moon may have been fixed by the texts but the selection of a particular hour depends on the will of the performer. So, this prohibition is not directed against the injunction of performance but against the independent exercise of the will of the performer. Hence, in the opinion of the Mimamsakas the prohibition is a case of prohibition proper.

Dr. Bhattacharya wants to assert that as the father has no natural, proprietary right, it is not possible for him to make the gift of a son at his sweet will. The idea of making such a gift is derived only from the sacred texts; and if the

† Narayanecharya

* Adhikarana III, 3. 12.

texts once prescribe such a gift and again prohibit it, an option is sure to arise. To avoid that option it is necessary to have recourse to a Paryudasa. But those who admit that the parents have a natural right even to an only son cannot say that the gift should take place in pursuance of any Shastric injunction, for, according to them, it depends on the will of the parents, and an injunction is not necessary for the exercise of one's free will. They will regard the passage "नृणां मातापितरौ प्रभवतः" "his parents are competent" as declaratory of the natural right of the parents, and not as enjoining the gift of a son. The fact that the verb has been used in the indicative mood "प्रभवतः" and not in the imperative mood also shows that there is no command. So, according to them, the prohibition is to be regarded as a prohibition proper, and not an exception. A prohibition which stands for checking a natural inclination is never regarded as an exception, otherwise the clause "न कर्मणः प्रभवत्" would not be a case of prohibition. So, if the present case be treated as a Paryudasa, a contradiction of the Kalanja maxim* would be inevitable. Thus, it is clear that if the natural right of parents is admitted, no modification of the prohibitory force of the passage, "न नैवेद्यं पुत्रं" etc. will be possible by regarding it as a Paryudasa.

In short, the passage, "प्रकृत्योचितसम्भवः, etc.," cannot be treated as an injunction if the natural right of parents is admitted. It can at best be treated either as a recommendation for making a gift or as a declaration of

* Vide p. 22.

the existence of such a right. In the former case, the negative clause, “नैकं पुत्रं etc;” will be a prohibition, and, in the latter, it will indicate the want of the existence of natural right. The negative particle must denote a contradiction of what is conveyed by the affirmative passage; otherwise what is the good of using it at all?

It may be asked that if the affirmative sentence merely recommends the making of a gift, the negative clause should indicate a mere moral admonition and not a direct prohibition. But in the present case it is not possible. We have said above that a prohibition which tends to check the natural inclination of a man cannot but be a prohibition proper. Here the existence of natural right is admitted; so, the prohibition must be a prohibition proper. Besides, we gain nothing by regarding it as a moral admonition. If the affirmative clause were a recommendation, it would necessarily imply an option. What would then be the necessity for conveying the same idea by using another clause? Thus, our conclusion is that the negative clause is a prohibition. In the Mitaksara we find a passage which supports this conclusion: “आपद-ग्रहणाद् अनापदि न दैयः, दातुरयं प्रतिषेधः.” Here the word ‘प्रतिषेधः’ is used, and not ‘पर्युदास’ or any other word. This shows that in the opinion of Vijñāneshwara also these negative clauses are prohibitions, and nothing else.

Now, if it be not admitted that parents have a natural right to their children it will not be possible to

hold that one can make a gift of one's son if one so likes. So, a sanction must be obtained from the Shastras. In this view, the passage, "अथ कन्याकन्या" etc," might be regarded as a general rule prescribing the gift of an only son or any other son. So the negative clause "न अर्थाय" etc," might become a Paryudasa. But the passage, "न अर्थाय अर्थाय" etc," in the very beginning of the section clearly indicates the existence of a natural right, and so, the negative clause also must stand with reference to the same thing. This clause is, therefore, intended to prohibit the exercise of a natural right. Hence, as we have shown before, it must be regarded as a prohibition proper, and not as a Paryudasa.

Mr. V. N. Mandalik and other writers are of opinion that the passage, "न अर्थाय"..... is nothing more than a mere Arthavada. But a negative clause can be regarded as an Arthavada only when it is neither a prohibition nor a Paryudasa. This question arose with regard the negative text "न अर्थाय" (do not perform the offerings in Soma sacrifices) and it has been decided that it is a case of Arthavada. The following is a translation of the portion of the Shastradipika* which contains the discussion: "If the Ajyabhaga offerings were available in the Soma sacrifice owing to any injunction or the rule of transference, it would be a case of prohibition. If the injunction of the performance of Ajyabhaga offerings were for the sake of Soma-sacrifice as well as for sacrifices other than the Soma, then an exception might be made out of the form 'non-Soma'. The conclusion is that

* Shastradipika X 8, 2.

as Ajjabhaga offerings are not to be made in the Soma sacrifice, so also they are not to be performed in the Pushu-sacrifice.

So, the clause “न चोष” comes to be an Arthavada, ie, a mere statement of a known fact. In pursuance of this conclusion a negative clause, which is neither a prohibition nor a Parayudasa, is regarded as an Arthavada. But we have shewn above that the text “न त्वेदेकं.....” is a case of prohibition proper, and hence, we cannot regard it as an Arthavada. The Adhikarana, referred to above, is called the Nisedharthavada-dhikarana, and a negative clause can be regarded as an Arthavada only in accordance with the principle laid down in it. But it is strange that Mr Mandalik and others have not at all depended upon this Adhikarana. They have, on the other hand; derived support from the Hetuman-nigadadhikarana.* So, we proceed next to see how they have applied the principle of the latter Adhikarana to the present case.

THE HETUMAT MAXIM.

We quote below an extract from Mr. Mandalik's Hindu Law which will show how he has explained and applied the principle laid down in the Hetuman-nigadadhikarana:—

“This text† on the most approved principles of criticism must also be treated as a recommendatory one, in as much as it contains a precept that is intended for a certain specified purpose. It is a rule of the Purva-

† Mimamsadhikarana I. 2. 3.

Mimamsa that all texts supported by the assigning of a reason are to be deemed not as Vidhi but simply as Arthavada (recommendatory). When a text is treated as an arthavada, it follows that it has no obligatory force whatsoever. Shabara Svamin constructs an adhikarana (a topic) on this head, which he calls Hetuman nigada-adhikarana (a topic in regard to texts which contain a clause containing the reason of the precept) out of five Sutras of Jaimini, ch I, quarter II, 26—30, and which he begins as follows;—

“अथ ये हेतुमन्निगदाः—‘गृध्रेण जुहोति, तेन ह्यन्नं क्रियते’—इत्येवमादयः, तेषु स देशः, किं मृत्तिस्तेषां कार्यं, एतद् हेतुः ?”

Translation.—Now in regard to such nigada (texts) having (a clause assigning a) reason, as ‘one should sacrifice by means of Surpa (a winnowing basket; for by means of that food is prepared,’ a doubt arises as to whether they are simply commendatory or contain a reason (making them obligatory). His final reply to the query is “ तस्माद् हेतुमन्निगदस्यापि मृत्तिरेव कार्यम् ” Translation:—‘Therefore, the import of texts having a clause that contains a reason is commendation only.’* Prof Keith has also expressed a similar opinion, as will appear from the following lines quoted from his book entitled the Karma-mimamsa:

“The same maxim, however, has been interpreted as supporting the general rule that an injunction for which a reason is adduced is merely equivalent to an Arthavada, so that Vashistha’s rule against the adoption of an only son is reduced to a pious expression of opinion, because

* Mandalika's Hindu Law, pp 499, 500.

it is followed by the explanation that a son is one who saves from hell his natural father, a fact which makes the adoption of an only son undesirable.”†

But Dr. Bhattacharya is against accepting this view. His view will appear from his own words quoted below :

“The argument on which Mr. Mandalik and his followers lay the greatest stress is that founded on the reason assigned in Vashistha’s text. The Rishi says that an only son should not be given because he is for the perpetuation of lineage. Applying to this the Hetumanni-gadadhikarana as he calls it, Mr. Mandalik arrives at the conclusion that the prohibition as to the adoption of an only son has no legal force. But his reading of the Adhikarana is inaccurate ; and not only is his translation of it misleading, but his conclusion does not follow from his premises.

Rules, which contain recommendatory clauses, are, no doubt, generally optional. But no one who has the least knowledge of the subject would say that they are always so. The सयोगव्यवहाराय explained in p. 61 ante, clearly shows that a rule or law may contain a recommendatory clause and yet be absolutely binding.”‡

But we do not understand how Dr. Bhattacharya applies the two principles simultaneously. In the Hetumannigadadhikarana the Samyogaprthaktva Nayaya forms the basis of the Purvapaksa. So in the Nyāyasudha

† Karmamimansa, p, 100.

‡ Bhattacharya’s Hindu Law, p. p. 177-78a.

the passage beginning with 'यदापि' of the Vartika is introduced with, these remarks: 'इदमर्थमाहसमुच्चयेनायं पूर्वपक्षः, न केवलमनुवृत्तिः।' "This Purvapaksa assumes both reason and commendation, and not reason only." This *prima facie* conclusion has certainly been given up in arriving at the final conclusion. So, it is not reasonable to assert, on the ground of the *Samyoga-prthaktwa* maxim, that there are both a reason as well as a commendation. As it has been decided in the case of the passage, 'तेन यदा कियते,' that it is a mere commendation, so, in the passage under discussion, we shall find a commendation only, and no injunction. So, the attempt, made by Dr. Bhattacharya, for supporting the existence of an injunction by applying the *Samyogaprthaktwa* maxim even after admitting that it is a case of *Hetumanni-gadadhikarana*, has not been a well-considered one.

Dr. Bhattacharya further observes: "The texts which prohibit the adoption of an only son are negative injunctions, which must be treated as exceptional clauses in the texts that enjoin adoption by sonless persons, and not as independent precepts. If they were really independent precepts of an optional nature, then a sonless person could either adopt or not adopt an only son as he pleased."* Dr. Bhattacharya adduces this argument, because he has all along treated the negative clause as a *Paryudasa*. But we have discussed this question at great length and have shewn that it is a negative injunction, and not a *Paryudasa*. So we are unable to attach any weight to this argument. Let us next see how Mr. K. L.

PART II.

Application of Mimamsa Maxims to Hindu Law,

The importance of the Mimamsa rules as regards the interpretation of the Hindu Law is very high. We cannot make a better estimate of it than what Sir John Edge* has done with reference to a question of Hindu Law arising before him. "The question is," says he, "how is the text of Vasistha to be construed. It must clearly be construed according to the rules for the construction of the texts of the sacred books of the Hindu Law, if authoritative rules on the subject exist. That rules for the construction of the sacred texts and law of the Hindus do exist cannot be disputed, although those rules have been frequently overlooked or not referred to by Judges or English text writers, probably because they are in Sanskrit, and have, so far as I am aware, not yet been translated. That they are rules of the highest authority is obvious from the manner in which they have been referred to by Mr. Colebrooke."*

It is a matter of regret that though Mr. Colebrooke pointed out the importance of the Mimamsa rules of interpretation long, long ago, still proper attention was not paid to them by the Courts of Justice in subsequent times. A proper application of these rules might have produced different results in many a Hindu Law

* Chief Justice, Allahabad High Court.

* Ind. Law Reports 14 All. p. 70.

case. Rules of interpretation possess an importance in respect of the Hindu Law, much greater than in respect of the law of any other country. The Hindu Law has never been regarded as man-made law. It is contained in the sacred books. The administration of it has always been more or less in the absolute charge of learned men who were to derive the law from the texts only. So, interpretations were necessary at every step, which could never be carried on consistently without fixed rules of interpretation. It may be said that the Mimamsa rules were framed for the purpose of construing Vedic passages only, and so, they are not applicable to the civil law. To this two answers may be given. In the first place, the law contained in the texts of the Smritis is presumed to follow entirely from the Vedas. According to the orthodox theory, all texts of the Smritis had corresponding texts in the Vedas, many of which are now lost.† The distinction between the sacred law and the secular law is not recognised by the orthodox Hindu mind. The Smritis are regarded as an offshoot of the Vedas. Hence, the Mimamsa rules which are applied to the Vedic texts are also equally applicable to the Smriti texts. Secondly, a rule is always a rule. It will, as a matter of course, govern a case which comes within its purview, no matter whether it is a question of sacred or secular law. The logic of the Mimamsa is the logic of law, and is capable of a very wide application. In fact, all commentators and digest-makers

† Adhikarana I. 3, 1.

of the Smṛtis have copiously cited the maxims of the Mimamsa in their works for settling controversial points.

We find the following statement in the commentary of Shabara in the topic on the authoritativeness of the Smṛti texts. "Hence those (injunctions) which have apparent objects in view are authoritative on that ground, and those which have no apparent objects are to be supposed to have been based on Vedic texts."* Now, by this statement, it is not meant that all such Smṛti texts as enjoin the following of one's preceptor, etc., are not based on the Vedas, merely because their objects are apparent ; but even such texts are to be supposed to have had a Vedic origin without which no Niyama would be possible. The Tantravartika also says to the same effect :

“यत्तु भाष्यकारेण दृष्टार्थत्वात् प्रामाण्यमित्युक्तं, तत् पूर्व-
पक्षवाद्यतिशयार्थम् । एतदुक्तं भवति यास्तावद् अदृष्टार्थाः स्मृत-
यः ताः कथंचिदप्रमाणीकुर्याद् भवान्, इमाः पुनर्गुर्वनुगमनादि
विषयाः कथमिव अप्रमाणं भविष्यन्ति ।”*

"In stating that certain things are authoritative because they have apparent objects, the commentator intends to silence his opponents. The position may be explained thus,—‘you may not recognise the authority of those texts which do not indicate any apparent object, but how can you ignore the value of those texts which prescribe the following of one's preceptor, etc., (which indicate apparent objects) ?’"

* Adhikarana I. 3. 1.

* Tantravartika Bom. Ed, p. 78.

A duty which produces a worldly benefit attracts people naturally, and one may not like to know whether it has any other sanction or not. But, if we consider the matter from another point of view, the existence of a further sanction will be manifest. What would be the consequence if you omit to perform such a duty? Would an omission end in a mere loss of the expected benefit, or produce a sin also? The following extract from the Nyayasudha makes the point clear.

“निष्प्रविद्यैरप्यनुष्ठेयमानस्य गुर्वनुगमनादेर्दृष्टीर्यत्वा-
योगाद् भवश्यकथ्येतात्तन्यधानुपपत्ते रकरणनिमित्त-प्रत्ययाय-
पहिहार्यत्वावसायात् तस्य च अनन्यप्रमाणत्वाद् वेदमूलत्व-
सिद्धिः ”*

—“To such acts, as the following of one's preceptor, etc., which are performed even by people who have finished their educational career, no earthly motive can be ascribed. But the compulsory character of such duties cannot be otherwise established than by holding that it is necessary to avoid the sin that would accrue from non-performance, and, as there is no other authority to warrant this conclusion, it is admitted that the texts prescribing such duties have had a Vedic origin.”

It is enjoined in the Smrtis that a pupil must follow his preceptor and so forth. So long as the preceptor teaches the pupil, the latter is certainly interested in pleasing the former by following him, etc. But when the course is finished, and the pupil does not want any

* Nyayasudha, p. 126.

further favour from his preceptor, there is no necessity for pleasing the latter. But in fact it is found that people who have finished their educational course behave themselves in the same manner towards their ex-preceptors as they did when they were students. They would never do so unless such duties were compulsory. But this idea of compulsion can emanate only from the Vedas and from no other authority, and hence, such injunctions of the Smṛtis are supposed to have a Vedic origin.

Now, we see that the duty of following one's preceptor is not only compulsory for a pupil who has to win favours from his preceptor but it is also compulsory for one who expects no such gain. If the duty be not carried out, a sin would accrue to both alike. Hence, it is concluded that a Vedic sanction is to be supposed for all injunctions of the Smṛtis having or not having apparent objects. Those injunctions, which deal with tangible, worldly objects, are ordinarily regarded as 'secular law,' while those injunctions which deal with no such objects are regarded as 'religious law,' But both of them, as we have seen above, are to be regarded as offshoots of the Vedic law.

The sage, Yajnavalkya, has made it binding upon kings to try cases in accordance with the rules of Dharmashastra, as will appear from the following passage:

“व्यवहारान् नृपः पश्येद् विद्वद्भिर्ब्राह्मणैः सह ।

धर्मशास्त्रानुसारेण क्रोधलोभविवर्जितः ॥” *

* Vyavahara, v. 1.

"The king shall try cases, together with learned Brahmanas, according to the Dharmashastra and without giving vent to anger or greed." Yajnavalkya himself has drawn a distinction between Dharmashastra and 'Arthashastra.' It is clear from the manner, in which he has used the expression 'Arthashastra', and also from the interpretations of the Mitaksara, that it means those rules of law which entail visible worldly objects. Vijnaneshwara has interpreted it as धर्मशास्त्रान्तर्गतं नैव अर्थशास्त्रं i.e. it is nothing foreign to Dharmashastra but is a part of it. Still, apprehending that some cases might be tried as cases of secular law according to the principles of common sense, etc, Yajnavalkya enjoins that all cases are to be tried according to the law of Dharmashastra. But the law of Dharmashastra is an offshoot of the Vedic law which is interpreted and adjusted according to the rules and principles of the Mimamsa. These rules and principles, therefore, are to be adopted for interpreting and adjusting the law of Dharmashastra also. Now, the law of Dharmashastra includes rules of pure religious Law as well as rules dealing with worldly objects. Hence, the rules and principles of the Mimamsa are to be applied to both of them. The Mimamsa maxims are particularly to be applied to cases in which there arises a conflict between different Smṛti texts. The following line of Yajnavalkya Smṛti shows the importance that is attached to the Mimamsa maxims.

"स्मृत्योर्विरोधे न्यायस्तु बलवान् व्यवहारतः" *

"When Smṛiti texts conflict with one another, the principles or decisions of the Mimamsa, which have been adopted in practice, will prevail." The word, 'Nyaya' seems to mean ordinary rules of practice or equitable principles, but on a proper consideration we cannot accept this meaning as correct. It is not fair to suggest that ordinary rules of practice or equitable principles should be regarded as the decisive factors in settling disputed points of religious law. Had 'Nyaya' meant ordinary rules of practice or equitable principles, it would not have been necessary to use the two words, 'Nyaya' and 'Vyavahara,' having the same meaning, in the same sentence. But our interpretation of the word is free from such a difficulty. The maxims of the Mimamsa are not strange things, but they have been arrived at by applying the general principles of logic to various knotty cases of Vedic law. It is for this reason that in the Mitaksara the word 'Nyaya' has been interpreted as being of the form of general rules and exceptions. Just as the rulings laid down by the higher courts of law are accepted as authorities for settling points of modern law, so the Nyayas of the Mimamsa which have been actually adopted in practice are invoked for settling points of Smṛiti law. That 'Nyaya' means a Mimamsa maxim or decision is borne out by the following passage of the Bhattadipika,—“सन्नवायविरोधे स्मृतिर “प्रमाणम्” if a Smṛiti text conflict with a 'San-nyaya' it loses its binding force.” The expression 'san-nyaya' has been explained in the Prabhavali† as nothing other than a Mimamsa-nyaya.

* Prabhavali, I. 3, 5.

In the *Shastradīpikā* also it has been held that such texts of the *Kalpa-Sūtras*, as *अपुत्रोऽपि दत्तव्यः पुत्रं वा* etc. have no binding authority, inasmuch as they go against the decisions of the *Mīmāṃsā*. Besides, it is not at all probable that such a high importance should have been attached to popular maxims or principles. Hence, we conclude that in the above passage of *Yajñavalkya*—*अपुत्रोऽपि दत्तव्यः* the word *Nyaya* does not mean a popular or equitable principle but a maxim or decision of the *Mīmāṃsā*.

Thus, we see that we have to depend upon the maxims and decisions of the *Mīmāṃsā* for the interpretation of *Smṛti* law and for reconciling its conflicting views. We shall next proceed to show how the *Mīmāṃsā Nyayas* are actually applied to concrete cases. "Adoption," says Prof Keith, "affords a fruitful field for the application of *Mīmāṃsā* principles." We propose, therefore, to interpret certain *Smṛti* texts relating to adoption in the light of the *Mīmāṃsā* principles. The text of the *Smṛti*, which speaks of adoption, runs thus:

"अपुत्रेणैव कर्त्तव्यः पुत्रप्रतिनिधिः सदा"

"A sonless person must always take a substitute for a son."

The expression '*aputrena*,' here, is in the masculine gender. The question strikes one at once as to whether a male person only is entitled to adopt, or the expression includes a female also. Exactly the same question arose in the case of the Vedic injunction, *सर्व्वेभ्यो यजेत* "one who desires to enjoy heaven shall

perform a sacrifice." There, too, the expression, स्वर्गकामः is in the masculine gender. The Adhikarana in which the matter has been discussed is thus summarised in Shastradipika-

“तत्र पुलिंगनिर्देशात् पुंस एवाधिकारिता ।

प्रकृत्यर्थतया लिङं संख्यावन्नाविवक्षितम् ॥” *

“As the word denoting the agent is characterised by the masculine gender, a male person only is entitled (to perform a sacrifice); the gender is included in the meaning of the base, and so, it cannot be said that the gender is not intended as the number.” This is the Purvapaksa or the *prima facie* view of the case. On this the conclusion is—

“प्रकृत्यर्थोऽपि खल्वेतदुद्देश्यस्य विशेषणम् ।

संख्याया तुल्यनीतित्वान् न विवक्षां प्रपद्यते ॥”

—“Though this (gender) is included in the meaning of the base, still it qualifies the subject (and not the predicate); its position is in no way different from that of the number, and hence, it is not intended.” Thus, this Adhikarna removes the ineligibility of a wife so far as the performance of a sacrifice is concerned, and there can be no objection to applying the same principle to the case of adoption, too.

Now, another question arises here as to whether this eligibility would be joint or separate. On this point a discussion has been made in the next Adhikarana* and the decision is that the wife alone is not entitled to

*. Shastradipika VI. 1; 3.

*. VI. 1. 4.

perform a sacrifice. So, in the case of adoption, too, the wife alone would not be entitled to adopt. In the *Adhikarana* referred to above, it has been first argued that the husband and the wife are separately entitled to perform a sacrifice, as the expression, *Swargakāmah* (one who desires to enjoy heavenly bliss), is in the singular number. But this argument is not satisfactory. To complete a sacrifice the husband and the wife have to perform certain specific duties as *सन्निवृत्त*, etc., and so, they have to depend upon each other, and, if they proceed separately the performance of each will be defective. Hence, the conclusion is that the right to perform a sacrifice is a joint right. From this it follows that a wife by herself has no right to perform any duty in which the co-operation of the husband is necessary. But the digest-makers have decided that a wife who has obtained permission from her husband is entitled to adopt. The authority for this decision is the following text of *Vashistha* :

“न स्त्री पुत्रं दद्यात् प्रतिगृह्णीयाद्वा, अन्यत्र अनुष्ठानाद्
मरुः।”

“the wife must not give or take a son in adoption without the permission of her husband.” This text clearly implies that with the permission of the husband the wife is competent to adopt. So, a special provision is made by this particular *Smṛti* text and not on any general principle.

It may be asked here if the performance of a sacrifice and the adoption of a son are exactly similar cases in so far as the co-operation or the mutual help of the husband

and the wife is necessary. To this the answer would be that co-operation is as much necessary in the one case as in the other. The following passage throws some light on this matter—

“अग्न्याधानादिकं तत्र कृत्वाज्योत्पवनान्तकम् ।

दातुः समक्षं गत्वा तु पुत्रं देहीति याचयेत् ॥”

“After performing all the rites from Agnyadhana up to Ajyotpavana, (he) shall approach the giver and beg with the words ‘Give your son ’ ”

The rite, Agnayadhana, that is mentioned in this passage is possible only in the case of a husband who possesses the sacred fire as well as the wife, and not in the case of the wife.

In the Shastradipika we find a decision which is embodied in the following words :

“प्रोषिते अन्यकर्मव्यापृते वा यजमाने ये ताव-

दाज्यावेक्षणादयः तेषु अध्वर्यादयः कर्तारः” +

“If the sacrificer has gone to a distant place or is engaged in any other sacrifice, the Adhvaryu and others (priests) will be entitled to perform the (his) rites of Ajyaveksana, etc.” On the strength of this statement it may be maintained that a wife whose husband has gone to a distant land is entitled to adopt, as her husband is alive and as his fire is present. But when the husband is dead, how can his widow who does not possess, nor has the capacity to possess, the sacred fire, be allowed to per-

form a ceremony in which the use of the sacred fire is compulsory. After the death of the husband the widow cannot cherish the sacred fire for her own sake. On the other hand a man whose wife is dead, may, if he so likes, preserve the sacred fire for his own sake, which will be regarded as a representative of his deceased wife. Hence it may rather be possible for such a widower to adopt.

Thus we see that according to the decisions of the *Mīmāṃsā* a wife is only allowed to exercise her right to adopt a son jointly with her husband. In the text "माता पिता वा दद्यातां यमद्विः पुत्रमापदि" * "the son whom he father and the mother give in distress," of *Manu*, the word, वा has been taken to mean 'and,' for, otherwise the use of the verb in the dual number, 'दद्यात्' would not be appropriate; and so this text points to the joint right, of the husband and the wife. The text, "दद्यान् माता पिता चार्यं स पुत्रो दत्तको भवेत्" * "the son whom the father or the mother gives will become the adopted son," seems to establish a separate right for the father as well as for the mother. But in fact it is not so. The words, father and mother, do not mean here any father or any mother, but they are to be taken in a qualified sense. The word, father, means, as we have shown above, a father whose wife is dead, but who still preserves the sacred fire, and the word, mother, means a mother whose husband has gone to a distant place. We do not obtain anything else from the decisions of the

* *Manu* IX, 168.

* *Yajñavalkya*, *Vyavahara*, 130.

Mimamsa. In the Mitaksara the word, mother, has been taken to include a widowed mother also. This view of the Mitaksara is not based on any decision of the Mimamsa but is obtained by combining this text of Yajnavalkya with the text, "पितृपुत्रादौ भृत्यः"

At any rate the commentators have not regarded this text of Yajnavalkya as establishing the existence of a separate right of the mother. The interpretation of the Mitaksara shows that the mother cannot exercise her right independently. In it the word, 'mother' has been interpreted as a mother whose husband is either dead or gone to a distant place, and who is permitted by her husband. If the mother possessed an independent right it would not be necessary to put all these qualifications. The Mitaksara does not even say that the mother can give in the presence of the father with his permission. The observation of Mr. Golap chandra Sarkar-'in any view of the Law, the wife is competent to give her son in adoption, when her husband is alive, and is capable of giving his consent, only with his assent' * will be consistent with Mitaksara, only if by the word 'alive' he means "पौषितः," otherwise there will be an inconsistency. The Mitaksara adds a third alternative, "उभयैवा वा" 'or by both the parents.' We have said above that this view only is in accordance with the Mimamsa doctrine of the joint eligibility of a married couple, while a separate exercise of the right by the mother after her husband's death follows from some Smṛti texts only.

* Hindu Law of adoption p. 276.

As regards the right of the mother Mr Golap Chandra Sarker further says: "According to the ancient law, however, the father had in addition to the natural right the *patria potestas*, and the mother's status was similar to that of a minor wanting discretion: hence the father could exercise the right of gift, independently of the mother, who could not exercise such a right unless her want of discretion were supplied by the assent of her husband: this appears to be the substance of Vasistha's text. + These remarks of Mr. Sarker are quite in harmony with the ancient rules of practice. If a wife is disobedient her husband is entitled to perform a sacrifice without her co-operation; but when the husband is unwilling the wife cannot ignore him and proceed to perform a sacrifice without his help. A woman is not allowed to enjoy so much freedom. The text, *एवमन्याया*, 'a woman is not worthy of freedom,' stands in her way. But although a man, whose wife shows disobedience, is allowed to perform a sacrifice independently of his wife, still neither a bachelor nor a widower, who does not preserve a sacred fire, is ever allowed to perform a sacrifice. There is no reason why the same rules should not apply to the case of adoption.

In the texts of Manu and Yajñavalkya we find the words, *दत्तकम्* and *दत्तम्*, both of which are derived from the root, *दा*, which means to give. Hence it follows that the status of the boy as an adopted son is due to.

+ Hindu Law of adoption p. 70.

for it. If Mudga be not available, can Masa, which is a similar corn, be used instead of it? There is a rule in the Mimamsa that, if an article is not available, a similar article may be used in its stead.* So Masa which can serve all the practical purposes of Mudga-beans might be used instead of it. But it has been held in the sixth chapter* of the Mimamsa that Masa cannot be so used, because the use of Masa in a sacrifice is prohibited by a special text, 'समसं न मसमसं मसं' "Masa, Chanaka and Kodrava are not fit to be used in a sacrifice." It was argued that Masa would be used here not as Masa but as (a substitute for) Mudga, and so, Masa might be allowed. But that argument has been refuted by the counter-argument that, whether Masa comes as Masa or as a substitute for Mudga, it comes to be used in a sacrifice, and, when its use in a sacrifice is prohibited, it can not be used on any account. So, though Masa can meet all the apparent purposes of Mudga, still it cannot be used in a sacrifice, and why? Because there is an invisible element involved. When Masa is declared to be unfit, it is understood that the invisible merit arising from the sprinkling of water will not be produced in Masa, and hence, the sacrifice will be defective; otherwise, there could be no earthly objection to using Masa in the absence of Mudga.

Similarly, a child, such as an only son, whose gift and acceptance are prohibited in the Smṛti texts, is not fit for adoption. Such a child may be competent for

* Mīmāṃsādhikarāṇa VI 3. 4.

* Mīmāṃsādhikarāṇa VI. 3. 6.

this prohibition and eats Kalanja, he will not feel the natural results of eating the thing, viz, satisfaction, nutrition, etc. Hence, it is concluded that in this case a violation would cause sin only. By applying this principle it might be argued that in spite of a prohibition, gift and acceptance would cause sonship. But this argument would be very cogent if the sonship of an adopted son were a perceptible something like the satisfaction due to eating. But we have shown above that it is not so. A tangible result may be produced by any man at any time by adopting a proper process of performance, but as regards an invisible result we cannot know from our experience how it is to be produced. Hence, we can by no means assert that an act performed by a person who is not permitted by the Shastras or at a time which is not recommended, will produce an invisible result. In the Bhamati we find—

“नहि अनधिकारिणा समर्थेनापि कृतं कम फलाय कल्पते
वैश्यस्तोम इव राजग्वयत्सुणाम् ।”

“An act done by a person, who, though able, is unauthorised, is not supposed to produce the result like the Vaisya-stoma performed by the Ksatriyas or Brahmanas.” A Brahmana or a Ksatriya is quite able to perform the sacrifice which a Vaishya is entitled to perform ; but the former is not authorised to perform it. So, if a Brahmana or a Ksatriya performs it, the proper result will not be achieved. The same decision is made, in the Purva-Mimamsa regarding the performance of a sacrifice by a Shudra. In the Apashudradhikarana* it has been held that a Shudra is not

* Mimamsadbhikarana VI. 1. 7.

authorised to perform a sacrifice. If an act done by an unauthorised person could produce the proper result, there would be no reason why a Shudra should not be able to achieve the desired result by performing a sacrifice; and then, there would be no necessity for introducing this Adhikarana at all.

So, we see that there is a clear difference between the eating of Kalanja and the gift and acceptance in adoption.

In the Vishwajit sacrifice, the sacrificer is required to give away all that he possesses. But it has been decided in the Mimamsa that one's father and similar other relations cannot be given. On this point the Shastra-dipika observes:

“स्वत्वत्यागपूर्वकं हि परस्वत्वापादनं दानं, न च दीयमा नोऽपि पिता न पिता भवति ।”*

“A gift is the creation of the right of another person after relinquishing one's own right; a father will not become no-father even if he is given away.” From this it follows that a mere gift neither extinguishes nor creates fatherhood, sonship, husbandhood, etc. One can give or sell a box or a table to another person, and by the transaction the right of ownership that belonged to the former will be transferred to the latter. But it is not possible to give or sell a wife so as to make her the wife of another person. If a mere gift or an acceptance

* Mimamsadhikarana—VI. 7, 1.

* Shastradipika Bom. Ed. p. 510.

could create sonship, there would be no necessity for the performance of Homa, etc.

The following text of Vashishta implies that the sonship of an adopted son is different even from ordinary sonship:

“शुक्रशोणितसम्भवः पुत्रो मातापितृनिमित्तकः, तस्य प्रदानविक्रयपरित्यागेषु मातापितरौ प्रमथतः ।”

“a person is the product of virile seed and uterine blood, caused by the father and the mother; the father and the mother are competent to give, to sell or [to abandon him.” From the epithet, ‘शुक्रशोणितसम्भवः’, we understand that it is only the natural parents who are competent to give or to sell, and that, when the parent-hood is due to any other cause, a gift or a sale is not permitted. In the case of adoptive parents this natural cause is wanting, and hence, they cannot give away the adopted son again in adoption, In ordinary sonship there is a natural element present, whereas the sonship of an adopted son is a pure creation of the Shastras. So an adoption is possible only in a case where it is allowed by the Shastras, and as there is an invisible element involved, we must strictly follow the letters of the texts. Therefore, if a particular time or a particular person is selected or recommended by the texts, our assumption should be that the transaction will be invalid if it is not made at that time or by that person.

PARYUDASA.

Some writers have made elaborate discussions to determine the exact character of the text—

“नत्वेक्षेकं पुत्रं दद्यात् प्रतिगृहीयाद् वा ।”

Dr. J. N. Bhattacharya regards this text as a Paryudasa. "If the parents," he says, "possessed any natural right in their children, then the prohibition could be treated as a prohibition proper, for there can be a prohibition with regard to only such an act as might be done out of natural power or impulse. But if it is admitted that the parents have no natural right, then the conclusion is unavoidable that the prohibition with regard to the gift of an only son is a Paryudasa."* Now, it may be asked, what would be the difference in effect between a prohibition proper and a Paryudasa? Exactly the same question has been discussed in the Adhikarana dealing with the passage 'न कलंजं भक्षयेत्'† It has been decided there that if the passage is regarded as a Paryudasa (viz, eat everything excepting kalanja), a violation of the exception will not cause sin; but if the passage is regarded as a prohibition proper, sin will be committed on violation. Similarly, in the case before us, if the rule be regarded as an exception, viz, 'give a son other than an only son,' the gift of an only son will produce no sin; but if it is regarded as a prohibition proper, viz, 'do not give an only son,' the gift of an only son will produce a sin (which will vitiate the Adrsta element).

The Mimamsakas regard a negative clause as a Paryudasa only when there is either of the two following obstacles standing in the way of regarding the prohibition as a prohibition proper. Where the leading

* Bhattacharya's Hindu Law. p. 175.

† Mimamsadhikarana VI. 2. 5.

clause in a certain connexion is a direction for the performance of some positive duties, and there is a subordinate negative clause regarding the nonperformance of some of these acts, the negative clause is not to be regarded as a prohibition proper, but as a Paryudasa (exception). In such a case the leading clause indicates that the whole matter is of a positive character. So, if any negative clause comes under it, it seems to be a revolting element. To avoid this difficulty the Mimamsakas take it as a Paryudasa. Again, 'when by construing a negative rule as a prohibition proper an option becomes inevitable, it is construed as a Paryudasa. An option means two different alternative courses. When all commands are supposed to proceed from the same authority it is not desirable that there should be commands of a contrary nature. Hence, options are generally repulsive to the Mimamsakas, and they try to avoid them by all means. So, if a prohibition is likely to give rise to an option, they try to convert it into a Paryudasa, or an exception to the first injunction. These two are the only causes which necessitate the conversion of a prohibition into a Paryudasa. We give below two typical, undisputed instances of Paryudasa and compare the prohibition of the gift of an only son with them. The first instance is "नक्षेत्रोदयमादित्यम्" "do not see the sun rising." This prohibitory clause is found in the midst of the details of Prajapati-vrata. Here, the leading clause enjoins the observance of a particular vow

* Mimamsadhikarana IV 1. 3.

which requires the carrying out of some positive details which are mentioned in the subordinate clauses under it. This negative clause cannot be taken apart from the rest, as it is clearly laid down in that particular connexion. So the Shastradipika says :

“उपक्रमे श्रुतं कर्म वाचि व्रतपदं यतः ।

नदन्वयवलात् कर्म विशेषोऽप्यत्र चोच्यते ॥

तेन लक्षणयाप्यत्र पर्युदासः ।”

“As the word ‘Vrata’ denoting a duty is mentioned in the beginning (the leading clause), and with reference to that a particular duty is enjoined by it (the subordinate clause), it is a case of *Paryudasa* even by implication.” The negative clause must be construed with reference to the positive leading clause, and so, it cannot be allowed to retain its negative character. But this principle does not apply to the case of the gift of an only son, for the negative clause, “नत्वं दैकं etc.” does not stand under any leading clause imposing any positive duty.

Our second instance is “यजतिषु वेद्यजामहं करोति नानुयाजेषु” “in all sacrificial offerings a particular Mantra is to be uttered—not in the *Anuyaja* offerings.” Here, the second portion, which is a negative clause, prohibits the uttering of the Mantra in certain offerings which the first portion enjoins. The uttering of a particular formula cannot be the outcome of any natural impulse. So, the prescription as well as the prohibition are made here by the sacred texts. Hence, an option arises. To avoid this unpleasant result the

prohibition is regarded as an exception. The *Shastra-dipika* summarises the case thus:

“यत् एव विग्रहोऽयं प्रतिषेधे प्रसज्यते ।

अतस्तत्-परिहाराय पय्यु^१दासाश्रयो वरम् ॥”*

“An option arises if it is regarded as a prohibition; so, in order to avoid it, it is better to have recourse to a *Paryudasa*”

Mr. K. L. Sarker has cited a case from *Raghunandana's Digest*—which we may discuss here for the better understanding of the difference between a prohibition and an exception.

The text discussed by *Raghunandana* is—“The *Parvana Shraddh* must be performed during the new moon, but not in the night,” Here the expression “but not in the night,” forms an exception (*Prayudasa*). Suppose, a man performs the *Shraddh* during the new moon, but in the night. The effect is that he gets no benefit from the performance of the *Shraddh*. But he commits no positive sin.† No man feels any natural impulse to perform a *Shraddh*. The direction for its performance is obtained from the *Smṛti* texts.

The texts at first enjoin that it should be performed during the new moon, but then prohibits its performance in the night. There is no question here of any negative clause standing in the midst of a roll of positive duties. We are only to ascertain whether there is any likeli-

* *Adhikarana* X. 8-1.

† *Mīmāṃsa Rules*, p. 333

hood of an option taking place. If the performance in the night-hours is supposed to be enjoined by the texts, then its prohibition will bring about an option ; but if it is supposed to be depending on the performer's sweet will, there will be no conflict between the texts, and the prohibition will be regarded as a prohibition proper. Raghunandana and the author of the *Karmapradipa* think that the idea of the performance in the night-hours is obtained from the *Shastras*, and hence, they conclude that, the prohibition is an exception to the injunction. The author of the *Karmapradipa* is of opinion that, as the performance of an excepted act does not produce any sin, no sin will be committed by performing a *Shradh* in the night-hours of the new moon. But the *Mimamsakas* think otherwise. The principle has been discussed in the *Bhattadipika* in connexion with the injunction “न प्रचक्ष्यते प्रह्व्यात्” * According to it, the period of the new moon may have been fixed by the texts but the selection of a particular hour depends on the will of the performer. So, this prohibition is not directed against the injunction of performance but against the independent exercise of the will of the performer. Hence, in the opinion of the *Mimamsakas* the prohibition is a case of prohibition proper.

Dr. *Bhattacharya* wants to assert that as the father has no natural, proprietary right, it is not possible for him to make the gift of a son at his sweet will. The idea of making such a gift is derived only from the sacred texts; and if the

† *Narayaneaharya*

* *Adhikarana* III, 3. 12.

texts once prescribe such a gift and again prohibit it, an option is sure to arise. To avoid that option it is necessary to have recourse to a Paryudasa. But those who admit that the parents have a natural right even to an only son cannot say that the gift should take place in pursuance of any Shastric injunction, for, according to them, it depends on the will of the parents, and an injunction is not necessary for the exercise of one's free will. They will regard the passage "तस्य पितामहः कृतः" 'his parents are competent' as declaratory of the natural right of the parents, and not as enjoining the gift of a son. The fact that the verb has been used in the indicative mood "कृतः" and not in the imperative mood also shows that there is no command. So, according to them, the prohibition is to be regarded as a prohibition proper, and not an exception. A prohibition which stands for checking a natural inclination is never regarded as an exception, otherwise the clause "न कर्तव्यं" would not be a case of prohibition. So, if the present case be treated as a Paryudasa, a contradiction of the Kalanja maxim* would be inevitable. Thus, it is clear that if the natural right of parents is admitted, no modification of the prohibitory force of the passage, "न कर्तव्यं" etc. will be possible by regarding it as a Paryudasa.

In short, the passage, "तस्य पितामहः कृतः" etc., cannot be treated as an injunction if the natural right of parents is admitted. It can at best be treated either as a recommendation for making a gift or as a declaration of

* Vide p. 22.

the existence of such a right. In the former case, the negative clause, “नैकं पुत्रं” etc;’ will be a prohibition, and, in the latter, it will indicate the want of the existence of natural right. The negative particle must denote a contradiction of what is conveyed by the affirmative passage; otherwise what is the good of using it at all?

It may be asked that if the affirmative sentence merely recommends the making of a gift, the negative clause should indicate a mere moral admonition and not a direct prohibition. But in the present case it is not possible. We have said above that a prohibition which tends to check the natural inclination of a man cannot but be a prohibition proper. Here the existence of natural right is admitted; so, the prohibition must be a prohibition proper. Besides, we gain nothing by regarding it as a moral admonition. If the affirmative clause were a recommendation, it would necessarily imply an option. What would then be the necessity for conveying the same idea by using another clause? Thus, our conclusion is that the negative clause is a prohibition. In the Mitaksara we find a passage which supports this conclusion: “आपद-यद्वर्णाद भ्रमादि न द्वेयः, दातृयं प्रतिषेधः.” Here the word ‘प्रतिषेधः’ is used, and not ‘पर्युदास’ or any other word. This shows that in the opinion of Vijnaneshwara also these negative clauses are prohibitions, and nothing else.

Now, if it be not admitted that parents have a natural right to their children it will not be possible to

hold that one can make a gift of one's son if one so likes. So, a sanction must be obtained from the Shastras. In this view, the passage, "नमः पितृभ्यः" etc., might be regarded as a general rule prescribing the gift of an only son or any other son. So the negative clause "न तृतीयः" etc., might become a Paryudasa. But the passage, "न तृतीयः पितृभ्यः" etc., in the very beginning of the section clearly indicates the existence of a natural right, and so, the negative clause also must stand with reference to the same thing. This clause is, therefore, intended to prohibit the exercise of a natural right. Hence, as we have shown before, it must be regarded as a prohibition proper, and not as a Paryudasa.

Mr V. N. Mandalik and other writers are of opinion that the passage, "न तृतीयः"..... is nothing more than a mere Arthavada. But a negative clause can be regarded as an Arthavada only when it is neither a prohibition nor a Paryudasa. This question arose with regard to the negative text "न श्रद्धा" (do not perform the offerings in Soma sacrifices) and it has been decided that it is a case of Arthavada. The following is a translation of the portion of the Shastradipika* which contains the discussion: "If the Ajyabhaga offerings were available in the Soma sacrifice owing to any injunction or the rule of transference, it would be a case of prohibition. If the injunction of the performance of Ajyabhaga offerings were for the sake of Soma-sacrifice as well as for sacrifices other than the Soma, then an exception might be made out, of the form 'non-Soma'. The conclusion is that

* Shastradipika X 8, 2.

as Ajjabhāga offerings are not to be made in the Soma sacrifice, so also they are not to be performed in the Pushu-sacrifice.

So, the clause “न सोमे” comes to be an Arthavada, i.e., a mere statement of a known fact. In pursuance of this conclusion a negative clause, which is neither a prohibition nor a Parayudāsa, is regarded as an Arthavada. But we have shewn above that the text “न त्वैवेका.....” is a case of prohibition proper, and hence, we cannot regard it as an Arthavada. The Adhikarana, referred to above, is called the Nisedharthavada-dhikarana, and a negative clause can be regarded as an Arthavada only in accordance with the principle laid down in it. But it is strange that Mr Mandalik and others have not at all depended upon this Adhikarana. They have, on the other hand, derived support from the Hetuman-nigadadhikāraṇa.* So, we proceed next to see how they have applied the principle of the latter Adhikarana to the present case.

THE HETUMAT MAXIM.

We quote below an extract from Mr. Mandalik's Hindu Law which will show how he has explained and applied the principle laid down in the Hetuman-nigadadhikāraṇa:—

“This text* on the most approved principles of criticism must also be treated as a recommendatory one, in as much as it contains a precept that is intended for a certain specified purpose. It is a rule of the Purva-

† Mimāṃsadhikāraṇa I, 2. 3.

Mimamsa that all texts supported by the assigning of a reason are to be deemed not as Vidhi but simply as Arthavada (recommendatory). When a text is treated as an arthavada, it follows that it has no obligatory force whatsoever. Shabara Svamin constructs an adhikarana (a topic) on this head, which he calls Hetuman nigadadhikarana (a topic in regard to texts which contain a clause containing the reason of the precept) out of five Sutras of Jaimini, ch I, quarter II, 26—30, and which he begins as follows;—

“एव ये हेतुमन्निगदाः—‘सुर्यां च जुहोति, तेन यमं क्रियते’—इत्येवमादयः, तेषु संहिताः, किं न्युतिर्येषां कार्यं, एतं हेतुः ?”

Translation:—Now in regard to such nigada (texts) having (a clause assigning a) reason, as ‘one should sacrifice by means of Surpa (a winnowing basket; for by means of that food is prepared,’ a doubt arises as to whether they are simply commendatory or contain a reason (making them obligatory). His final reply to the query is “ तस्माद् हेतुमन्निगदस्यापि न्युतिरेव कार्यम् ” Translation —‘Therefore, the import of texts having a clause that contains a reason is commendation only.’*

Prof Keith has also expressed a similar opinion, as will appear from the following lines quoted from his book entitled the Karma-mimamsa:

“The same maxim, however, has been interpreted as supporting the general rule that an injunction for which a reason is adduced is merely equivalent to an Arthavada, so that Vashistha's rule against the adoption of an only son is reduced to a pious expression of opinion, because

* Mandalika's Hindu Law, pp 199, 500.

it is followed by the explanation that a son is one who saves from hell his natural father, a fact which makes the adoption of an only son undesirable.”†

But Dr. Bhattacharya is against accepting this view. His view will appear from his own words quoted below :

“The argument on which Mr. Mandalik and his followers lay the greatest stress is that founded on the reason assigned in Vashistha’s text. The Rishi says that an only son should not be given because he is for the perpetuation of lineage. Applying to this the Hetumannigadadhikarana as he calls it, Mr. Mandalik arrives at the conclusion that the prohibition as to the adoption of an only son has no legal force. But his reading of the Adhikarana is inaccurate ; and not only is his translation of it misleading, but his conclusion does not follow from his premises.

Rules, which contain recommendatory clauses, are, no doubt, generally optional. But no one who has the least knowledge of the subject would say that they are always so. The संयोगवृत्त्यवस्थाया explained in p. 61 ante, clearly shows that a rule or law may contain a recommendatory clause and yet be absolutely binding.”‡

But we do not understand how Dr. Bhattacharya applies the two principles simultaneously. In the Hetumannigadadhikarana the Samyogaprthaktva Nayaya forms the basis of the Purvapaksa. So in the Nyayasudha

† Karmamimansa, p. 100.

‡ Bhattacharya’s Hindu Law, p. p. 177-78a.

the passage beginning with 'यदादि' of the Vartika is introduced with, these remarks: *इदं सर्वं वादस्तु यदेनायं पूर्वपक्षः, न वैयर्थ्यहेतुर्देन।* "This Purvapaksa assumes both reason and commendation, and not reason only." This *prima facie* conclusion has certainly been given up in arriving at the final conclusion. So, it is not reasonable to assert, on the ground of the *Samyoga-prthaktwa* maxim, that there are both a reason as well as a commendation. As it has been decided in the case of the passage, 'नेन यत्नं सिद्धते,' that it is a mere commendation, so, in the passage under discussion, we shall find a commendation only, and no injunction. So, the attempt, made by Dr. Bhattacharya, for supporting the existence of an injunction by applying the *Samyogaprthaktwa* maxim even after admitting that it is a case of *Hetumannigadadhikarana*, has not been a well-considered one.

Dr. Bhattacharya further observes: "The texts which prohibit the adoption of an only son are negative injunctions, which must be treated as exceptional clauses in the texts that enjoin adoption by sonless persons, and not as independent precepts. If they were really independent precepts of an optional nature, then a sonless person could either adopt or not adopt an only son as he pleased."* Dr. Bhattacharya adduces this argument, because he has all along treated the negative clause as a *Paryudasa*. But we have discussed this question at great length and have shewn that it is a negative injunction, and not a *Paryudasa*. So we are unable to attach any weight to this argument. Let us next see how Mr. K. L.

Sarkar has dealt with this matter. His view will be found in the lines quoted below :

"Some argue, as I already stated, that the statement of a reason vitiates the Vidhi in support of which the reason is stated. If this were so, then, in the present case, not only the exception would go out, but even the general rule laying down the power of the parents to give away their sons. I have shown to you that there is no valid basis for the proposition that the statement of a reason vitiates a rule in support of which the reason is stated. I have shown that the maxim, called 'the 'Drishta Adhikarana,' the 3rd Adhikarana of the third chapter of the first book of Jaimini, a corrupt reason invalidates a Vidhi, and not an indifferent far less a good reason. I have also shown to you that by the Hetubad nigada Adhikarana the reason stated is not to be taken as a condition precedent of the Vidhi, it is to be treated no more than as a mere recital. Thus the proposition prohibiting the adoption of an only son, cannot be treated as a nullity because a reason is stated for it. The question, however, yet remains whether the particular character of the reason stated in this case for the exception does not reduce to a nullity the exception itself. The reason stated is that an only son is required to continue the line of ancestors of the family in which he has been born ; this reason is not corrupt reason within the meaning of the Drshtahetu Adhikarana." *

Mr. Mandalik has said that, according to the Hetumat maxim, all texts supported by the assignment of a reason

* K. L. Sarkar's Mimamsa Rules P. 453, 54

are to be deemed as Arthavadas, and Mr. K. L. Sarkar comes to a conclusion that this view (of Mr. Mandalik) is not correct because the *Drstahetu* maxim is not applicable to all such cases. One may like to know if there is any connexion between the two principles. It can by no means be said that, according to the *Hetumannigada* maxim, only those texts should be treated as Arthavadas to which corrupt reasons are assigned. In the example, “शुर्वे च कुर्वीति, तेन ह्यन्नं दियते।”, a connexion is established between the winnowing basket and the act of offering, and the instrumentality of the basket, so far as food is concerned, is wanted to be assigned as its reason. Because Shurpa is instrumental in preparing food, therefore, the offerings are to be made with it. One will at once notice that this is no earthly reason at all. So it must be admitted that this case is not fit for the application of the *Drstahetu* maxim. Hence, if Mr. Sarkar is of opinion that the *Hetumannigada* maxim applies to those cases only where the reasons are known to be corrupt, we shall not be able to support him. The *Drstahetu* maxim is cited only in those cases where the authoritativeness (प्रामाण्य) of a particular text is in question, but it is never cited in a case where we are to determine whether a particular text is a *Vidhi* or an *Arthavada*. The two cases do not touch each other. Hence, it is not reasonable to hold that the difficulty, which was caused by an application of the *Hetuman-nigada* [maxim, can be removed by avoiding the application of the *Drstahetu* maxim. Thus we see that the arguments adduced by Dr. Bhattacharya and Mr. K. L. Sarkar for refu-

ting the view of Mr. Mandalik are not sufficient, and and that the view of Mr. Mandalik remains still uncontroverted.

Still, we are not prepared to follow Mr. Mandalik. In the first place we must ascertain to which text Mr. Mandalik applies the Hetumat maxim. Does he mean to 'show that the text 'न त्वेक' etc, is an Arthavada, or that the text 'सहि सन्नाय' etc" is so? To the former, the maxim cannot apply, for it does not contain any word denoting reason. In the example cited in the Adhikarana itself, the text, " 'तेन चन्नं क्रियते' which contains the word हि forms the matter for discussion, and not the text 'शूर्पेण जुहोति'. In the second text the word हि is found no doubt, but we must know one thing more. It has been clearly propounded in the Bhāṣya that the inevitability of an option is the only bar to accepting the reason. If the fact that the Shurpa is an instrument for preparing food is the cause of its being used as a sacrificial instrument, then any article, such as a ladle, a pot, or a pan, which is an instrument for preparing food, may be used as an instrument for offering oblations at our option; and then, the use of Shurpa which is mentioned in the creative injunction will not be compulsory. Dr. Bhattacharya explains this clearly in the following lines: "The result of the Hetubannigadadhikarana is that the reason given cannot be taken to extend the scope of the text, so as to support the doctrine that not only the winnowing basket, but all the other instruments for preparing rice, have to be used also. It is a general principle of interpretation that one

Utpatti Vidhi, or original injunction of the *Shastras*, must always be taken to be so worded that there may be no mistake as to its meaning; and the words used in it must therefore be taken in their usual sense, without extending or narrowing their meaning. A reason given in support of one *Utpatti Vidhi* cannot be treated a reason when such a view may affect the interpretation of the text. In such a case the reason given must be regarded according to *Shabara Swami* as having for its object only *Stuti* or commendation.* So, we see that in the case of *Shurpa*, the only apprehension is that if many articles are regarded as fit to be instruments for offering oblations, an option must take place which will reduce the strictness of the original injunction. But the present case is quite a different one, because, here, there is no room for an option. Here, the perpetuation of the lineage is put forward as the reason for not making the gift. Any son, and particularly an eldest son may be regarded as able to perpetuate the lineage. But there can be no choice between the gift of an eldest son and that of an only son, for he who is the father of an eldest son can not be the father of an only son at the same time. So, there is no possibility of extending the scope of the negative clause by reason of an option.

Thus, it becomes clear that the text, “*उत्तम पुत्रेण*” does not come within the purview of the *Hetumat* maxim. So, the passage need not be regarded as an *Arthavada*, but as one containing a reason. But, on the other hand, we do not gain anything by supposing

* *Bhattacharya's Hindu Law* P. 178.

that there is such a reason assigned here as has been indicated above. We may rather suppose that the text 'स हि सन्तानाय पूर्वेषाम्' is itself an injunction. We have said before that it can be construed in a different way. We can construe it as "पूर्वेषां स सन्तानाय भवति" "He belongs to his forefathers and exists for perpetuation." In this way the text may be regarded as laying down that the fore-fathers have a right to an only son. This idea is a peculiar one, and, as such, it is fit to be contained in an injunction ; otherwise, what is the good of emphatically asserting a thing (perpetuation of lineage) which is too well-known. This construction is consistent with the previous text which forbids the gift of an only son ;—an only son must neither be given nor accepted because he is a property of his fore-fathers. In this construction the word 'हि' is used in its ordinary sense, and is not meaningless.

It is not a fact that the Mimamsakas invariably recognise all those texts as Arthavadas in which a word denoting a reason is found. For instance, we may take the text "न ह्यत्र अनुयाजा ईज्यन्ते ।" "Because the Anuyaja offerings are not to be made here." The text with reference to which this reason is assigned is चतुर्जुह्वां गृह्णाति "Take the oblation four times in the sacrificial ladle." Here the first text states that the non-performance of the Anuyaja offerings is the reason for taking the oblation four times. In the Nyayasudha it is so explained in the Hetumannigadadhikarana, "चतुर् गृहीतानि आज्यानि भवन्ति न ह्यत्र अनुयाजा ईज्यन्ते—इत्यादयः परमार्थहेतवः"* "The oblations are

* Nyayasudha P. 82

to be taken four times. The passages नयन etc. are true reasons." So, we see that there are passages which are recognised as containing true reasons. It should also be noticed here that the text prohibiting the gift of an only son will remain unaffected even though we recognise the proposition "न हि मन्नाय etc., as an Arthavada. In the case of Shurpa the proposition वेदोक्तं विदितं is recognised as an Arthavada, but the text मन्वेन जुहोति retains its injunctive character all the same, and the use of Shurpa is compulsory owing to this injunction. So, even an application of the Hetumat maxim will not reduce the negative text into a recommendation. Mr. Mandalik has made an initial mistake in not correctly ascertaining the effect of the application of the Hetumat maxim. He has not looked into the fact that it applies only to the proposition that contains the reason, and that its effect is to reduce that text only into an Arthavada or a mere recital. It has been an error on the part of Mr. Mandalik to suppose that it affects any other neighbouring text. Prof. Keith also has committed the same mistake.

We have shown above, that the text, न हि मन्नाय, may be treated as an injunction or an Arthavada. The Hetumat maxim is not applicable to this text; but even if it be taken for granted that the said maxim applies here, there is not the slightest doubt that it will not touch the other text. नैकं पुत्रं etc.

MITAKSARA TEXTS.

We find that Mr. Mandalik, Mr. Golap Chandra Sarkar and others, have on the authority of the passage, दानुर्यं

प्रतिषेधः (the prohibition regards the giver) of the Mitaksara, come to the conclusion that the adoption of an only son or of an eldest son is valid, because the prohibition affects the giver only, and not the adoption. The authority of the Mitaksara regarding adoption is respected throughout India, and its view is regarded as authoritative. So, we ought to examine here the prohibitory passages of the Mitaksara from the Mimamsa point of view.

Those passages are as follow :

“आपद्ग्रहणाद् अनापदि न देयः । दातुरयं

प्रतिषेधः ।

तथा एकपुत्रो न देयः ।

तथा अनेकपुत्रसदभावे ज्येष्ठो न देयः ।”

By specifying distress it is intimated that the son should not be given unless there be distress. This prohibition regards the giver. Similarly, an only son should not be given. Similarly, though more than one son exist, the first born should not be given.....”

The remark दातुरयं प्रतिषेधः is supplemented in the Balambhatti with the words “न प्रतिग्रहीतुः” does not regard the taker.

“It expressly says” says Mr. Golap Chandra Sarker “that the prohibition regards the giver, and necessarily implies that it does not regard the taker, and, therefore, the gift is valid in law.”* The Dattaka- mimamsa ex-

plains the passage by saying that the taker also is implied by it. The first view is that, if the prohibited gift is made, the giver will commit a sin, whereas according to the second view the sin will affect the taker also. But neither of the two views indicates that the adoption will be invalid. It is for this reason that the passage is quoted in the Mayukha with the remark “न शक्यं;” If this prohibition is not शक्यं it may be शक्यं, as the two terms are usually contrary. A prohibition is regarded as Purusartha in a case where the commission of the prohibited act even during the performance of a sacrifice, does not vitiate the result of the sacrifice, but separately gives rise to a sin; whereas in a case of Kratwartha prohibition the commission of the prohibited act at the time of the sacrifice, will spoil the result*. So the opinion of the author of the Mitaksara appears to be that the performance of a gift or an acceptance for effecting an adoption, even in a case where it is prohibited will give rise to a sin but will not make the adoption invalid.

It may appear, according to the view stated above that all prohibited cases of adoption are valid, because the violation of a prohibition may render one's act improper but not invalid. But in fact it is not so. In a case of prohibition we are to judge as to what particular point the prohibition is directed. In the above case a restriction is imposed with regard to the proper time for adoption, and its result concerns only the agent; but in a case where a restriction is made with regard to the object of the gift, a violation will make the adoption

* Mīmamsā adhikāraṇa IV.1.1.

invalid. As an example we can take the next item, viz the case of the adoption of an only son. Here the prohibition is in respect of an only son who is the object of the gift, and hence the adoption of an only son will be invalid. The word तया is used twice in the above extract and is meant to connect the three prohibitions that are derived by the author of the Mitaksara by combining the texts of Yajnavalkya and Vashistha. The three prohibitions respectively are 'अनापदि न देयः', 'एकपुत्रो न देयः' and 'न्येष्टपुत्रो न देयः'. Besides these three, the word तया does not connect any thing else. Therefore, the expression "दातुरयं प्रतिषेधः" has no forward reference. So the exact meanings of the three clauses would be—a son is to be given only in time of distress, even in time of distress one who is not an only son is to be given, one who is not the eldest son is to be given. But it is to be noticed that all these prohibitions are not of the same character. If a father gives away his son when there is no distress he will commit a sin because the word, distress, qualifies the giver (the giver who is in distress). But if an only son is not an object of gift the prohibition attaches to the son and not to the father. The same argument applies to the case of the eldest son also. So, when it is said that something is not to be given we can make a distinction between two sets of cases. Where the prohibition affects the giver the adoption will be improper but not invalid, but where the prohibition regards the object of the gift the adoption will be invalid. .

"The first rule," says Mr. Golap Chandra Sarkar, "is

undoubtedly one of moral obligation, for it expressly says that the prohibition regards the giver, and necessarily implies that it does not regard the taker, and therefore the gift is valid in law." We can, as we have shown above, accept this conclusion as correct. But we are unable to conform to the view of the learned author as expressed in the extract quoted below: "It follows, therefore, that the second prohibition is a rule of the same character as the first, for in no other respect can there be a similarity between them. And for the same reason, the third rule also must be of the same description."* As regards these remarks of Mr. Sarkar we must say that they do not rest on a strong basis. It must not be forgotten that the above three clauses of the Mitaksara (*वसति न क्षाः* etc) are not prohibitions imposed by the author of the Mitaksara, but they are simply the statements of the prohibitions implied by the text of Yajnavalkya, combined with other texts. So these three clauses represent the corresponding negative sides of the three restrictive injunctions which are derived by combining the texts, viz,—the gift is to be made only in distress, one other than an only son is to be given and one other than the eldest son is to be given. The negative counterpart of a restrictive injunction is a prohibition proper. So the three negative clauses of the Mitaksara are prohibitions proper. It is a well settled conclusion with the Mimamsakas that if an act which is prohibited by an implied prohibition, is performed, the action will not produce the desired result. To

* Law of Adoption P, 287.

illustrate this rule we may cite the injunction ब्रौह्मन् वदन्ति "Husk the barley-corn" which has been discussed under the Sutra "तानि द्वेयं मुख्यप्रधान-कर्माणि" and which is regarded as a typical case of restrictive injunction. According to this injunction the sacrificer is required to remove the chaff by husking. It has been held that if the sacrificer adopts any other process for removing the chaff, such as picking out the grains with the nails of the hands, etc., the grains will not be fit for use in the sacrifice, and consequently the whole performance will be defective, and will not produce the desired result. It cannot be said that the grains are grains, and it does not matter whether we take them out by the one process or the other, for the very function of a restrictive injunction is to restrict our choice. Had the alternative courses that are excluded by a restrictive injunction been still open to us, there would have been no necessity for recognising a particular class of injunctions as restrictive injunctions in the Mimamsa. There is not the slightest doubt that the Mitaksara treats the above texts of Yajñavalkya and Vashistha as giving restrictive injunctions, and so, if an adoption does not take place strictly in accordance with the injunctions, it will be invalid.

But another thing also is to be taken into consideration. Restrictive injunctions may also be divided into two classes—Kratvartha and Purusartha. The example ब्रौह्मन् अवदन्ति illustrates the former, and the example "प्राङ्मुखोऽन्नानि भुञ्जीत," "at the time of taking meals

* Mimamsa sutra II. 1. 6.

sit with your face towards the east," illustrates the latter. We have said before, that a violation of an injunction of the former class spoils a sacrifice, whereas a violation of an injunction of the other description, produces some unseen demerit in the agent.* Now if the prohibition "अग्निं न दत्तः" of the Mitaksara is regarded as Purusartha, its corresponding restrictive injunction "अग्निं दत्तं न दत्तः" must also be regarded as Purusartha. The consequence will be that the act of giving, whether it is performed in time of distress or not, will simply concern the giver and not the validity of the adoption. But we have shown at the outset that all the texts clearly state that दत्त produces पुण्य and not any other unseen merit, and therefore, it cannot be said that the act of giving has nothing to do with the validity of adoption. So, a contradiction takes place. The only means of avoiding this contradiction is to admit that the gift is both Kratwartha and Purusartha. The effect of this will be that the gift will not only concern the giver but the validity of adoption also. But if we admit that the injunction relating to gift is both Kratwartha and Purusartha, we must at the same time admit that its corresponding prohibition अग्निं न दत्तः (which is stated in the Mitaksara), is also both Kratwartha and Purusartha. The observation of the Mayukha, न दत्तं may be explained as 'not Kratwartha only but Purusartha also.'

According to this view, if a son is given when there is no distress, the adoption will be invalid. Similarly the adoption of an only son or of an eldest son will be

* Nyayaratnamala.

invalid. Mr. Golap chandra Sarkar has taken a good deal of trouble to show that by the word, *सम* Vijnaneshwara means nothing but similarity. The word can denote similarity if the view just expressed above, is accepted ; but the result will be exactly the reverse of what Mr. Sarkar has propounded.

Let us summarise here the conclusions of the above discussions. From the statements of the Mitaksara two views may be gathered. The first is that even in a case where the gift and the acceptance are prohibited, the adoption may be valid if the prohibition regards the giver only, but that it will not be valid if the prohibition regards the object of the gift. The second view is that even where the prohibition regards the giver only, the adoption will be invalid. So, we see that though there may be a dispute regarding the validity of the adoption of a child given at a time when there is no distress, the invalidity of the adoption of an only son is quite undisputed

THE END.

